My Lords, I must admit that this amendment is something of a stalking horse—a bit like asking a Prime Minister on a Wednesday morning what is in the diary for the coming week. What I am really saying is that Clause 14 should be deleted and I thought that, rather than moving that the clause do not stand part, it was better to seek an explanation. That is why it has been done this way.
The amendment relates to material changes in circumstances of hereditament. This is not the same as physical alteration to the hereditament itself. A standard alteration to its extent, and an extension to or improvement of the physical fabric, will continue to be taken into account, as I understand it, as and when it occurs. There is no attempt in the Bill, as I read it, to fetter that—rather, this is to do with matters that do not change the measurable physical attributes of the hereditament itself but none the less patently affect its physical enjoyment.
I am particularly indebted to Luke Wilcox of Landmark Chambers for some very pertinent guidance on this issue. I have a note from him that he has given me permission to share with other noble Lords, and I may well do that, as it goes into more detail about what I am trying to explain.
In non-domestic rating, there is a hypothetical landlord and tenant and a hypothetical lease between the two as well as an assumed obligation for certain states of repair, none of which necessarily mirrors the actual state of affairs relating to the property. However, the hereditament itself is real, measurable and a physically determinable entity, and how it is to be regarded has always been subject to what in legal jargon used to be referred to as the rebus sic stantibus principle. In simple terms, that means that one had to value the
hereditament and its environment as it physically is. That is in essence what is now known as the reality principle.
There are two legs to the reality principle. The first is the physical extent—the construction, age, layout and other physical characteristics, fixtures and fittings and general suitability and fitness of purpose of the hereditament for its intended or actual use. The second relates to the local circumstances affecting the area where the physical hereditament is situated. Put another way, it is the local business environment that underpins its physical enjoyment, as distinct from its physical extent. This could be location in relation to other complementary trades, whether there is or is not good customer accessibility, the relevance of parking restrictions, proximity to public transport, levels of shopper footfall and all those sorts of things, which are not related to the physical nature of the hereditament itself but are part of its market environment and, therefore, its rental value.
The current position is that, where there is a change in a matter affecting the physical enjoyment of the property, such as a regulatory change to its planning status or a change in a matter which is physically manifest in the locality—in the past, Government Ministers referred to changed bus routes; I would add a change in road layout to that category—those matters, to the extent that they are evident and quantifiable, are material changes in circumstances, or MCCs, and can trigger a mid-list change in rateable value. Such factors are a part of the reality principle, which is one of the most fundamental concepts in rating law and, to my certain knowledge, has been so for over five decades.
What is proposed here is that Clause 14 would amend the rules that govern when a mid-list alteration to a property’s rating assessment is permitted by changing the definition of what may constitute “material changes of circumstances”. Under the Government’s proposals, those matters, even though manifestly affecting physical enjoyment, would no longer be MCCs, wherever and whenever they are directly or indirectly attributable to legislation or official guidance. Under the relevant portion of the Bill, new paragraph 2ZA(2)(a) of Schedule 6, inserted by Clause 14, an MCC is something that is
“directly or indirectly attributable to a relevant factor”.
New paragraph 2ZA(3) goes on to say what the relevant factors are:
“legislation of any country or territory … provision that … is made under, and given effect by, legislation of any country or territory … advice or guidance given by a public authority of any country or territory … anything done by a person with a view to compliance with anything within paragraph (a), (b) or (c)”.
New paragraph 2ZA(5) states that
“‘legislation’ includes any provision of a legislative character … ‘public authority’ includes any person exercising functions of a public nature”.
This, to my mind, is a substantial change to what has long been understood. What is proposed here is that this category of what has always been understood to be a material change in circumstances should be removed.
It appears that this is a response to matters that arose during Covid. The various Covid lockdown regulations significantly altered the way in which occupiers
could occupy their premises. This in turn gave rise to a number of requests for mid-list alterations, since the regulations affected the ability of occupiers physically to enjoy their properties. The Government considered that general legislation should be part of the general market conditions considered at revaluations—this is the case being made—and so should not count as MCCs. However, the Government’s view in this regard differs not only from their own internal guidance, which I checked only yesterday on their website, but from that of the Valuation Office Agency, which regarded, and still regards, legislative changes as MCCs where they are physically manifest. That much is evident from the paperwork.
The Government passed the Coronavirus Act 2020, which prevented matters directly or indirectly attributable to the coronavirus regulations from being MCCs. This was a very specific and nationwide response to an emergency situation and was promoted as such. Clause 14, however, seeks to extend that principle to all events arising from legislation or regulation of all kinds and in all normal times, which is a very different construct.
The Government claim that Clause 14 is intended to restore the law to its originally intended state and condition and that its purpose is to require general legislation and guidance to be treated as part of the general market conditions which are thought to be considered only when a new list is compiled—which, under the Bill, would be every three years. However, under Clause 14 we are considering not necessarily nationwide or even emergency situations but much more mundane changes, often of a local or per-property specific nature. Some are harmless and insignificant but others would have significant effects on individual businesses and the physical enjoyment of the premises. These measures could deny a beneficial use which underpins the operation being run from a hereditament. Clause 14 is not the same thing at all as restoring the situation to what was always understood in rating practice but, in fact, a material departure from it.
The audit trail of legislation that brought in what is now Section 2(7) of the Local Government Finance Act 1988 does not support the Government’s claim either. In fact, it reveals quite a different narrative, and an examination of Addis Ltd v Clement (VO), which has long been and remains the benchmark legal decision that the 1988 Act sought to enshrine, demonstrates this. Not only that but its antecedents go back to the 1920s and have been reaffirmed at senior judicial level as recently as 2020. I repeat: the Government’s guidance on their website and the guidance issued by the VOA make it clear that changes which affect the physical enjoyment of the hereditament, as distinct from changes to the physical hereditament itself, are indeed in scope of material change of circumstances.
This means that Clause 14 will have a far wider effect than the Government’s stated intention. That is because, if something can be so loosely defined as being “indirectly attributable” to a change in legislation, and thereby no longer treated as a material change of circumstances of the relevant type, this opens up a vast array of circumstances in which the causative measure and the non-MCC status may apply. Many things would come into play which affect perhaps only
one property or a discrete group, such as a change in planning permission, a premises licence or a road layout change. These are changes which in many cases—in fact, almost invariably—can be made only by dint of legislative authority but none the less would henceforward be “indirectly attributable” to legislation, and thus no longer material changes of circumstances.
There is no sense in which a change in, say, the planning status of an individual property or the exercise of administrative authority resulting in something which patently affects the physical enjoyment of a single property or a locally identifiable property type, can be regarded as part of general market conditions, falling to be dealt with only at revaluation, yet those changes will be excluded under Clause 14 as currently drafted. I do not think that such an approach could ever be justified even on an annual revaluation basis. They are not general market shifts but the result of specific, conscious measures by an authority exercising powers.
Why is this a problem? If the planning or licensing position of a property, or its accessibility or commercial standing in its locality, have changed early in the life of a list, under Clause 14 the ratepayer will continue to pay rates on what would be an incorrect valuation, possibly for almost three years. This gives rise to clear unfairness and inequity. On my reading of the Bill, a billing authority would presumably be in no position to require the rateable value to be reviewed if it implements a scheme under a statutory power which could increase the rateable value of a hereditament in like circumstances.
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I assume that it is not the Government’s intention that this should be the effect of the Bill, but that is what will happen as it is currently drafted, based on the expert and legal advice I have received. It will have significant—and, I hope, unintended—consequences for a fundamental aspect of the law of rating. It needs to be rethought. With apologies for a lengthy technical explanation, I will listen with care to the Minister’s response and her reasoned justification. I beg to move.