Armed Forces Bill

In reply to the Secretary of State’s justified remark about my absence, may I make it clear that I left the House because I was summoned to the office of my new party leader? There is no announcement resulting from that; I am staying in the same position. I wish to make it clear that no disrespect to the Secretary of State was intended by my leaving a few minutes after an intervention on him. I take a gloomier view of the Bill than the last few speakers, including two distinguished colleagues of mine. As we debate service discipline, it is important to remember that the grinding overstretch resulting from the four major entanglements into which the Government have taken our armed forces and from cuts in their manpower has led to an exodus of experienced people from the armed services, as well as a rise in the services divorce rate. The men and women who will be subject to the measure that we are debating have seen their pensions attacked when the whole of the rest of the public sector have seen their pensions protected. They have seen the burden of proof raised for compensation claims for injuries incurred on service. They have been infuriated by the Saville inquiry and the Northern Ireland (Offences) Bill. Behind the Armed Forces Bill lies an ugly trend towards civilianising the military world. Military life, with its risks, hardships and requirements for stern discipline simply is not comparable to that of civilians. I listened with interest to the hon. Member for South Ribble (Mr. Borrow). He will not mind my saying that he ended on the fence. I share many of the concerns that he expressed. The military world is not the same as the civilian world. It would be wrong to disparage the entire Bill. I understand why we are not opposing Second Reading and there are a number of welcome elements. The service complaints panel strikes the right balance in dealing with issues such as Deepcut. We must not have another Deepcut. I agree with my colleagues’ comments on the tri-service aspect as servicemen increasingly operate in joint units, although there is a question about some of the special requirements of some naval commanding officers, particularly submarine commanders. I welcome the modest expansion of powers for the CO in the Army and Air Force regarding summary hearings for lesser offences. It is that aspect that makes other parts of the Bill so hard to understand. Evidently the Government comprehend, at least in part, the importance of the CO and such powers for maintaining not only discipline, but a sense of continuity and community. There is a unique bond between a commanding officer and his men. The strength of that bond underpins the remarkable feats that the House has come to expect of our servicemen and women. As Lord Boyce said on 14 July in the Lords debate on the legality of the chain of command,"““we interfere with the unique linkage between the commanding officer and his men at our peril.””—[Official Report, House of Lords, 14 July 2005; Vol. 673, c. 1235.]" Why limit that trust now by removing all the powers relating to more serious crimes? We all know why. The Secretary of State made it clear in his speech—the case of Trooper Williams. It is important to remember that that was at a time when there had been a small number of allegations concerning prisoners. It related to something that had happened not in a prison or in a camp, but at a checkpoint in a dangerous area and involved a member of the enemy who was found to be carrying ammunition. The case was initially dismissed by the CO on advice from the Army legal service because of a lack of evidence. The director of the Army legal service then referred it to the Attorney-General for possible trial in the civil courts. After protracted wrangling, the case was dropped by the Crown Prosecution Service following a long delay because of a lack of evidence. The provenance of the case is disturbing, to say the least. In his statement on 7 April, the Attorney-General referred to the fact that"““the commanding officer had ‘dismissed’ the charges against Trooper Williams””" and continued:"““The matter could not, because of the actions of the commanding officer, be dealt with by way of court martial. It was referred to me to consider further action.””—[Official Report, House of Lords, 7 April 2005; Vol. 671, c. WS 92.]" That is in the context of recent remarks by the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, who I see in his place. He stated:"““Discipline is essential, and we depend on service law to enforce it.""A fighting force that cannot obey orders and display self-control in peacetime will not stand up to the much more demanding circumstances of operations.””" In a sense, that is platitudinous. We would all agree with that statement. Did the Minister feel that he had to say it? Does he believe that British troops are less disciplined than other armies in any of the theatres in which they have recently operated? There are indeed a very small number of disturbing incidents involving prisoners in Iraq, but overall I believe our forces are the best disciplined in the world. Yet today they face a brutal enemy and an unprecedented blizzard of investigations and prosecutions—prosecutions brought about by Government policy and in which, in a number of cases, the Attorney-General has played a crucial role from the safety of his office in Whitehall. The Williams case was a protracted, distressing and shameful assault on the reputation of a gallant soldier. It did not happen because his CO had the power to pursue the case but did not do so. It happened because the opinion of the CO was brushed aside in what many in the Army believe—rightly—was a political desire to charge and convict someone amidst all the allegations of human rights abuses in Iraq. Now the Government want to remove the authoritative opinion of the commanding officer, the man on the spot who shares the risks with his soldiers, the man who got it right in the Williams case, and hand that power to the Army legal service. The Government have learned the wrong lesson. They are keeping the bath water and throwing the baby to the wolves. On 24 March—I quoted this in an intervention on the Secretary of State—the Adjutant-General wrote to the Chief of the General Staff and CIC Land, copying his letter to the brigadier, to inform them that he intended to write to the director of Army legal services to ask him to draw the case to the attention of the Attorney-General for the purpose of having resort to his jurisdiction. In that letter, the reason given was:"““With current legal, political and ginger group interest in the deaths if Iraqi civilians during operation telic: our investigation and subsequent failure to offer for prosecution could become a cause celebre for pressure groups, and a significant threat to the military justice system.””" I have no intention of attacking a senior serving officer, but if I were a serving soldier, my blood would run cold if I heard that remark, which was first unearthed by Lord Campbell in July in another place. The situation is being compounded by the International Criminal Court Act 2001, which my party rightly voted against. All hon. Members oppose war crimes, but the wording of the 2001 Act is so vague that senior officers can be held accountable for actions of which they had no knowledge, simply on the ground that they might have taken steps to prevent them. I do not intend to try your patience, Mr. Deputy Speaker, by repeating my recent speech on the workings of the 2001 Act in relation to the case of Colonel Mendonca, which is now sub judice. I ask the courts to take into account the point that the 2001 Act works against the chain of command. The long-standing leadership principle in the British Army that commanders delegate authority to their sub-commanders, let them get on with the job, trust them whenever they can and support them if things go wrong and they believe that their sub-commanders have behaved reasonably, which takes considerable moral courage. The ghastly news that General Peter Wall, who is a fine soldier by any standards, is being investigated for supporting one of his subordinates in such a situation under very difficult circumstances underlines the ghastliness of the 2001 Act. Turning to the recent case against paratroopers from the 3rd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment, the case against seven members and ex-members was dropped, because the judge had concerns about the adequacy of the evidence and the integrity of the Iraqi witnesses—reportedly, the case cost £10 million of taxpayers’ money. In the Lords debate on the legality of the chain of command, Lord Inge highlighted the fact that British lawyers were hawking no-win, no-fee arrangements around Iraq, promising taxpayers’ money to those who would bear witness against British soldiers. So much for the deal, which the hon. Member for South Ribble has rightly emphasised, on the duty of care that we owe to our soldiers. Why would the Government want to create a new legal apparatus and remove the power of responsible commanding officers at the same time as they are putting the Compensation Bill through the House of Lords? The Compensation Bill is a modest response to public concern about the pernicious and corrosive compensation culture, which often originates in the pursuit of money by a small number of lawyers and which destroys risk taking, personal responsibility and community spirit. It suggests to judges that they can—many of us want it to ““require”” judges to do this—consider the social harm of awards made against those who take responsibility. The Armed Forces Bill, however, has the power to compromise the ability or willingness of our armed forces to take necessary action in theatres of action by removing their most important safeguard—the role of the commanding officer. For an individual soldier, the CO represents a trusted bulwark of understanding and common sense who takes account of the differences inherent in active service. Instead of being allowed to intervene, he is now threatened with committing a war crime under the 2001 Act, if he does not actively pursue a prosecution. The Government have lost sight of the fact that a court martial system is an inquisitorial system, not an adversarial system like the civil courts. When a matter goes to court martial, it is easier to get a conviction than would be the case in a civilian court.