My Lords, in moving Amendment 70 I am extremely conscious that it is a probing amendment to look at one aspect of the Government’s thinking on the creation and operation of CCAs. However, in many ways it is also a paving amendment for many of the other amendments in this group. Clause 8 confers on the Secretary of State, subject to the consent of the constituent parts of the proposed CCA, numerous powers in relation to it, ranging from membership and voting powers to the appointment and function of an executive of the CCA. It also covers the overview and scrutiny arrangements as well as the appointment of a mayor, where relevant, and of non-constituent and associate members. So it is very wide-ranging and to some extent, the amendments in this group touch on many of those issues.
It is important to begin by making it clear that, for we on these Benches, at least one issue is really important. Given their crucial role, not least in planning and economic development, we believe that district councils should be full members of any CCA. We have already moved amendments to that effect, as have other noble Lords, and we will continue to do so at later stages of the Bill. I note that, in Amendment 81 in this group, my noble friend Lady Scott of Needham Market and the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, are also proposing a role for parish councils.
We have also been clear that the voting membership of a decision-making body such as a CCA should comprise only those who have been elected to it or one of the constituent organisations that makes it up. In simple terms, we believe that those who have to abide by a law or decision should have some say in deciding who makes those decisions; I certainly believe that that should be true of a second Chamber of this Parliament. For those reasons and many others, as my noble friend Lady Scott will no doubt discuss in a few minutes, we oppose the appointment of non-constituent and associate members to a CCA. We certainly feel, as expressed in Amendments 155 and 156 from my noble friend Lord Shipley, that if they are put in place, these unelected CCA members should not have a vote.
Even if we reach agreement on who should be constituent members of a CCA, there remains the crucial question of what the voting arrangements should be. As I mentioned in an earlier debate, I appreciate the concern that if, for example, district councils are allowed to become constituent members of a CCA, they could, because of their number, always outvote the other constituent members and, in effect, have a veto. It is therefore important that we are clear about how the voting arrangements will be made. Incidentally,
I entirely accept that my probing Amendment 70 could lead to that very problem of district councils having a veto.
The Minister has already made it clear that the Government intend to allow CCAs to determine their own arrangements where possible. We broadly agree with this approach, but surely we need to be clear whether that freedom will extend totally to, for example, voting arrangements, without any restrictions on local decision-making. After all, subsection (2)(b) of Clause 8, which refers to the Secretary of State’s power to make regulations, states that regulations may—so it is possible for the Secretary of State to do this—cover
“the voting powers of members of the CCA (including provision for different weight to be given to the vote of different descriptions of member)”.
Like my noble friend Lord Stunell, who will go into more detail on this at a later stage, we are concerned that, for example, setting aside a requirement that the CCA need not be constructed in accordance with the balance of political representation among the constituent members could lead to serious problems with its voting on the issues on which it makes decisions. Not limiting the number of associate members—who could, as we have heard, be given a vote—as per the current arrangement could also have a significant impact on the voting decisions of the CCA.
I am absolutely clear that while we support the Government’s principal intention of ensuring that decisions on these matters are made by the CCA itself, we need to be very clear what freedoms it will really have and what the implications of Clause 8(2)(b) really mean. No doubt, that clarity will come when the Minister winds up. I beg to move.