Armed Forces Bill

In the heat of battle, the commanding officer would wish to reflect. That, I take it, is accepted. He would wish, presumably, to take advice, to consult, to have a hearing on an offence committed in the heat of battle such as murder or rape or another sexual offence. The problem is that summarily dismissing an offence of such seriousness without a hearing, which is what happens under the present system, creates a situation where, no matter who else in the military may feel that that decision was wrong, it cannot be dealt with further in the military. That is precisely the situation that arose in the case of Trooper Williams, which was the route whereby the matter was referred to the civilian court. If we contain such serious offences within the military, so that they have to be decided by the director of public prosecutions—[Interruption.] Yes, I beg the House’s pardon. If we ensure that the director of service prosecutions is the responsible body, we prevent another Trooper Williams case. Incidentally, although this was not the primary reason, the commanding officer is then freed up for the responsibility of giving succour, support, assistance and advice to his man or woman who is accused of the crime. There is no conflict of interest then between the commanding officer’s duty of care to the individual concerned and the director of service prosecutions bringing a prosecution. By taking away the summary right to dismiss cases as serious as those described, without even a hearing, we are protecting the system from the course of events that caused the civilian system to intervene.