My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their important contributions. I venture to suggest that we all in many ways share an analysis of the nature of the problem and that we are working, I hope collaboratively, to arrive at solutions on very difficult issues.
I will deal in so far as I can with the various points made. I can tell your Lordships that there was a very full exchange with the Sentencing Council. As I understand, it was concerned among other things with exactly how “overkill” is defined, or that sort of point. The question is: how far should you go into all that in
the Explanatory Memorandum? Maybe it was a bit skimpy; if so, the Government will take that very much into account. However, the Sentencing Council’s views have been fully taken into account and they are reflected in the instrument. I do not anticipate any disagreement from the Sentencing Council’s point of view with this statutory instrument.
Secondly, as both noble Lords have rightly said, these regulations do not in any way cut down the discretion of the judge in a particular case to consider all the circumstances that he thinks fit. They will always take into account all relevant circumstances, but they provide important statutory reinforcement of the approach that should be made in domestic homicide cases. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, rightly said, and as I think is common knowledge, we have had domestic violence cases as a substantial proportion of all murder cases for years and years—probably for centuries. However, we have become much better informed. I nearly said we have also become much better equipped, but I do not quite mean that; we have become much more able to understand the situation—I will put it like that—and draw appropriate conclusions than perhaps has been the case in the past.
As I think I said in opening, this is still work in progress. We are still working on aspects of this—on sentencing and, in due course, we will be working on aspects of the law of murder itself, whether we should have just one law for murder, or ways of distinguishing better between different circumstances. That, I think, is a question for another day.
On the general question of sentencing, I want to say, respectfully, that I acknowledge the force of the careful remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, on this issue. I think, respectfully, that today is not the day for a general debate on sentencing policy, but we have very difficult issues in this area. There are always the questions of public safety, deterrence and rehabilitation, but there are also questions of public outrage and anguish. How do we deal with those?
From a personal point of view, it is very nearly impossible to disregard public outrage and anguish as factors in the circumstances when the court comes to consider what it should do. That is a fact. We are certainly in a situation where, for some time now, sentences have been growing longer. That has produced pressures on the prison estate, which have been further complicated by Covid and by the increased numbers of police officers, who are arresting more people than they were before. We have all sorts of things to deal with. These are difficult matters, which will merit full debate on another occasion. I have endeavoured to deal as far as I can—otherwise, I hope your Lordships will forgive me—with the points made this afternoon. I commend this instrument to the Committee.