I rise to support wholeheartedly the amendment that stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve). Part 3 goes to the heart of what I consider to be a most reprehensible and devious piece of legislation proposed by this Government.
The Government seek to portray part 3 as an innocuous measure aimed at modestly increasing or, if you like, streamlining the powers of the Assembly. Were that indeed the case I have no doubt that neither I nor my right hon. and hon. Friends would have any problems with it and we would not be taking up the time of the House. The Assembly is now a fact of life in Wales. It may not yet be working entirely satisfactorily but it is part of the fabric of government in Wales and we all have a duty to make it work as best it can. However, part 3 is not a modest measure. It is a measure aimed at conferring primary legislative competence on the Assembly on a piecemeal basis. It is therefore, by any measure, a major constitutional innovation which, if enacted, will transfer a significant degree of legislative competence from this place to another legislative body.
That such transfer is, as I say, on a piecemeal basis through Orders in Council does not render it any less significant. The fact is that, over time, more and more primary powers will be ceded by Parliament to the Assembly, subject of course always to the executive filtration process of the Secretary of State, which, like my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) I find particularly repugnant.
It is generally agreed that the convention that has developed in this country is that if primary powers are ceded by Parliament to another body, a referendum should first take place in which the will of the people is consulted. That is what happened in Wales in 1997; that is what should happen now. The Government know that. Part 4 provides for such a referendum and that referendum must take place before Assembly Acts may be passed, but Assembly Measures will be no less primary legislation, so the question is: why will the Government not give the people of Wales the simple right to vote on the proposals in a referendum? The answer is simple: they know that they would lose.
The Secretary of State has already acknowledged that there is no consensus in Wales for more primary powers for the Assembly. On 15 June last year, he said:"““we will call a referendum only if there is a consensus for one. There is no consensus for one now, and it would be lost.””—[Official Report, 15 June 2005; Vol. 435, c. 266.]"
and recently the right hon. Gentleman said that neither he nor the Welsh First Minister was"““in the business of calling referendums we are going to lose.””"
That is all well and good, but if the Secretary of State fears that the people of Wales would vote against the transfer of primary powers to the Assembly, why is he so insistent on inflicting those powers on the people of Wales, whether or not they want them?
The suspicion must be—I hope that it is not unfair—that some internal Labour party tension is prompting the proposals in part 3, which enable the transfer of powers to the Assembly while preserving the illusion of power remaining at Westminster, whereas, in fact, the power remains in the hands of the Secretary of State for Wales. The fact that the proposals constitute such a device was acknowledged by Lord Richard when he gave evidence to the Welsh Affairs Committee. What he said has been quoted before, but it deserves to be quoted again. He said:"““Let’s be frank about it, it is a device to avoid having to come to Westminster and ask for primary powers to be formally devolved. It is quite an interesting device. . . . Westminster can say they have not devolved primary legislative powers, but depending on the way in which the Order in Council procedure is used, it could in effect be a concealed grant of almost a direct legislative competence down to Cardiff.””"
In fact, it is more than almost; it is the transfer of a direct legislative competence to Cardiff without first consulting the people of Wales in a referendum.
That is reprehensible, and made all the more so by the fact that control of the whole procedure resides in the Executive and not in this House. The Minister shakes his head, but it is true: control rests with the Secretary of State for Wales, not with this House. The proposals represent a fraud on the people of Wales and the electorate of the entire United Kingdom. If the people of Wales are to have more devolution—not an ignoble aspiration on the part of those who want it—we should be entirely satisfied that that is what they want. Part 3 is wholly unnecessary; it is in the Bill purely and simply to serve the internal interests of the Labour party.
I say that we should proceed immediately to part 4 and consult the people of Wales now, through a referendum, on whether they do indeed want more legislative competence to be handed down to Cardiff. If so, we must abide by their decision and hand over that power. If not, we must equally respect their decision. The proposal is a three-card trick—an absolute disgrace to the Labour party. Perhaps the absence of Labour Members indicates the shame that they feel. What is proposed is an illegitimate exercise—an attempt to usurp the powers of this place. It is wholly reprehensible and the amendment should be supported.
Government of Wales Bill
Proceeding contribution from
David Jones
(Conservative)
in the House of Commons on Tuesday, 28 February 2006.
It occurred during Debate on bills on Government of Wales Bill.
Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
443 c176-8 
Session
2005-06
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