Government of Wales Bill

No. I am sorry, but I need to make progress and have already given way to the hon. Gentleman. If Parliament agrees that enhanced powers on a particular matter should be conferred on the Assembly, and once the Order in Council has been made, the Assembly can deliver new made-in-Wales legislation in relation to that matter. The new laws will be called Assembly measures, and the Assembly’s arrangements for scrutinising and approving measures will closely follow the procedures used in this House for considering primary legislation. Although the detail will be a matter for the Assembly itself to determine, the Bill requires that the Assembly provides for three stages of consideration on the principle, detail and the final text of proposed measures, which are analogous to Second Reading, Committee and Third Reading. That reflects an important principle underlying the Order-in-Council procedure. The proposed powers to be conferred would be bestowed by Parliament not on individual Ministers—not on the Executive—but on an elected legislature, with its own rigorous procedures for scrutiny both of the Executive and of legislative measures. I have discussed this matter with the Chairs of both the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the Constitution Committee of the House of Lords. They agree that there is an important distinction to be made between powers conferred on an elected legislature and those delegated to a Secretary of State. There should therefore not be the same concerns expressed over powers conferred on an elected, accountable law-making body such as the Assembly, with its own scrutiny processes, as have been expressed over powers delegated to Ministers. The Government believe that this new procedure will be of immense benefit to the Assembly Government in enabling them to carry out their functions in the devolved fields of responsibilities. Of the bids for legislation that the Assembly has made over the past six years, the vast majority have been on matters that have excited little or no parliamentary controversy, such as the Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Bill and the Public Audit (Wales) Bill, and all but two of them could have been accommodated under the new streamlined process provided for in this Bill. The exceptions are the demands for the Assembly to have the power to ban hunting and to have control over shop opening times. An additional one may be the request for St. David’s day to be a bank holiday. Those could not be delivered under the Order-in-Council process, as they lie outside the existing devolved settlement. The procedure will give the Assembly much wider flexibility and discretion, while preserving the key pillar of the existing devolution settlement: it is Parliament that will determine the new powers that the Assembly will acquire. Parliament, as ever, remains sovereign. The procedure will also relieve pressures on parliamentary business managers from Assembly bids for Bills. As we have heard, the Opposition suggest that the new Order-in-Council procedure might be used to give the Assembly primary powers through the back door. That is simply not the case, as clause 94 makes abundantly clear. If the Assembly ever attempted to acquire such powers by the back door, I as Secretary of State would block it, so would this House and so would the Lords. It is inconceivable because there is a triple lock to prevent it. Parliament remains in charge. The additional powers offering a more streamlined route for Assembly decision making fall within the settlement endorsed in the 1997 referendum. However, it may prove at some time that even they are still insufficient to address the needs of the people of Wales. The Bill therefore makes provision to confer full primary powers on the Assembly, subject to a referendum. I am proud to be the first Secretary of State for Wales to seek to place primary powers on the statute book. But, as I have explained, it is essential that such a fundamental change to the devolution settlement should first be approved by the people of Wales through a referendum, and it would be hugely damaging to the cause of devolution to move to that stage before there was widespread agreement in Wales. For that reason, the Bill includes a number of safeguards to ensure that there is no premature move towards primary powers. First, the Bill ensures that a referendum would be triggered only if supported by two thirds of all Assembly Members. Secondly, the Bill places a responsibility on the Secretary of State to ensure that a referendum could take place only after adequate public consultation. Finally, a referendum order would require the approval of both Houses of Parliament by affirmative motion and two thirds of all Assembly Members before it could proceed. Taken together, these safeguards will ensure that a strong, multi-party consensus must exist before a referendum can be called—something that is not likely to happen in the near future. These provisions are vital to settle the constitutional debate in Wales. By legislating for primary powers now, we avoid the need for a further Government of Wales Bill. Instead of the constant distraction of endless constitutional argument, this Bill puts primary powers on the statute book awaiting the verdict of the electorate. Instead of being the domain of political and constitutional anoraks, the question of the Assembly’s powers will be in the hands of the Welsh people. Instead of sniping from the sidelines, proponents of primary powers will have to win the argument. Those leading the calls for an early referendum are doing a disservice to the cause of devolution in Wales. To call a referendum on primary powers now, when we know that it would fail, would not only destroy the chance of enhancing the Assembly’s powers, but do terrible damage to devolution itself. Just look at the aftermath of the no vote in 1979, when the prospect of devolution was taken off the agenda for nearly twenty years—a generation. I know that some will say that certain opinion polls show a majority in favour of a Scottish-style Parliament, but I caution them to remember the opinion polls prior to the referendum in 1997, which predicted an overwhelming victory for the yes campaign. The votes did not reflect the headlines in the end, and I believe that the same would be true today. Let me now deal with our proposals to reform the electoral system for the Assembly. In 1998, the Labour Government established the additional member system for elections to the Assembly. Broadly speaking, that electoral system has been a success: it has preserved the strong tradition of individual constituency representation that is fundamental to our democracy while delivering a system of fair votes that has improved democratic accountability in Wales. It has even thrown a life belt to the Welsh Conservative party, although that is not something that I would celebrate. However, although it has worked well in ensuring fair representation in the Assembly, I, as one of the Ministers who took the Bill through the Commons, never imagined the abuses that have resulted. The system as it has operated in Wales has a major weakness. A widespread practice since the Assembly was established has been that candidates who are rejected by a particular constituency have secured back-door election as Assembly Members through the regional list and so have been able to claim to represent the constituency that rejected them. In Clwyd, West in 2003, three of the four defeated candidates were subsequently elected to the Assembly through the regional list. That practice clouds political accountability and denies the voters their right to reject a particular candidate at the ballot box. The change made by the Bill—requiring candidates to choose whether to stand for a constituency or a regional list—will put the voters in charge.