Police and Justice Bill

I wish to speak in strong support of the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, to preserve the current status of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons. First, I pay tribute to the work done week by week, quietly, and with non-partisan determination, by those at the inspectorate who provide a detailed, objective and expert assessment of our prisons and immigration detention facilities. The Government’s plans to subsume it within a conglomerate of criminal justice inspectorates are misguided. I come to that conclusion after listening to the debates that have taken place on this matter over the past months, both within and outside Parliament. I have tested the views put forward by both sides of the argument against a set of questions that I believe any Government must consider when they plan administrative reorganisations on the grand scale. I shall set out some of those questions. Is the organisation functioning effectively now? What is it doing wrong that can be remedied only by structural change? What is the added value that it will gain from structural change that cannot be gained in any other way? What will be lost by change? Is that loss critical to the long-term effectiveness of the organisation? Is there an alternative route to improving the function of the organisation—one that on this occasion would not have the disadvantages of the Government’s proposals? The debate today has been a devastating critique of the Government’s plans, put forward from around the Committee. We have heard a range of views explaining why the Government’s plans are deeply flawed and why they have failed to pass the test put by the questions that I have considered. Subsuming the prisons inspectorate within a wider parent body is inappropriate. It would significantly damage its effectiveness. There are alternative, preferable options for improving its operation within the criminal justice family, without damage to the prisons inspectorate itself. In opening, the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, drew our attention to the inelegantly titled Option 7 in the policy document. The Government have consistently recognised that the Inspectorate of Prisons is a beacon of excellence. It simply does not make sense to subsume it within a system that the Government have said is not operating as effectively as the independent prisons inspectorate does. Why would people of the current and past calibre of chief inspector wish to be deputy to a new portmanteau chief inspector when they cannot speak out independently or have independent access to Ministers? The Government have argued that the weakness of the current system is that the criminal justice system acts in silence. Of course it is important that the inspectorates have a dialogue, but there are perfectly sensible ways in which inspections could proceed effectively without combining the inspectorates. When the chief inspectors of the various services got together with Ofsted in 1999 and asked the Government to fund a secretariat that would co-ordinate joint inspections and process joint inspection reports, the Government refused to provide funding. That is a route which would provide a solution for the Government. We have deep concerns about Clause 30(3), which states that, "““the Chief Inspector shall have regard to such aspects of government policy as the responsible ministers may direct””." It is clear that that would prevent the chief inspector speaking out against and criticising the Government in certain circumstances. The Government’s response from Fiona Mactaggart in another place was to say: "““Ministers will not have the power to direct the chief inspector other than where a statute provides for it””.—[Official Report, Commons Standing Committee D, 28/3/06; col. 246.]" That is exactly the point of Clause 30(3). This statute gives Ministers a potentially wide power of intervention. Any assurance that a Minister currently in office would not use the power of course would be accepted, but it cannot bind future Secretaries of State and Administrations. We really do not think that this is a sufficient measure, and there have to be guarantees in the statute. The independence of the Inspectorate of Prisons is paramount. In another place the Government maintained that this can be achieved by creating a statutory office of the inspector, but we simply do not see why that in itself would guarantee the independence of the position. Many statutory offices are created by legislation, but that does not necessarily mean that they are independent. The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, also referred to the important matter of the UN convention in his opening remarks. I read with interest the statement made by Anne Owers on 28 June. She expressed her particular concern that the Joint Committee on Human Rights and other international experts do not believe that the current provisions for the new inspectorate will be compatible with the optional protocol to the UN Convention on Torture which came into effect last month. We share that concern. In conclusion, I argue that the Government’s proposals pose significant risks to the future independence and excellence of the prisons inspectorate. Indeed, the Minister in another place, Fiona Mactaggart, recognised that there are risks. She maintained that the Government had, "““put a lot of energy into the design of the inspectorate to minimise those risks””.—[Official Report, Commons Standing Committee D, 28/3/06; col. 252.]" But I argue that significant risks remain, risks that must not be taken, which is why Clause 28 should not stand part of the Bill. My hope is that the Government will take the opportunity of the Summer Recess to think again on this matter and come back on Report and agree with noble Lords that the right thing to do is amend this Bill and thus preserve the independence and current status of the inspectorate.