Equality Bill [HL]

I wish to add a few words to those of my noble friend, because the amendment raises a serious matter, which cannot be dealt with   simply in a few moments. The Race Relations Act 1976, which we amended in 2000, allows racial discrimination in relation to immigration control. Section 19D creates a blanket exception, but with, at least, a pathetic safeguard that Ministers of the Crown, acting personally, must provide relevant authorisation for a particular class of case, stating that they authorise the immigration authorities to discriminate. For example, there was an authorisation of a most unsightly and, I believe, unlawful and unconstitutional kind that authorised express and direct race discrimination against Roma, Pontic Greeks and one or two other categories of minorities. That relevant authorisation was personally signed by the Minister, who had to take personal responsibility in Parliament for having authorised that invidious form of discrimination against a vulnerable group in relation to immigration control. I declare an interest, because I argued the Prague airport case before the House of Lords and elsewhere, where it appeared that that authorisation was being relied upon to discriminate racially against Gypsies who were seeking to fly from Prague airport to London to claim asylum. The Law Lords unanimously decided that there was, indeed, unlawful race discrimination in that practice. That was in relation to race discrimination and   although it was offensive and odious, ministerial responsibility has, at least, been written into a particular category of case. This provision does not deal with race discrimination but with religious discrimination and, moreover, with religious harassment. Whereas in the next group of amendments the Government are rightly removing the blanket exception for religious harassment for other provisions, they are not doing that in relation to immigration control. So this House is being asked to approve a blanket exception that allows the immigration authorities to discriminate or to harass on religious grounds persons seeking to enter or remain in this country. I can perfectly understand that when an extremist cleric of any faith seeks to enter this country and is a bad man, because he preaches violence, extremism or hatred or stirs up anything of that kind, the immigration authorities must have the power—and they do—to refuse entry to or to deport that person or to refuse leave to remain. But that is not on grounds of religion or belief but of the conduct of that person. There must be a power to do that, and there is. Here, a blanket exception allows any religious discrimination and harassment in respect of any of the functions. If noble Lords look at how that is defined in Clause 54, the language is astonishing, because it goes further even than the allowance of racial discrimination by allowing anything to be done under the exception in relation to   religious discrimination or religious harassment, as regards the immigration functions of entry control or leave to remain. That is deeply obnoxious, completely unnecessary and there are no safeguards against abuse. There are   even no safeguards in relation to the Human Rights Act in large measure, because the European Convention on Human Rights does not itself guarantee anything to do with immigration controls in relation to leave to enter or remain under normal circumstances. We on these Benches would require cogent justification for this provision and would not be satisfied with general assurances. Of course, the Joint Committee on Human Rights unanimously expressed its own concerns, as my noble friend said, but this provision is not necessary and should, therefore, be firmly removed from the Bill.