Armed Forces Bill

If the hon. Gentleman can indulge me by letting me get beyond page two of my speech I might reach some of the points that are being raised. I return to the point about the independent service prosecuting authorities who decide whether a prosecution is warranted in any case referred to them. They use the standard evidential test, based on a realistic prospect of a conviction, and the public interest test before they proceed. Another misconception is that military cases may arbitrarily be handed to civilian jurisdiction. That is not true, and I am sorry that the hon. and gallant Member for Canterbury, who raised that issue earlier, is no longer in the Chamber, as it sounded as though he believed it. In relation to offences committed in the United Kingdom over which both our civilian and service courts have jurisdiction, protocols between the service and civilian police forces apply at the start of investigations. There are also a few offences for which our civilian courts have jurisdiction when the offence is committed by UK citizens abroad—a point to which reference was made earlier. The Attorney-General made it clear in another place that in exceptional cases he has a role in deciding between prosecuting authorities with overlapping jurisdictions, but in no case—no case—has he exercised that role without the agreement of the relevant service prosecuting authority. Therefore, the apparently widespread myth that the Attorney-General or anyone else would intervene contrary to the views of the service authorities, or without consultation or agreement with them, to allocate a case to the civilian authorities is just not true. Let us be perfectly clear that the Government are committed to retaining a separate system of service law. In our view, and in my view, that is essential to underpin operational effectiveness. The integrity of the system is essential if we are to retain the confidence of those who are subject to it, as well as those who are not. That involves professional and independent investigations into alleged serious offences and decisions on whether to prosecute being taken by an independent prosecutor with an understanding of the service context—the one that I was speaking about earlier—but, moreover, there must be proper safeguards and support for those who face investigation and prosecution in the military system. Against that background on the major questions, let me turn now to the Bill itself, which is primarily about service discipline. It establishes for the very first time a modern, single system of service law. It defines offences, provides for the investigation of alleged offences and the arrest, holding in custody and charging of individuals accused of committing an offence. It makes provision for service personnel to be dealt with summarily by their commanding officer or tried by courts martial. It will retain the right of service personnel to elect trial by court martial and to appeal to the summary appeal court or the courts-martial appeal court as appropriate. That is all familiar. It is not revolution; it is, if anything, evolution. The most significant change in the Bill is that there will be one system, not three. In future, under the Bill, armed forces personnel of whatever service will be subject to the same system wherever in the world they are serving and in whatever unit or formation. That will enable the proper alignment of discipline and command, and it will do so across all three services, instead of relying on ad hoc arrangements for joint operations, as we must do at present. Moreover, all service personnel will be subject to the same rights, powers and duties when they are charged with an offence. That is not only clearer but fairer to all those who serve in the armed forces.