My Lords, in the short time available, I shall concentrate on my conclusions. The first point that I wish to make relates to the policy that the Bill is intended to facilitate: namely, deterring small boats. I do not believe that the Bill, if enacted, will serve as an effective deterrent. I believe that individuals who choose to make the perilous journey across the channel in overcrowded and vulnerable boats are unlikely to be deterred by the slight prospect of being relocated to Rwanda. Those of your Lordships who have principled reservations about the Bill should not support a Bill that cannot achieve its desired objective.
My second point, and my principal objection to the Bill, is the statutory reversal of the Supreme Court’s judgment that Rwanda is not a safe country. Whether Rwanda is or is not a safe country is a matter of fact, to be determined after careful assessment of the relevant evidence. This is what the Supreme Court did. In my view, it is contrary to long-standing principles to reverse, by a statutory pronouncement, a judicial finding of fact.
I turn to my broader objection. This country prides itself on being a country in which the rule of law prevails. We are a country which adheres to its international obligations. The Bill trashes our reputation for domestic and international probity. I cite two provisions. Clause 1(4)(b) states:
“It is recognised that … the validity of an Act”—
any Act, I note—
“is unaffected by international law”.
International law is very broadly defined: see Clause 1(6). That provision is right in strict law, but its sole purpose in the Bill is to provide comfort for the Braverman wing of the Conservative Party and it is a proposition that we should voice with very great caution.
Clause 5 enables a Minister, at his or her discretion, to determine whether or not to be compliant with judicial rulings of the European Court of Human Rights. Members of the international community reading the Bill would be entitled to conclude that the given word of the United Kingdom cannot be relied on.
On Clause 3—the disapplication of the Human Rights Act in respect of individuals who would otherwise benefit from its provisions—I call to mind the words of Pastor Niemöller, spoken in 1947:
“First they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out—
Because I was not a socialist.
Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out—
Because I was not a trade unionist.
Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out—
Because I was not a Jew.
Then they came for me—and there was no one left to speak for me”.
Of course, the circumstances are very different from those of the 1930s, but we should beware the precedent that we would create. It is best not to step on to a slippery slope; it can end in some very murky places.
I end with what I hope is a constructive suggestion: the Bill should not be implemented without a positive resolution of both Houses of Parliament. Such a resolution should not be considered until Parliament has received a report on the safety of Rwanda from, for example, a Joint Committee of both Houses appointed for the purpose; there may be other ways of meeting the objective. In the event of no report or an unfavourable report, the Bill would remain in the long grass, where it should be. Such an approach could be reinforced by sunset clauses and constant, continuing assessment. That way, Parliament would at least have an assessment of fact on which it could properly rely. Incidentally, it also accords with the judgment of this House in last week’s vote.
6.42 pm