Children and Adoption Bill

I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman. The representations that I have received state that the Bill includes the paramountcy principle. There are concerns that the paramountcy principle is being undermined by existing case law and practice within the family courts, and we therefore need to reinforce clause 7 to ensure not only that risk assessments are conducted, but that the courts are required to act upon such risk assessments when they make decisions in difficult cases. Most children’s charities argue for a further strengthening of the Bill, because they know that the paramountcy principle has already been undermined by case law precedents. For example, in re O in 1995, which concerned the imposition of conditions for contact, it was stated that contact is"““almost always in the interest of the child””." It was hoped that court practice on child contact and domestic violence would improve after the judgment in re L, V, M & H in 2000, which stated that the courts should have a heightened awareness of the effects of domestic violence on children and that they should make findings of fact and minimise risk. That judgment also upheld the ruling that contact is almost always in the best interests of the child. Both case law and the inspectorate of court administration report on the practice of CAFCASS indicate that there is a strong presumption of contact despite the existence of the paramountcy principle, which is supposed to be the court’s priority. The inspectorate of court administration report on CAFCASS’s activities in such cases states that"““No formal risk assessment was undertaken in any of the observed interviews””." The report also notes"““a worrying lack of attention to safety planning””" and that"““the nature of domestic abuse is not sufficiently understood by most CAFCASS practitioners””." The inspectorate of court administration report identifies the strong presumption of contact as the fundamental reason for the failure to protect children. CAFCASS officers admit that it is difficult for them to challenge the strong presumption of contact, even when there are concerns about the continuing impact of abuse on a child. Although the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham does not regard the report as significant, many hon. Members do, and it should make us think carefully about what the Bill does to facilitate and enforce contact. Are the safeguards adequate to ensure that contact is safe before contact orders are enforced? I shall pray in aid the Prime Minister’s reply to my recent parliamentary question:"““We of course are concerned by the finding of the Inspectorate of Court Administration report that there is such a strong presumption by the courts that there must be contact with both parents that concerns about violence and children’s safety are overridden. We remain utterly committed to the principle that the welfare of the child should be paramount in the consideration of the courts. We recognise that more needs to be done to address domestic violence concerns””.—[Official Report, 2 November 2005; Vol. 438, c. 828.]" As I have said, the amendment by the other place is extremely welcome, but it does not require the court to take that advice into consideration, and the Bill should state that that is a requirement. Furthermore, we must examine pre-contact risk assessment, which must be considered throughout all proceedings, including enforcement proceedings. When enforcement takes place, we must ensure that there is a requirement for a further risk assessment should it be necessary to safeguard the care and welfare of the child. We know that the most dangerous points for children and their parents in domestic violence cases are the points of separation and of contact. In the interests of children, it is therefore vital that we not only say that a risk assessment may be taken into account, but require it to be done before enforcement, because the danger is that domestic violence has taken place after the parents first had contact with the courts. We owe children nothing less than that. The Bill requires a further provision on the voice of children. The Adoption and Children Act 2002 includes a requirement that children’s views should be taken into account, but as I understand it, that provision has not been enforced. We should include a provision in this Bill to enforce section 122 of the 2002 Act, which introduced separate representation for children in family proceedings.