My Lords, in moving Amendment 274, I will speak also to Amendment 318 in my name and that of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford. In doing so, I draw your Lordships’ attention to my professional interests.
I have two other amendments in this group: Amendments 320 and 325. They are on a related issue but, given the detail that I need to provide in relation to Amendments 274 and 318, I will do no more than signify my firm support for them and leave the heavy lifting on them to my co-signatory, the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham; I thank him very much for agreeing to do that.
While I am talking about the other amendments in this group, let me say that I agree that Amendment 504GJD in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, is certainly worthy of consideration in terms of providing better passive fire safety measures.
I turn to Amendments 274 and 318. I express my thanks to the Bill team for their engagement; to campaign groups across the country for maintaining awareness of the issues; and to the members of the policy team who have supported me. There are too many of them to name but they know who they are and I am very grateful to them. Most of all, I am grateful to the more than 200 individuals and leaseholder residents’ groups who have written to me over the past four weeks both to support me and to tell me about the tragedies and individual concerns that have beset their lives. It is particularly to give them a voice that I raise this issue today.
Amendments 274 and 318 concern, I believe, matters of great social and economic importance. Despite the Government’s measures in the Building Safety Act 2022, far too many leaseholders remain adversely and significantly affected by serious defects in the original construction of the buildings that they occupy or own. Although the BSA was a significant first step in solving the building safety crisis, it leaves significant numbers of leaseholders without adequate protection from, variously, cladding and non-cladding costs, and much of it is based on extra-statutory commitments of one sort or another. So we have a situation where enfranchised leaseholders and buy-to-let owners with more than three properties are excluded, while residents living in buildings below 11 metres in height receive no protection from non-cladding costs at all.
Correspondents tell me that the Government’s remediation scheme is not working for them and that there is confusion about the process, qualifying interests and building height calculation, with gridlock until all the complex arrangements are in place. The most frequent comment is that owners are still locked into
unsaleable properties with waking watch and massive insurance costs, as well as high remediation bills in prospect without any early or firm date for resolution. I now learn that many conveyancers may even be reluctant to take on work involving buildings over 11 metres high because of the complexity and professional risks that face them.
I welcome the announcement that many of the country’s largest developers have committed to remediating buildings that they were responsible for, but I am concerned that their contractual obligations are limited to life-critical fire safety defects, rather than the wider definitions in the Building Safety Act. Furthermore, the developer contract apparently covers only around 10% to 15% of buildings that require remediation and appears to absolve developers of responsibility for those waking watch and other consequential costs.
Statutory liability for remediation itself is placed on landlords but without consideration of whether they have the resources to deal with this issue and are able to cover the costs. The DLUHC impact assessment admits that it has no cost estimates when it states:
“For buildings above 11 metres that have historical non-cladding fire safety defects, there is no reliable data”—
not even estimates—
“on the prevalence, or extent, of these costs”.
However, an Association of Residential Managing Agents survey suggests that the non-cladding remediation costs in buildings above 18 metres are, on average, £25,671 per flat and, in buildings below 18 metres, £38,184 per flat. There appears to be no data on the sub-11-metre block remediation issues. We do not know how many we are dealing with. By my reckoning, more than 200,000 individual flats are significantly affected in England alone. Others have arrived at higher totals. So my first question for the Minister is: will she be kind enough to tell us what figure her department is working to?
Some landlords have the resources to meet these remediation obligations but it is not universal. Several large groups are in fact thinly capitalised or have significant indebtedness. For example, the three groups that comprise what is known as the Long Harbour fund appear to have relatively modest net assets, while the Consensus Business Group has significant borrowings from insurer Rothesay Life. They are unlikely to have the free cash to fund remediation works as well as servicing their bondholders and lenders if the incidence of defects and the average remediation costs, to which I have referred, are totted up.
As noble Lords will know, freeholds are typically valued by capitalising the sum of the net ground rents. In value terms, however, they are small by comparison with the collective of leaseholds. High remediation liabilities may make them worse than valueless. So if landlords’ interests are negative and they become insolvent—bear in mind that some of them are dealt with through special purpose vehicles—these freeholds, with their negative value, are likely to be disclaimed by liquidators and escheat to the Crown, with all the delays and uncertainty that that entails. I foresee a legal limbo with unsaleable flats; although this would be unprecedented at scale, it is far from improbable, yet nobody in DLUHC admits to having done the calculations to assess the impact.
My fear is that the Government’s approach creates new credit risks for lenders, particularly in relation to buy-to-let portfolios. If excluded leaseholders are unable to pay their share of the remediation costs, schemes of remediation risk simply being stalled. In such circumstances, leases could be forfeited, widening out their lender security unless extra capital is given. Such a forfeiture would providentially give landlords a windfall gain. Historically, few leases have been forfeited because rebalancing the mortgage has been the preferred course of action. However, it is one thing to have a debt of a few thousand pounds on a service charge in arrears; it is another thing to have the much more costly and complicated scenario of remediation costs, which may run into tens of thousands of pounds. I do not believe that historical forfeiture data gives an accurate picture of the new scenario going forward. Credit risk and mortgage interest recalibration are likely to have impacts on the wider financial system and, in turn, effects on other derivatives and insurance policies. I believe that this is something that has some way yet to unravel.
This is not only about the free market; it is about the social sector as well. Many shared equity owners have told me that, although they have a minority equity stake, they are being made responsible for a 100% share of the remediation applicable to their unit of occupation. That seems grossly unfair. Amendments 274 and 318 would avoid all this and provide for an alternative, comprehensive solution to the building safety crisis that protects all leaseholders from past and future issues.
Amendment 274 would mandate the Government to establish a building safety remediation scheme—BSRS. Amendment 318 would create a new schedule setting out guidance for its key features, all intended to dovetail with the principles of the existing building safety fund. The intention is to protect all leaseholders—indeed, all owners of buildings of whatever height and tenure—from the costs of remediating buildings that are unsafe in their construction and the interim safety measures in circumstances where they are entirely innocent of the causes of these defects.
Where a building constructed since 1992 did not comply with the regulations in force at the time, strict joint and several liability for remediation of all material building safety defects would be placed on a developer and principal contractor. If neither is able to pay, or if a building met the regulations that were in force at the time of construction but is now seen as unsafe, which can happen, remediation funding would come from a much wider levy on the construction industry and materials providers as a whole, rather than just developers, as is currently proposed by the Government. Once a significant effect is established, there is no need for property owners to apportion blame; the industry can sort that matter out for itself.
Remediation will be carried out to standards under the BSA to avoid concerns about remediators effectively policing themselves and, worse, using their own selected approved inspectors. These may be the same firms that previously signed off things that they should not have.
Noble Lords will excuse me for not explaining Amendment 318 line by line given its length, but I seek brevity. Anyone wanting further detail can go
to a resource at tinyurl.com/earloflytton. The approach has been scrutinised by a leading construction counsel, a planning KC, parliamentary counsel and other legal minds, as well as by building control, construction and fire safety practitioners. I am extremely grateful to them all for their input. It has attracted support from Ted Baillieu, former state premier of Victoria, Australia, and co-chair of the Australian cladding task force. This matter is attracting international interest around where we go with these sorts of defects. It has also attracted the interest and support of other organisations, including the Association of Mortgage Intermediaries, ARMA, the British Property Federation, the Intermediary Mortgage Lenders Association, NAEA Propertymark, the National Residential Landlords Association, and many others.
Developers should have been the first stop in the Government’s waterfall principle that we discussed just over a year ago. The BSRS bolts on to the existing government commitment, gives leaseholders and lenders more certainty of remediation, and puts them in a greater degree of control. However, it does not just deal with the present crisis. It covers similar situations in the future, and will, I believe, make short-cutting in building standards unworthwhile going forward. We all know that the race to the bottom on quality must cease. The BSRS provides a necessary layer of protection, especially as the Building Safety Act specifically excludes enfranchised leaseholders and commonhold unit owners from all its protections.
The Government do not have the money to solve the problem and are, at present, as I see it, unprepared to place the responsibility on the construction industry that has created this situation over decades of marking its own homework. I believe that the proposals I am advancing would deal with this. Echoing what one commentator said to me last week, if we do not get this right then the taxpayer could end up meeting the entire cost and we will go on building homes badly. We cannot allow that to happen.
All that apart, this is a fundamental matter of justice and equity. It is about protecting the innocent and vulnerable from the cost of failures by profitable enterprises—businesses that would be held liable for their actions in any other mercantile circumstances that one might conceive of. Indeed, the most basic function of government should be the protection of the citizen and society. Meanwhile, my mailbox continues to be filled with tales of individual tragedy, lives on hold, unsellable property, finances in disarray, fear of imminent bankruptcy, careers and retirements wrecked, mental health threatened, weddings shelved, the starting of families put off, forced evacuations—25 blocks is the tally since 2017—and much more misery besides. This crisis is not over until everyone is protected. I beg to move.
5.45 pm