My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Hollick and the members of the Industry and Regulators Committee for their excellent report. In common with many previous speakers, I have no confidence in Ofwat; it needs to be replaced by a body which is independent of the industry and has a majority of customer-elected representatives on its board.
Can the Minister explain what justifies the 35% operating profit margins for water companies? I have not come across anywhere else in the private sector that competes having that kind of margin. High profit margins have not been accompanied by high levels of investment—indeed, others have commented on how low and how poor it is.
The investment picture is muddled by financial engineering. Let me give noble Lords some examples. On 28 June 2023, in the other place, the Minister responsible for the environment said:
“Water companies have invested £190 billion since privatisation”.—[Official Report, Commons, 28/6/23; col. 281.]
This amount does not appear to be right at all. Let me flag up some reasons for this. One example is on page 134 of Thames Water’s 2022-23 financial statement. It states that the company
“capitalises expenditure relating to water and wastewater infrastructure where such expenditure enhances assets or increases the capacity of the network. Maintenance expenditure is taken to the income statement in the period in which it is incurred. Differentiating between enhancement and maintenance works is subjective”.
A translation of that is that the amounts which are capitalised for maintenance cannot be independently corroborated at all. Will the Minister return to the House and make a statement explaining how much of the maintenance expenditure has been capitalised by water companies so far?
I turn to my second example. Water companies have the same policy as Carillion, which was destroyed by it; namely, they are capitalising interest payments on their debt, which is utterly imprudent. This overstates their investments and distributable reserves, and it understates their leverage. In the last two years alone, Thames Water has capitalised £330 million of interest payments, which increases its capacity to pay dividends. So will the Minister return to the House and make a statement explaining how much of the interest has been capitalised by water companies and what the related risks to them are?
Water company dividends, which a number of speakers have referred to, are also understated. On 28 June, the Minister in the other place said that Thames Water
“has not paid any dividends for the last six years”,—[Official Report, Commons, 28/6/23; col. 287.]
but that is not what the company’s accounts say at all. Page 43 of its 2022-23 financial statement describes a £45 million payment to its immediate parent company, and the word “dividend” is used. Thames Water Utilities Holdings Limited received that and then forwarded it to another company, whose accounts also say that it is a dividend. So, just in the last two years, Thames
Water has paid its parent company £82 million. If it is spelled “dividend” and if directors and auditors say it is a dividend, it must be one—the Minister cannot deny that in any way. A wholly owned subsidiary has only one shareholder—the parent company—and, if the subsidiary is paying a dividend, it is a dividend. I hope the Minister will be able to clarify that.
Strangely, page 43 of Thames Water’s accounts also says that this dividend is not really a dividend because the purpose is
“solely to service debt obligations and group related costs of other companies within the wider Kemble Water Group”.
If there is any substance to that claim, Thames Water is saying, “We are understating our leverage”. What the hell is Ofwat doing? It is utterly out of its depth in trying to read the accounts and make sense of financial engineering. So will the Minister return to the House and make a statement on how much has been extracted from water companies in the form of dividends that are not really dividends?
Finally, the committee’s report raises questions about executive remuneration and, in a sense, it welcomes that Ofwat might have a say in that. I do not want Ofwat to have any such powers to influence executive remuneration at water companies. These must go to the customers, who must vote every year on executive pay. If they think they got a good enough service from water companies, they will approve directors’ remuneration. Let there be a bit of democracy; how could the Minister oppose that?
4.23 pm