Let me first thank all noble Lords for their amendments, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lennie, for the time he gave to discussing this matter. As always, there were valuable contributions from all parts of the House.
On the details of the amendments, Amendment 60, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lennie, and the noble Baroness, Lady Blake, seeks to establish an industry-led advisory board for the ISOP. In the original consultation, the respondents strongly indicated that the body should be independent of energy sector interests, and I think that is a view shared by the Opposition. The Government
therefore remain concerned that inserting in legislation a formal oversight role, as is being suggested, will place decision-making back in the hands of the energy sector and go against the reasons and mechanism for creating an independent ISOP in the first place. This could make the ISOP risk-averse or unwilling to take action that is potentially challenging to market participants but could be on the side of consumers, even if that action might be beneficial to the system itself.
We are therefore concerned that, rather than enhancing independence, members of such an advisory board would likely hold various energy sector conflicts. There are many ways this could crystallise, including resistance to systemic reform, more strident advice in favour of compensation for energy sector participants, or incumbent bias, for instance seeking to frustrate new market entrants which could stifle the innovation that I think everyone, in all parts of the House, is agreed that we need to reach net zero.
Establishing an industry-led advisory board for the ISOP would be similar to establishing one for, for instance, the Climate Change Committee—an organisation which, in our view, also needs to remain independent of industry interests. I hope noble Lords would agree that we need genuine, independent, expert thinking, rather than vested interests. Thankfully, this amendment is not required to ensure board independence; the Government intend to require that a number of sufficiently independent directors—or SIDs, to use the acronym—sit on the ISOP’s board. A SID is a board member who meets certain criteria to ensure that, as well as being skilled, knowledgeable and experienced, they are impartial, with restrictions including on certain shareholdings in the energy industry. Requirements in the ISOP’s licence will set a minimum number of SIDs to ensure that the ISOP’s board has strong representation from those outside the ISOP and is unconflicted by the interests of the energy industry.
To ensure effective scrutiny of the appointment of the ISOP’s chair, we are also asking the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments and the new departmental Select Committee, once established, to conduct pre-appointment scrutiny. Energy sector experts will have opportunities to input to the ISOP’s work, of course. For instance, the system operator’s business plan submissions, assessed by Ofgem, will continue to be open to consultation with market participants, including members of the specific industry forums mentioned in this amendment. Finally, through its price control process, Ofgem will ensure that the FSO is fully resourced to fulfil its objectives and obligations, including the funding of its statutory duties towards consumers, energy security and net zero.
Turning to Amendments 59 and 62, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, again we agree with the sentiment of the noble Lord’s amendments, and the Government remain resolute that the ISOP shall be an independent public body. We continue to act to make this so. However, it is critical that the ISOP remains a dynamic organisation capable of adapting and evolving to the future conditions of the energy sector. I therefore hope the noble Lord will agree with me that it is preferable not to constrain the ISOP pre-emptively in legislation at this fairly early stage but
to maintain some flexibility. With the rapid deployment expected in the energy sector, reasonable circumstances may arise in which the ISOP is well placed to take on some future energy sector role or interest.
Regarding the specifics of Amendment 62, I believe there are already significant controls and limits upon the Secretary of State in acting as the sole shareholder. These will include limits in the framework agreement, which we will of course make public. These controls will ensure that the ISOP’s operational independence is protected.
Legislating for the ISOP to “be independent” does not, in my view, appear to offer a material benefit beyond the controls already established in Part 4 of the Bill and the framework documents, but it risks preventing the intended corporate composition of the ISOP, thereby undermining its effectiveness.
Finally, on Amendment 61, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, the Government agree that it will be important to ensure that the ISOP is fully resourced to fulfil the objectives and obligations set out in its licence. In our view, the most effective funding mechanism to achieve this and realise our vision for an independent ISOP is for it to be funded by consumers through price control arrangements, much like the current gas and electricity system operators are today.
Levies placed on licensed bodies can be expected to filter through to consumers. However, we are concerned that the requirement to establish an audit board risks duplication with the current well-understood and transparent regulatory model established under Ofgem. Without a price control process run by the regulator, there is also a risk of poor consumer value for money. As with other regulated bodies in this sector, the ISOP will have the operational freedom it needs to manage and organise itself to effectively deliver its roles and objectives. We also intend the ISOP to sit outside the regime of Cabinet Office controls on spending, which bodies funded by taxes and levies are required to operate under.
With the explanations and reassurances that I have been able to provide, I hope that noble Lords will agree not to press their amendments.