My Lords, I draw attention to my interests in the register. I am a serving district and county councillor and a vice-president of the District Councils’ Network.
I will speak to our Amendments 78 and 85 and will comment also on some of the other amendments in this group. Many in this House who have connections with local government will be very aware of the significant issues in relation to formal audit over the last three years. This has been the result of a number of issues in the private sector audit regime that we now have, including the increasing complexity of local authority
accounts and the resultant demands on training, the recruitment and retention of staff, and rapidly increasing fees, to name just a few factors that have been experienced by the private audit sector. In fact, it was estimated last year that only 9% of local authorities had been able to have their 2021 audits completed on time.
Audit is really vital, as the noble Lord said just now. It provides public reassurance and confidence for both members and officers, and more particularly for the public. It is disappointing that the Bill does nothing to address that issue. However, the amendments in this section are aimed at ensuring that scrutiny within the CCA is as powerful and independent as it can be, which should, in turn, mean that audit is effective and can develop a high level of confidence among members and the public.
Turning first to our Amendment 78, this is needed because of the proposals in the Bill that effectively exclude district councillors from being voting members of the CCA itself. I appreciate that we have some work to do to clarify that point. The fundamental impact of the decisions taken by the CCA must, therefore, be able to be scrutinised effectively by members with a detailed local knowledge of their area. As chairs of overview and scrutiny review the decisions of their own councils’ executive committees on a regular basis, they will have a good working knowledge of the strategic planning for their areas, and therefore will be able to assess the likely impact of decisions taken by the CCA.
There is a precedent for this. For example, in the policing panels, which scrutinise the work and budgets of police and crime commissioners, all districts in a PCC’s area are entitled to be present. It is not intended that this amendment would prevent other members being appointed to an overview and scrutiny committee—for example independent members, as referred to in Amendment 84, from the noble Lord, Lord Shipley.
I turn now to our Amendment 85. This relates to the sharing of best practice on scrutiny, and there is some very good advice and support on scrutiny available from the Centre for Public Scrutiny. It will be vital to the successful operation of the CCA that best practice from around the country is shared among the committees. We appreciate that this is not necessarily the role of the Secretary of State, but it could be made clear in guidance to overview and scrutiny committees that they should give consideration regularly to how they operate and how they assimilate best practice.
I will now comment, if I may, on some of the amendments tabled by other noble Lords. We support Amendment 77, from the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, which is designed to strengthen the role of overview and scrutiny in relation to CCAs. The Labour Party has long been advocating that local public accounts committees could be a way of pulling together local scrutiny of the impact of both national and local policy-making and decision-making on local areas. This would be a first step towards ensuring that overview and scrutiny committees have a level of independence from the CCA. The membership of these committees also needs to be carefully considered.
Turning to Amendment 79, the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, referred to the fact that overview and scrutiny committees must be able to carry out their
work without influence, and I totally support that. The overview and scrutiny committees must be completely unfettered from any interference from the CCA, including such devices as setting out workplans for them or prohibiting them from scrutinising any aspect of work undertaken by the CCA. Neither should the CCA be able to determine the process used by the overview and scrutiny committees. For example, if the committees wish to call witnesses, including members of the CCA, they should be able to do so. We would be grateful for the Minister’s clarification that it is the intention that overview and scrutiny committees are entitled to carry out their scrutiny of the CCA in any way that they determine will achieve effective scrutiny.
The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, raise some important issues around the way in which rural issues—such as housing, education, transport, rural economies and so on—often differ from those that are the main consideration of a CCA. We should support the freedom of a CCA to create any sub-committee that is relevant to the work that it undertakes. If it helps to have a rural sub-committee specifically listed to ensure that rural issues are considered by a CCA, that is no bad thing. This is particularly useful where the CCA covers an area that is largely urban but contains smaller rural areas, as it will ensure that issues relevant to rurality are properly considered and reported back to the CCA. A report from one of our own Lords committees, on rural communities, showed that, on the whole, local enterprise partnerships are not great at delivering for rural areas, so the need for that sort of committee of a CCA is well evidenced.
Amendment 82, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, is a belt-and-braces amendment, if noble Lords will forgive the expression, to ensure that, should a Member have recently crossed the Floor from one political party to another—meaning that they would have had very recent contact with the mayor, their decision-making processes and strategy—they are not then placed in a position to be able to scrutinise the mayor’s actions. It truly is belt and braces because, in my experience, people who change their political party do so because of disenchantment with where they have been, so it is possible that they may be the best critics of the mayor and their administration. However, this amendment would ensure that there could be no deliberate manipulation of the scrutiny function.
Similar to Amendment 82, Amendment 83, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, would mean that, if there is no party with an outright majority on the CCA, the chair of overview and scrutiny should not be a member of either of the parties that may hold the majority together. Depending on local circumstances, this might be difficult if, for example, a third or fourth party is very much in the minority and may not be able to put forward a chair. In those circumstances, it might be necessary to make provision for an independent chair; the fact that we need to continue to discuss this means that there are issues here that continue to need resolution.
The LGA has made some extensive comments on Amendment 84 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Shipley. It is worth recording what it has said
about having independent co-opted members on audit committees; it is certainly in favour of it. It states:
“Having multiple co-optees enables them to have complementary skills (eg finance, risk management, governance) … The constitutional rules should still require the majority of audit committee members to be elected members. This is for two reasons”—
which are fairly obvious to me but perhaps they are not always so obvious. They are that
“audit committees are fulfilling a role delegated by elected members … who are jointly and severally ‘those charged with governance’, and … elected members represent the community and are in a unique position not enjoyed by independent co-optees to understand what the concerns of local people are in relation to assurance”.
So, although we would support the increase in transparency provided by an increased number of independent members participating in an audit committee for all the reasons that the LGA and the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, have highlighted, we question the need to have a specific number when the Bill already states that “at least” one member of an audit committee is an independent member. Perhaps it should be for the CCA to determine its preference for the number of independent members, based on the particular skills base that it feels it needs to carry out the audit role. In time, we feel that good practice would be developed by CCA audit committees as they understand what particular skills are needed in relation to CCA audit work; we are sure that they would be supported by national bodies such as the LGA in sharing good practice.
Another important issue arises here: the question of remuneration, which the LGA has raised. Independent members of a CCA audit committee are likely to be necessarily highly skilled individuals in, for example, finance, risk management and/or governance. While one could expect that they will give a certain proportion of their time for community benefit, it seems unreasonable to expect that they would carry out this role without any remuneration at all. Although the cost of the remuneration of independent members is likely to be minimal in the context of the overall budget of the CCA, consideration should be given to this at the initiation of the CCA so that the roles can be properly defined and recruited. The availability of the necessary skills in any particular area can be decided only in practice.
I am grateful to noble Lords for all their amendments in this group.