My Lords, with the leave of the House, I will also speak to Amendments 29, 33, 34, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 57, 100 and 101 in this group. These amendments significantly strengthen the exclusions and debarment provisions on national security grounds. I hope they will further assure noble Lords that the Government are taking the issue of national security seriously and are ready to take action. I thank particularly the noble Lord, Lord Alton, who I see in his seat and who has worked tirelessly to raise this issue in the House, for our constructive meetings.
The new amendments will enable a Minister of the Crown to take a stronger approach in response to a specific risk profile of a particular supplier and make targeted decisions about whether the debarment should be mandatory for particular types of contracts, depending on the nature of the risk. If the supplier poses an unacceptable risk in relation to selected goods—for example, networked communications equipment—the Minister will be able to enter on the debarment list that the supplier is an excluded supplier for contracts for the supply or support of that type of equipment.
The entry may also, or as an alternative, stipulate that the supplier is excluded from contracts relating to certain locations or sites, or from contracts let by certain contracting authorities. This removes discretion from contracting authorities regarding exclusions where a supplier poses a threat for particular contracts, thereby reducing the risk of a supplier being allowed to participate in those procurements. By allowing this type of targeted and proportionate approach, we can direct that suppliers must be excluded where the risks are unacceptable and allow contracting authorities to make appropriate choices where the risk is manageable—for example, for the provision of pencils or plastic furniture.
Amendment 31 commits a Minister of the Crown to keep suppliers under review for potential investigation for debarment on national security grounds. This amendment commits Ministers to proactively consider new debarment investigations where there is evidence of risk so that the Government can act effectively and on time. We believe this would be highly advantageous in minimising the risk of those who pose a threat to our national security being awarded public contracts.
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I am pleased to announce that the Government will create a new specialist unit, with dedicated resources within the Cabinet Office, to take on and manage this new approach. The new national security unit for procurement will regularly monitor government supply chains and review pertinent information to determine which suppliers should be investigated for debarment on national security grounds. It will be able to draw on the full range of expertise within government, access the latest intelligence, including that from Five Eyes partners, and respond swiftly to emerging threats. It will also carry out investigations of suppliers for potential debarment on national security grounds. The new unit will consider the findings and propose recommendations to the Minister for the final decision on whether the supplier should be added to the debarment list.
The unit will also have a role in supporting and upskilling contracting authorities. By directly engaging with them and providing guidance, it will help contracting authorities confidently to implement the national security exclusion and debarment regimes, maximising their effectiveness. The amendments constitute significant steps to strengthen our approach to national security in procurement. They have been welcomed by the other place and I believe this House should also welcome them.
Amendment 47 removes Clause 65, which was agreed to on Report in the Lords. The original amendment required the Government to publish a timetable for the removal from the Government’s procurement supply chain of surveillance equipment or other physical technology where there was evidence that a provider had been involved in modern slavery, genocide or crimes against humanity.
The noble Lord, Lord Alton, has tabled a revised version of the amendment—amendments in lieu, Amendments 47A and 47B—which would require the Government to publish a timeline for the removal of networked physical technology or surveillance equipment from the Government’s procurement supply chain where
there was established evidence that a provider had been involved in modern slavery or the crime of genocide, or was subject to the People’s Republic of China’s national intelligence law.
I am sure the noble Lord will want to speak to his amendment in lieu but, before he does, I hope he may allow me to make a few points. First, I agree with the intent behind the amendment, but the Bill’s new debarment regime makes huge progress on excluding suppliers who are unfit to deliver public contracts, including on modern slavery grounds.
Secondly, I take this opportunity to remind the House that last year the Government published a WMS asking departments to consider the removal of visual surveillance equipment from government sensitive sites to ensure that no such equipment is connected to departmental core networks, and to cease any future procurement for such equipment. In the other place we committed that, within six months of Royal Assent for the Bill, the Government would set out the timeline for the removal of surveillance equipment supplied by companies subject to the national intelligence law of China from sensitive sites. I reiterate that promise today.
Thirdly, the key issue here is where those cameras are located. The level of risk in recycling centres, leisure centres, schools or hospitals does not match the level of threat that we potentially face on sensitive sites. These are not the sites that would typically be of interest to a hostile state, and they do not contain the type of material that would be particularly useful to them.
Lastly, replacing devices is not the only method for mitigating risk. We should look to strengthen protective measures to ensure that devices are less vulnerable to attack. The Government are working with the National Cyber Security Centre and the newly-formed National Protective Security Authority to provide organisations with a library of advice and guidance, enhancing the protection of these devices and reducing the likelihood of compromise.
I thank the noble Lord for his constructive engagement since tabling his amendments. While regrettably I cannot support his amendment, I am happy to offer a clear definition of the sites that our commitments regarding physical surveillance will apply to. Our commitment will apply to government departments and cover their sensitive sites, which are: any building or complex that routinely holds secret material or above; any location that hosts a significant proportion of officials holding developed vetting clearance; any location which is routinely used by Ministers; and any government location covered under the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. While our commitment does not extend to the wider public sector, public sector organisations may choose to mirror our action—indeed, I believe that some of them have chosen to do so.
I am also happy to commit—and this is important—to an annual written report to Parliament detailing progress on our commitment to remove from government departments’ sensitive sites physical surveillance equipment subject to the national intelligence law of China. I hope that these commitments satisfy the noble Lord and that he will not be pressing his amendments. I thank him again for his contribution on this important matter.
Amendment 102 removed an amendment which was added to Schedule 7 on Report in this House creating a discretionary exclusion ground for suppliers engaged in forced organ harvesting. Forced organ harvesting is an abhorrent practice and we are in full agreement that complicity in the abuses associated with the overseas organ trade must not be tolerated. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has subsequently tabled two amendments in lieu, Amendment 102B in Motion 102A. I take this opportunity to reiterate the Government’s stance on this important issue. The UK has been explicit that the overseas organ trade, or complicity in it, will not be tolerated. For example, it is an offence to travel outside of the UK to purchase an organ, by virtue of the Health and Care Act 2022. The Government continue to monitor and review evidence relating to reports of forced organ harvesting in China and maintain a dialogue with leading non-governmental organisations, and with international partners, which is equally important, on this very important issue.
I do not believe that these amendments are necessary as the issue is already dealt with under the existing exclusion grounds. Under the Procurement Bill, any suppliers failing to adhere to existing ethical or professional standards that apply in its industry, including relating to the removal, storage and use of human tissue, could be excluded under the grounds of professional misconduct.
To further reassure noble Lords, as far as I am aware no supplier to the UK public sector has been involved in forced organ harvesting—though if they were, the exclusion grounds would apply. Although I sympathise with the noble Lord’s concern—he has been very eloquent in this area in successive debates on the Bill—I am not convinced of the case for this amendment. I hope that, in the light of what has been said, he may decide not to press this amendment today, bearing in mind all that I have said about our approach to this abhorrent practice. I beg to move.