Commons Bill [HL]

moved Amendment No. 149:"Page 16, line 18, leave out paragraph (a)." The noble Baroness said: We are debating the functions of commons associations. It is important that we get this right if commons associations are to be successful. Amendments Nos. 149, 151 and 162 have been grouped because the same theme runs throughout them, although arguably they could be dealt with in three separate points. The functions of an association, as dictated in subsection (3)(a) and (b) and subsequently subsection (4)(a), all seem to override the common law rights of the landowner to manage his own land in accordance with his land ownership rights. I also believe that still to be the case despite the recent amendments tabled by the Government to subsection (3)(a). I recognise that in some cases owners are uninterested or unidentifiable, but where they are interested, I argue, it is a significant issue. Subsection (3)(a) effectively hands over the rights to manage vegetation, traditionally a role of the owner—although I accept that some ask commoners to fulfil it—to the association. Will the association, in respect of all the points that I am about to make, have to obtain permission or consult the owner before any decisions are taken or changes made? Although I recognise that there are problems of both under-grazing and over-grazing to address, there could also be conflict between the owner and the association regarding the management of vegetation; for example, for sporting activities, grouse or, more controversially, as we heard at an earlier Committee sitting, a golf course. Paragraph (b) provides the power for an association to limit, or to impose conditions on, rights to use the surplus land, which is the absolute property of the owner. The grant or exercise of such power would be, according to various lobby groups,"““a basic infringement of the owner’s rights””." Some have even said that those powers go against the owners’ human rights. There is a balance to be struck. For example, in some cases the owner and his tenants exercise more than half the grazing on the common—although it is called surplus, the issue needs to be seen in that context. Any fetter on the rights of the owner to use that surplus or to let it either in the long or short term is a fundamental limitation on the owner’s right of management, which has preserved the ecological value of commons to date. We accept that if an association is formed to deal with good agricultural practice upon the common, the rights exercised by the owner, tenants, licensees and so on, should be subject to the same rules as affect the commoners, so that if stock is to be reduced, all should abate pro rata. Equally, if there were to be a reduction, it would be unreasonable to allow the owner to take the benefit of the reduction and then re-let it. This is very much a probing amendment. It would be equally unreasonable for commoners to decide that they would like to enter into a scheme and that the owner’s tenants alone should bear the reduction because their rights arise from the surplus while the commoners take the benefit of payment. The National Sheep Association, in its briefing to us on Clause 30 in particular, pointed out that although commons associations are set up specifically for agricultural management of the common, they appear to have limited ability to influence non-agricultural activity, which could compromise sustainable agriculture. That seems an unreasonable omission that should be corrected. I beg to move.