Racial and Religious Hatred Bill

I thought that it might be hazardous to cite that example, and in fact, the situation is even more complicated than that. In fact, in such a circumstance one is invoking anticipated possible consequences, rather than real ones. By way of defence, a person might say, ““Of course I am entitled to say that all corn dealers are thieves when outside a corn dealer’s house. I am not saying that you should act on that belief. I am not saying that you should burn the man’s house down.”” So it is quite a leap to jump from a point of view that is certainly controversial, and in respect of which the circumstances matter, to an assumption about its consequences. The serious distinction that we have to draw is between beliefs and believers. In trying to strike this balance—we are all doubtless trying to strike it in different ways—I simply wanted the Bill to provide some reassurance. The Minister, who could not be a more congenial and agreeable person to have at the Dispatch Box in these circumstances, has indicated his desire to find this middle ground, if it can be found. My new clause simply states:"““Nothing in Part 3 of the Public Order Act 1986 . . . shall be read as creating offences that involve material that criticises or ridicules or causes offence.””" It is simply an attempt in the most anodyne way possible—a way designed to maximise agreement—to secure in the Bill the commitment that nothing in it will stop people criticising or ridiculing other people’s belief systems, and that no offences will be created simply because someone acts in that way. If we include such a provision, we will have gone a long way toward getting the balance right, and toward providing the reassurances that many of us want.