Police and Justice Bill

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Linklater, for moving the amendment and giving us the benefit of her thoughts on this subject. It was a speech I have heard before, but no less interesting for that. The points contained in it are very interesting indeed. Ultimately, however, I do not find myself in great sympathy with the amendment, though I certainly understand the range of issues, and I appreciate the committed tone and the plea that come with it. The noble Lord, Lord Judd, in supporting the noble Baroness, put his finger on what is one of the more important issues for me: the desirability—indeed, the need—for us to express solidarity in society with the victims of crime, particularly of the sort of anti-social behaviour we have been discussing this afternoon. I acknowledge that there are difficulties, particularly in dealing with juveniles who can have their offensive behaviour glorified as a result of this process. I accept that there is concern about that. I also understand that there are times when the sort of publicity that some court cases involving young people give rise to can have a damaging effect and has the potential in some cases to make it harder for that behaviour to be addressed. We have to balance that against the potential for greater disorder by those in breach of anti-social behaviour orders, and the nuisance, aggravation and disturbance in communities that some of those individuals can create. It is unfortunate that in some senses we lack crisper statistical data with regard to the outcome of publicity, but then it is a difficult area in which to make a value judgment. It is also a difficult subject on which to collect hard data. I come to these issues with what I would describe as a rather common-sense approach. I live in a very pleasant area that is not far from the seafront, but which is adjacent to a part of my city that people sometimes see as a harbinger of particular sorts of crime, although that is actually an unfair reflection. What I often get from our local community is a claim that historically insufficient attention has been given to issues of anti-social behaviour, and a plea for relief. Part of that is a desire to see that young people are not only brought to book but are seen to be brought to book and are clearly and visibly identified in a way that is sensitive to community needs and aspirations and community protection. That is the nub of this whole issue. I want to make it clear too how the amendment would affect our legislative approach. As the noble Baroness well understands, it would simply repeal those sections of the Crime and Disorder Act that remove the automatic imposition of reporting restrictions but which give the courts discretion in the matter. That is the important point. That discretion operates in proceedings against juveniles who are in breach of ASBOs, or which relate to the making of ASBOs against juveniles on conviction of criminal offences. It has to be said that publicity of these proceedings is often an integral part of local agencies’ efforts to tackle anti-social behaviour; there is no question of that. But there is no naming and shaming. ASBOs are made in open court and unless the court imposes restrictions, the media are entitled to report them, even if they involve young people. But it is for the court to decide whether to impose reporting restrictions. The courts recognise that these cases sometimes, perhaps often, need to be reported for two reasons: first, to let the community and the victims of anti-social behaviour know that something positive has been done to stop the abuse—that is important because communities need to have confidence in the criminal justice system—and, secondly, to publicise the prohibitions so that communities can help to enforce the order. Publicity is not aimed at punishing or shaming the individual. We need to remember at all times that the anti-social behaviour of juveniles and, indeed, adults—despite the statistics that are quoted we need to remember that adults are most subject to ASBOs—will have had a serious and lasting effect on other people’s lives. As I said at the outset, the needs of such individuals need to be very carefully balanced with those of others in the community who have a right to be protected. However, the court can still impose reporting restrictions if it believes that the situation warrants it. The court will have had the opportunity to consider very carefully the circumstances of the individual—their background and any mental health problems from which they are suffering—because there is an absolute requirement on it to have regard to the welfare of the child or the young person. The existing legal framework—of which we have had several years’ experience—is working well. Within that framework local authorities have a duty under various pieces of legislation to carry out assessments before the court comes to a conclusion. Support will be given if it is required. We always recommend a needs assessment to ensure that support services are in place. Although I heard what the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, said about the percentage of parenting orders, I would want to interrogate the data further before I passed judgment because they do not describe the full picture. Ultimately we need to remember that the sole purpose of the order is not just the young person’s welfare. The harm that anti-social behaviour can inflict on an individual, a community and a locality has to be measured as well. If this Government have achieved one thing in the law and order field, it is to raise up the agenda and in people’s minds the importance of tackling anti-social behaviour in a precise way as it affects people in their homes and communities. I believe that we have the balance about right. I have heard the arguments and have listened to individual cases being recited, but, on balance, we need to protect communities and people in their homes and make sure that lives which have previously been disrupted and, in many instances, frankly, made hell, are properly respected. So I have ultimately come to the conclusion that we must reject the amendment.