The noble Lord, Lord Robathan, referred to his experience in the forces in Northern Ireland. It reminded me that when I was defending in the Brighton bomb trial in 1986, I was surprised to discover that Daniel O’Connell, the leader in the 19th century of the fight for Catholic emancipation and the scrapping of the Act of Union 1800, was, despite his nickname of “The Liberator”, dismissed as a traitor. The inspiration of the IRA was the rebellion of 1798, when Wolfe Tone and Emmet sought full independence for Ireland, with French republican support. That rebellion was a horrific episode, characterised by the dragooning of Ulster and other atrocities. I was appalled to discover that the Ancient Britons, a Welsh regiment of fencibles who were foremost in that savagery, had been raised in my neighbourhood in north Wales.
I therefore have some understanding of the deep and historic roots of the divide between the Catholic and Presbyterian communities, although not of course the lived experience of the noble Lords who are speaking in this debate. The more I come to understand the issues as a member of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland Sub-Committee, the more I am led to the conclusion that the Belfast/Good Friday agreement was something of a miracle, wrought by many across the political divide. Surely today’s politicians on all sides can emulate Paisley and McGuinness and sit together, to co-operate in government and to resolve issues by discussion and compromise.
The Windsor Framework is by no means perfect, as the noble Lord, Lord Jay, remarked. In my view, although there are many improvements in the Windsor Framework to the previous protocol, the Stormont brake is so surrounded by qualifications that it is unlikely ever to be used. It is instructive to look at what the European Commission has published in its commentary on the framework:
“The Stormont Brake is a new emergency mechanism that will allow the UK government, at the request of 30 Members of the Legislative Assembly in Northern Ireland … in the most exceptional circumstances, as a last resort as set out in a unilateral UK Declaration, to stop the application of amended or replacing provisions of EU law, that may have a significant and lasting impact specific to the everyday lives of communities in Northern Ireland.”
That is the EU view.
Thus, the Stormont brake goes only a short way to address the undoubted democratic deficit. Further, since it can be triggered by a petition of concern advanced by a minority of Members of the Northern Irish Assembly, it creates a positive Grand National of high jumps and fences which could easily lead to political conflict and a new impasse. The brake comes into play only after the 27 continuing members of the EU, having engaged in the necessary discussions and compromises needed to reach agreement, have put together a final legislative Act or regulation. It is then presented as a fait accompli to the people in Stormont.
What the people of Northern Ireland need is input into the pre-legislative discussions. But let us not despair. I believe that changes can be made without renegotiation of the Windsor Framework, and certainly without placing the protocol in the dustbin. In the same EU commentary to which I referred, the EU states that it recognises that Northern Ireland stakeholders have
valuable insights to offer on Northern Ireland’s unique circumstances, and it will take into account their views in a timely and meaningful manner:
“The Commission will, in particular, be guided by the Commission Work Programme to identify specific Protocol-relevant measures for which space for intensified engagement with Northern Ireland stakeholders will be created.”
In the same spirit, the framework agreement strengthens the work of the joint consultative working group by the creation of themed subgroups, which are designed to be the conduit by which advanced notice of policy proposals in the EU will be conveyed to the UK Government.
In my view, the UK Government should now give firm assurances that a major part of the team which attends the joint consultative working group formed by the protocol should come from Northern Ireland. After all, most of the measures are concerned with devolved matters. This would of course have implications for expanding the Northern Ireland Civil Service to allow it take on such responsibilities.
Similarly, the joint committee to which the JCWG reports should have expanded representation from the Northern Ireland Assembly. Currently the First Minister and Deputy First Minister are invited to attend. No doubt they have an expert team of advisers, but token membership of the joint committee would most certainly not be enough. There must be room, where a particular measure or set of measures is referred to the joint committee, for the Minister responsible in the Northern Ireland Executive to attend as of right. The issue of who attends these committees is in the hands of the UK Government and does not require the assent of the European Commission.
The democratic deficit can never be completely resolved in the absence of a vote in the European Parliament. But the views of NI stakeholders and elected representatives can be fed in at an early stage through the revived and reformed joint consultative working group. This would give to the people of Northern Ireland not just the convoluted and clumsy mechanism of the Stormont brake but an essential and effective voice in the creation or subsequent amendment of EU measures.