Fraud Bill [Lords]

I hear what the Solicitor-General says, but I still do not entirely understand the point. I do not want to detain Second Reading by trying to reach that comprehension, so perhaps we can explore it in Committee. All those cases suggested a duty that could be expressed in those terms, so the idea that there may be some other context in which a court could be persuaded that a person had a reasonable expectation of that duty without it comprising a duty seems a very nice point, of which I would need some persuasion before embracing it. Clause 5 gives definitions of gain and loss and, again, we can usefully explore those points in Committee. Subsection (3) notes:"““‘Gain’ includes a gain by keeping what one has””." So how would the law apply, for instance, in the case of overpayment of a sum of money that one has received in good faith, such as a child tax credit? Again, that is something that we can explore at a later stage. On clause 6, the point has already been raised about mens rea in the case of possession of an article and we heard warm words in support of conjurors, who will be able to go about their legal business, using their paraphernalia without fear of arrest. I am not absolutely sure that that is what the Bill says, although I accept the assurances of the Solicitor-General. At what point does a conjuring trick become a dishonest act? The three-card trick seems to be the turning point at which a conjuring trick starts to become a confidence trick. I shall be interested to know how the definition will work in such cases. The Solicitor-General was at pains to say that it would not be an absolute offence, but there is at least an intimation that it is, because the Bill does not specify a statutory defence. I am less worried about conjurors, however, and more worried about unwitting agents of fraudsters. There are many examples of a person carrying forged credentials—forged documents or letterheads—believing that they are acting lawfully and appropriately for an enterprise when in fact they are not. It worries me that they might unwittingly find themselves in possession of an article that was being used and had been produced for the purpose of fraud, but which they were not aware was being used or had been produced for the purpose of fraud. We need to be clear about the defence that could be used in those circumstances. We do not want to create a defence that is too easily used by someone who is probably guilty of an offence but who wishes to use their ignorance as a means of avoiding prosecution. We must also be careful to ensure that innocent people are not found guilty of an offence when they are genuinely ignorant of the purpose to which the article in their possession could be used.