My Lords, I shall speak to these three statutory instruments in the order in which they appear on the Order Paper. I know the Minister spoke to them in a different order—three, one, two—but I am much more simple-minded, I am afraid, so will go with one, two, three. I am also speaking without the professional experience of my colleague and others who are present in this debate, even if not participating, so there is an element of “man-on-the-street reaction” to some of the questions I have around these various statutory instruments.
I will start with the designated activities regulations. I would like to understand much better the circumstances under which this first of the three SIs allows the FCA to exempt businesses or persons from being an authorised person when they are carrying out activities such as short selling and credit default swaps. Indeed, the language is quite loose, so it may well include other complex financial structuring and sales.
The reason that I would like to understand those circumstances is that I remain very exercised by the 2008 financial crash. It is an experience from which we all have to learn, and which we must be careful not to forget, but it was, to a significant extent, triggered by the ignorance and negligence of businesses and people who were carrying out structured finance. Indeed, credit default swaps in particular were at the heart of much of the crisis. Short selling, which is wrapped into this SI, particularly uncovered short selling, is definitely a risky activity. Why should these risky activities be carried out by people who have not been through an authorisation—in effect, an approval process?
I understand that the industry often says that this is an onerous process but, having been on the committee that first recommended that process, the heart of the authorisation process is to verify that the person carrying out the activity meets the test of being fit and proper. Indeed, the core of the process is a criminal records check and a process to verify that the expertise and experience that has been claimed by the individual or the business is actually true. Neither of those can ever be taken for granted. People who have been involved in financial mis-selling over and over again turn out to be serial offenders whose history was never checked and who are shown to have been involved in previous mis-selling practices. We saw that extensively with the mini-bond scandal but it has a much wider history than that.
Firms have told me that, since they have had to go through the authorisation process, they have been shocked to find how many of their decision-makers were hired not on the basis of their expertise or CVs but because they were a friend of somebody who was important in the organisation who had highly
recommended them. When they started checking the CVs, as the Minister may be aware, they discovered that many people had gravely exaggerated; the experience and expertise that they had claimed turned out not to have a whole lot of substance behind it.
In an industry where there is so much at stake and so much capacity to manoeuvre and do the wrong thing, why are we limiting the authorisation process? I want to understand better the circumstances in which the FCA will make the decision that the authorisation process need not apply. It is a pretty significant decision. I understand the industry push-back; all the organisations feel that they are virtuous, so why should anybody look over their shoulders?
On the whole I am comfortable with the second SI, which focuses on short selling, but I do not understand—here, I am in a different position from my colleague, my noble friend Lady Bowles—why individual firms will no longer be required to publish net short positions above 0.5% of issued capital. I should have thought that investors would like to have this information, but I understand that, from a systemic perspective, an aggregate number may be sufficient for the regulator. However, it concerns me that we are reducing transparency in this area and I should like to understand much more clearly why transparency has been such a problem that it has to be removed. It does not take a lot of activity for this information to be public, so it cannot be particularly onerous to publish it. What are the harms that the industry feels exist because of publication? Perhaps we could have some examples of where a firm has been harmed. Presumably, that evidence has been put before the FCA or we would not have the drafting of this SI.
Why can the Treasury arbitrarily change the threshold for reporting net positions to the FCA? To me, the Treasury does not need to be accountable to anybody for changing that threshold and I just do not understand why that is and what the circumstances are.
I am also concerned that the financial services industry has been playing the growth mantra in order to move to a lighter-touch regulation environment. Whenever there is a debate on short selling on the Floor of the House, many people stand up and argue for uncovered short selling to be allowed far more extensively on the grounds that it will bring more players to invest in high-risk projects. The argument is made continuously that uncovered short selling will increase the liquidity in the market and offset any increased risk. I regard uncovered short selling as a risky activity, and I am not clear how this SI impacts on the FCA’s scope—without reference to Parliament, scope increases to allow a much greater range of uncovered short selling. As I was reading the language, I could certainly see that interpretation as possible.
4.45 pm
The third of the SIs—the one that the Minister focused on at the beginning—is on ring-fencing. I feel pretty strongly about this issue, having gone through the experience of listening for two years to our banks describing the actions that created the crises of 2007 and 2008. Among that evidence, one of the most important conclusions that we as a committee came to
was that the lure of the free money from retail deposits, and the lure of putting that into risky investments, was irresistible to what some people call the “casino” side —the investment side—of banking. The Government and the regulator have already lifted the bankers’ bonus cap, and they have weakened the clawback for bonuses received on deals that go badly wrong. I start to worry when those two changes are combined with amendments that provide easier access to that so-called free money—the retail deposit money.
The changes in this SI are restricted: they largely change the size of the banks that have to obey ring-fencing rules. Can the Minister tell me how many banks are affected by that change? It would be nice to know the identity of the current set of banks that would be affected by the change because that would give us a sense of how much risk is being added into the market.
I understand that the Government are hopeful that money from deposits—the free money—will go into UK SMEs. I say to the Minister that I think he is an optimist, as I do not think a lot of it will happen, but we must recognise that, as UK SMEs scale up, they have a high failure rate—it is about 49%—so there is a real impact in fuelling those kinds of investments. We must be careful not to take financial stability for granted but to understand that it requires constant vigilance. If the Minister could help me with those issues, I would be grateful.