Armed Forces Bill

Indeed, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Before you took the Chair, I was careful to say that I would answer a question that a Labour Member asked me but within the scope that I would be allowed in the Chamber. Perhaps the clash between the legal and judicial purists and the pragmatists is at its clearest in the abolition of the reviewing authority. There, the purist interpretation of judicial function comes into conflict with the traditional way in which service discipline has been upheld. On the one hand, it could be clearly understood that involving the reviewing authority in a purely judicial process could be perceived as anomalous. Indeed, that view has been presented on several occasions—certainly, the European Court holds it. On the other hand, the Select Committee drew attention to the fact that the reviewing process contributes to the efficient running of service disciplinary procedures, and acts in the interests of promoting justice. There is certainly no case for believing that the reviewing authority is detrimental to the interests of service personnel; it can reduce sentences but not increase them, so there is no concept of double jeopardy. The Government must decide whether to pander to the judicial purists or to maintain a system that has worked particularly effectively in the past. I shall now come to other aspects of the Bill. The fact that there has been an increase in the number of joint units commends itself to a unified disciplinary code and a tri-service Act. This is the greatest justification for the Bill. Frankly, the alternative—the appointment of separate commanding officers for the different services—could lead to inconsistency and disparity in the treatment of individuals, although it is also worth pointing out that when that happened in the Falklands, for example, commanders in the field were able to work in a constructive and practical way to resolve the issues. On commanding officers’ powers, there clearly has to be a compromise between the Army and the RAF on the one hand and the Royal Navy on the other. That will mean a change in the operational conditions for all concerned. As the Secretary of State pointed out, it will mean a reduction in the summary powers of naval commanding officers, and a concomitant increase in those powers for commanding officers in the Army and the RAF. We are concerned, as was the Select Committee, to ensure that those commanding officers are given the appropriate training to ensure that they make responsible use of their new powers. A system of revision must be undertaken to ensure that discrepancies do not arise in the execution of the new powers. It is important that, as far as is possible, the commanding officer has ultimate authority over the unit, and sufficient latitude to enable him to deliver operational effectiveness. The commanding officer is at the centre of the system of discipline and is responsible for the behaviour of those under his or her command. It is the knowledge that the CO has the power to dispense summary justice that helps to mould a unit, as well as the leadership to which the Secretary of State referred. The CO’s dispensation of justice is a key means of commanding respect, which is part of that leadership. Given the increased number of cases facing the Royal Navy, it is also important, in a practical sense, that expeditious processes result in minimal disruption as a result of the increased number of courts martial that will inevitably happen, especially when witnesses are required who are currently serving on one of Her Majesty’s ships. I hope that the Minister will be able to deal with that point in his reply this evening. The introduction of a single prosecuting authority is a sensible move in the interests of efficiency, as it will bring the structures of authority in line with the changes in tri-services rules. Likewise, a unified courts martial system is appropriate, with the support authorities also being brought into alignment. We have one concern, however, about the unified courts martial system, and perhaps the Secretary of State could deal with it now. It relates to the Government’s almost baffling refusal to allow randomly selected panels. Most of us in this country believe that randomly selected juries underpin our judicial system and guarantee independence in the operation of the court system. The panel for a court martial being chosen rather than selected on a random basis will create an unnecessary hostage to fortune for those who wish to portray military discipline as having the potential to be influenced by other interests. A randomly selected panel would be a strong bulwark against that false charge being made by those who want to see further interference in military disciplinary procedures. I hope that the Government will consider this matter constructively, and an early answer would be greatly appreciated.