My Lords, it is a privilege to take part in this debate and I am very grateful to the Government for allowing us to have it within the CRaG period. It was also a privilege to be a member of the International Agreements Committee. Thanks to our excellent chairmanship and the wonderful work done by our staff, we were able to complete this report within the CRaG period despite the Christmas Recess.
I used to work in international relations and was until recently a trustee of the Refugee Council, so I cannot debate this treaty without recording my profound objection to an arrangement that is incompatible with
our responsibilities under the 1951 refugee convention, its 1967 protocol and, of course, the European Convention on Human Rights. But I acknowledge that that is more for next week’s debate than today’s. My concern is primarily with the policy and the Bill that we will be looking at next week, not the treaty, which is intended to salvage the policy from its Supreme Court shipwreck.
On the policy, I will make just one point. I simply remind the House yet again that there is no precedent for the way it dishonours our convention commitments. The Government keep referring to what the Australians did in 2012, but that was different: the asylum seekers they diverted to Papua New Guinea were not handed over to the Papua New Guinea authorities. Australian officials went and heard in Papua New Guinea their claims for admission to Australia. Like the arrangement the Italians have been considering with Albania, this was offshoring; what we are talking about is offloading. Those we offload to Rwanda are never to get a hearing for their claim to asylum in this country. We intend to wash our hands of them and declare them inadmissible: Rwanda’s responsibility, not ours. This is unprecedented and unconscionable.
On the treaty itself, I have only three points to make. First, as a member of the International Agreements Committee, I of course support the report we unanimously agreed. It follows the scope and logic of the Supreme Court’s reasoning. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, explained, in considering whether Rwanda would be safe for those sent there, it focuses on the court’s assessment of the risk of refoulement—enforced return to the country they first fled. I would have wished to draw the canvas a little broader, looking beyond the procedural reforms that Rwanda has apparently agreed to make and trying to judge how safe for refugees wider Rwandan society actually is. Without looking back to the genocide 30 years ago, when more than half a million in Rwanda lost their lives, I might have noted, as the Supreme Court did, that only three years ago our Government were criticising the Rwanda Government in the UN Human Rights Council for
“extrajudicial killings, deaths in custody, enforced disappearances and torture”.
I might have asked whether it is Rwanda that has changed or whether we have just found it convenient to change our tune for domestic political reasons. I might have picked up the State Department’s damning country report two years ago on Rwanda’s human rights record. I would certainly have wished to note Rwanda’s 100% rejection rate for asylum claims there by applicants from Afghanistan or Syria, according to UNHCR, and contrasted that with our 99% acceptance rate, according to the Home Office, for people from those two tragic countries who manage to lodge their claims here. I might have asked what it says about the safety of Rwanda that we are still accepting claims from Rwandan citizens for asylum in this country, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, pointed out. Allowing them refugee status here means that we have determined through our processes that they have a real and well-founded fear of persecution back home.
All these issues are relevant, although they are not in the IAC report, but I in no way resile from the report. We agreed it unanimously, and we all
acknowledged the efforts the two Governments have made to address the issues raised by the Supreme Court. But—this is my second point—the committee was clear that resolving these issues will take time to assess whether the 10 steps that the Rwanda Government have agreed to take, listed in paragraph 45 of the report, have been taken, are working and are proving sufficient to set at rest the concerns raised by the Supreme Court. None of the 10 steps has yet been taken. There is no new Rwanda asylum law, first instance body or appeals court, no judges have been appointed and no training has been done. It will all take time.
I believe that if the new arrangements set out in the treaty and its annexes are implemented and bed down, the situation for asylum seekers in Rwanda will genuinely improve, but clearly the Government themselves are not confident that these improvements will be sufficient to set Supreme Court minds at rest. If they thought the treaty would crack the problem, why would they now be legislating to prohibit our domestic courts independently assessing whether it has cracked the problem? Why a belt, if the braces are not broken?
Thirdly, Article 10(3) of the treaty states that no one we have transported to Rwanda can be sent on to a third country, whether or not they have asked for asylum in Rwanda and whether or not asylum in Rwanda has been granted. The only place they can be sent to is back here, if we decide we want them back. On the face of it, that is a reassuring fail-safe if the new procedures prove inadequate to prevent removal to a third country. Actually, it is not—because, as the report points out at paragraph 37, Article 10(3) goes on to lay an obligation on us and Rwanda
“to agree an effective system”
to ensure that removals do not in practice occur and to check on where the refugee in question now is. Hang on, that is the clock striking 13 times, casting doubt on all that has happened before. It shows the Rwanda Government acknowledging in the treaty that, despite all the assurances in the treaty, it is possible that refugees will in practice be sent back to the countries from which they originally fled—and well might the Rwandans admit that possibility, because that is exactly what happened with their arrangement with Israel, causing the Israelis to break it off.
So we and they are to agree an effective system to ensure that that does not happen again; but we have not done so, and the task will not be easy given Rwandan geography and society. It is one of the unfulfilled promises listed in paragraph 45 of the report. In the absence of an effective system, up and running and proving effective, Article 10(3) cannot be even minimally reassuring to Parliament or, I would imagine, to the Supreme Court.
In conclusion, the considerations of international law and national reputation, which I mentioned at the outset, convince me that it would not be right to ratify this treaty at any time; and arguments from history suggest that it would be very reckless to do so any time soon. But these are my personal views. The IAC read its remit rather narrowly. What we did was consider whether the treaty can be said now, today, to meet the Supreme Court’s concerns. Our unanimous answer—I repeat, our unanimous answer—based on the
overwhelming weight of the evidence that we received, was no: not today, not yet. Our unanimous recommendation is to delay ratification until the outstanding tasks have been carried out and the new systems proven in practice. So I support both Motions in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith.
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