My Lords, this is indeed an apposite day to be discussing ongoing ping-pong. I am very happy to speak enthusiastically and more slowly about my noble friend Lady Stowell of Beeston’s Amendments 139 and 140. We are happy to support those, subject to some tidying up at Third Reading. We agree with the points that she has made and are keen to bring something forward which would mean broadly that a statement would be laid before Parliament when the power to direct had been used. My noble friend Lady Harding characterised them as the infinite ping-pong question and the secretive ping-pong question; I hope that deals with the secretive ping-pong point.
My noble friend Lady Stowell’s other amendments focus on the infinite ping-pong question, and the power to direct Ofcom to modify a code. Her Amendments 139, 140, 144 and 145 seek to address those concerns: that the Secretary of State could enter into a private form of ping-pong with Ofcom, making an unlimited number of directions on a code to prevent it from ever coming before Parliament. Let me first be clear that we do not foresee that happening. As the amendments I have spoken to today show, the power can be used only when specific exceptional reasons apply. In that sense, we agree with the intent of the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Stowell. However, we cannot accept them as drafted because they rely on concepts—
such as the “objective” of a direction—which are not consistent with the procedure for making a direction set out in the Bill.
The amendments I have brought forward mean that private ping-pong between the Secretary of State and Ofcom on a code is very unlikely to happen. Let me set out for my noble friend and other noble Lords why that is. The Secretary of State would need exceptional reasons for making any direction, and the Bill then requires that the code be laid before Parliament as soon as is reasonably practicable once the Secretary of State is satisfied that no further modifications to the draft are required. That does not leave room for the power to be used inappropriately. A code could be delayed in this way and in the way that noble Lords have set out only if the Secretary of State could show that there remained exceptional reasons once a code had been modified. This test, which is a very high bar, would need to be met each time. Under the amendments in my name, Parliament would also be made aware straightaway each time a direction was made, and when the modified code came before Parliament, it would now come under greater scrutiny using the affirmative procedure.
I certainly agree with the points that the noble Lord, Lord Allan, and others made that any directions should be made in as transparent a way as possible, which is why we have tabled these amendments. There may be some circumstances where the Secretary of State has access to information—for example, from the security services—the disclosure of which would have an adverse effect on national security. In our amendments, we have sought to retain the existing provisions in the Bill to make sure that we strike the right balance between transparency and protecting national security.
As the noble Lord mentioned, the Freedom of Information Act provides an additional route to transparency while also containing existing safeguards in relation to national security and other important areas. He asked me to think of an example of something that would be exceptional but not require that level of secrecy. By dropping economic policy and burden to business, I would point him to an example in those areas, but a concrete example evades me this afternoon. Those are the areas to which I would turn his attention.