Commons Bill [HL]

The noble Baroness has been so persuasive that I ask her to withdraw her amendment on the basis that we will consult on whether the county court should have a role in such matters. Traditionally, they have not—they have been matters of Chancery, dealt with by the High Court—but I am sufficiently persuaded to look at this again to see whether there might be role for the county court. She should not necessarily expect that we would come back the answer she seeks, but I can see the strength of the case that she made, particularly in relation to costs. However, noble Lords should not think that county court actions are necessarily cheap. Turning to Amendment No. 84, I understand exactly what my noble friend meant when he stated that where fraud is proven it should be put right. The argument that I shall put forward is not an easy one, but I ask the Committee to listen to it with patience. It is not a long argument, but I think I have already hinted at it. We must remember that many entries in the commons registers date back some 40 years. I am not na&-uml;ve about the fact that some of the claims for the provisional registration of rights were exaggerated, dishonest and even downright fraudulent. But, frankly, proving fraud many years later is unlikely to be practical. Indeed, so far as we are aware, few, if any, such claims have been brought before the High Court by virtue of similar provision in Section 14 of the Commons Registration Act 1965. Nevertheless, we do believe that if fraud can be proven, there might be good reasons why it may not be fair or reasonable to put right what was wrong. For example, fraud may have been perpetrated to secure an unwarranted registration of rights in the register, but those rights attached to a farm holding that were fraudulently gained may have passed between several innocent successors in title to that farm, each of whom paid a realistic price to reflect the value of the rights. Section 10 of the 1965 Act ensured that registration was conclusive evidence of the existence of those rights and the purchasers would have had no reason at all to doubt the provenance of their rights. So we think that the court should have discretion—that is all we are saying—to decline to order an amendment to the register, even where fraud has been proven. But I can go this far and hope that that is sufficient for him today, and agree to reflect further on the meaning of ““fair”” as used in the clause and to write to him and consider whether an amendment is needed.