My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 68 and 90, which are in my name. These amendments address the serious concerns raised by the provisions in Clause 3 and Clause 6, which give the Government sweeping powers to create or widen criminal offences and impose civil sanctions.
I have to revisit some old ground here but, given the gravity of this issue, I feel we have no choice. As was pointed out by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the Constitution Committee, these clauses are skeletal legislation, meaning that they lack detail, leaving critical decisions about enforcement and prosecution to be made at a later stage via secondary legislation. We feel that the approach of using skeletal legislation for such crucial issues is problematic. These clauses give broad powers to create and enforce criminal offences without providing clear primary legislative guidance on who will have the authority to impose sanctions. This is particularly concerning because it leaves us very little clarity on which bodies will hold the responsibility to prosecute criminal offences.
The DPRRC and the Constitution Committee have highlighted these concerns, noting the lack of detail in the Bill and its potential to bypass parliamentary oversight. The Government’s decision to leave critical decisions about enforcement powers to be determined later by regulation, rather than in the Bill, undermines the transparency that businesses and consumers need. The Bill as written provides no information about the exact scope of the criminal offences that could be created or widened. This is not just a technical issue. It raises serious questions about the accountability of the bodies that will enforce these sanctions. The Minister may not be happy that these issues continue to be addressed but, until we receive clarity, we have a duty to bring these issues up, as I hope the Committee would agree.
The most concerning aspect of the clause is the provision allowing the creation or widening of criminal offences by regulation. The powers given to the Secretary of State or any other body of a public nature in this regard are overly broad, with little or no clear guidance or justification on what these offences will be. The Bill should, at the very minimum, provide some specification of the type of offences that may be created, rather than leaving this to broad, undefined powers that will most likely lead to overreach. The question has to be asked: why is it necessary to give the Government the power to create new criminal offences by regulation in the first place? Given the gravity of criminal sanctions, the Bill should be more transparent and specific about what offences will be created and who will be responsible for enforcing them—a point that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, made in his reference to the CPTPP, incidentally.
Criminal sanctions carry serious consequences and it is fundamental that Parliament has a say in the creation of such offences, rather than allowing the Government to define them through secondary legislation. We understand that the Government have argued for flexibility in enforcement and that the regulatory framework must be adaptable, but that flexibility should not come at the cost of clarity or proper oversight.
We have heard serious concerns from businesses and industry stakeholders about the skeleton clauses in this Bill. Specifically, there is real uncertainty about which public bodies the Government intend to designate as having the authority to impose criminal sanctions. Again, the question has to be asked: what additional public bodies are the Government planning to empower to prosecute businesses for currently barely defined criminal offences under the Bill?
As my noble friend Lord Lansley pointed out on the previous Committee day, currently enforcement responsibilities for consumer protection laws are set out clearly in Schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act 2015, which names very specific enforcement authorities, but the Bill removes that clarity and instead gives the Government the power to designate by secondary legislation which public bodies can impose criminal sanctions. This creates a situation where businesses may have to deal with a wide array of bodies, many of which may not have the expertise or experience needed to understand the complexities of product and metrology regulations.
This broad power to assign enforcement duties to any body that is deemed appropriate opens the door to a wide range of unknown authorities, so the question here is: why are the Government attempting to create this uncertainty? Why not retain the existing list of enforcement bodies in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and allow changes to be made to that list through normal, well-defined procedures, rather than using secondary legislation to grant powers to an unknown set of authorities? Businesses deserve to know exactly who will be responsible for enforcing the regulations and imposing sanctions. The Bill’s current drafting creates a legal vacuum where there is no certainty about the powers of various public authorities, which could have serious consequences for businesses’ legal security.
The ambiguity surrounding criminal sanctions is deeply troubling for business, especially when these powers can be used by a range of authorities that may not be clearly identified at this stage. It raises serious concerns about due process and the fairness of enforcement actions. If a business is unsure whether it is complying with regulations and there is uncertainty about which body will be enforcing them, the risk of facing criminal sanctions obviously becomes much higher and that creates an environment of fear and uncertainty for business, which is already facing difficult economic conditions.
This situation is further complicated by the fact that secondary legislation will define the details of how these sanctions are imposed, potentially without proper scrutiny by Parliament. Criminal penalties should never be determined by regulation alone; they must be clearly laid out in primary legislation with full parliamentary oversight.
The balance of probabilities standard in civil cases can create significant challenges for businesses as well, especially in the context of the provisions outlined in the Bill regarding enforcement and sanctions. The balance of probabilities standard makes businesses more vulnerable to claims from enforcement authorities or competitors. In the absence of clear regulations and objective criteria, businesses may find it difficult to mount a defence as the mere likelihood of non-compliance could be enough to trigger sanctions. This could result in a climate of fear and uncertainty whereby businesses are hesitant to innovate or engage in new activities, due to the potential for legal action based on speculative or incomplete evidence.
The Government have claimed that this Bill will support economic growth and innovation, yet its skeletal nature and the conversations that we have had with leading industry experts suggest that they are concerned. Moreover, the Bill already includes an emergency clause—we will come on to this in our debate on the next group, I think, and we will address it later—that allows for swift regulatory action if necessary. So there is no reason why criminal sanctions cannot be made clear at the outset. There is simply no need to leave the scope of criminal offences and enforcement powers so broad and undefined.
To clarify, we absolutely recognise the importance of product safety and the need both to protect consumers and for necessary regulations. We oppose the various skeletal clauses in the Bill, as we have made clear over the course of these Committee sessions, because of the lack of clarity and the potentially authoritarian powers
given to unnamed, undefined public bodies in some of these regulations. I hope that the Minister will address the many concerns the amendments in this group address and will commit to clarity for business. I beg to move.