My Lords, I am going to lose my voice at this rate. I will introduce my amendments in this group and briefly comment on those in the names of other noble Lords.
My Amendment 67 to Clause 8 means that regulations can relate only to the initial constitutional arrangements, and my Amendment 68 means that the regulations relating to the constitutional arrangements of a CCA can be made only after consultation with the CCA. Clause 8 allows the Secretary of State to establish constitutional arrangements, and we do not have a problem with that at all. These are defined as
“membership ... voting powers ... executive arrangements”
and
“functions of any executive body”.
The executive arrangements include government appointments, the functions by which the executive operates, the functions of the executive that might be delegated to the committee, the “review and scrutiny” of the executive, “access to information” about the executive and the disapplication of Section 15 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989—plus the keeping of records. These are important aspects of establishing who will be on a CCA, where decisions will be made and what will and will not be in the public domain.
We believe that, once the Secretary of State sets up the bodies, they really ought to be allowed to get on with the job without undue interference. We believe that we should be able to trust them to exercise the significant power and money functions that will be devolved to them from the centre by this clause. So, if we trust them to do that, we should also trust them to be able to operate their own constitutional arrangements.
My Amendment 67 would insert the word “initial” to demonstrate that the Secretary of State may make provisions about the first set of constitutional arrangements only, and then the CCAs can carry on
and do it themselves. Amendment 68 would further ensure that CCAs are consulted on any further regulations that would relate to their constitutional arrangements.
I will speak briefly to my Amendment 88 to Clause 16, which would mean that the
“regulations can only be made with a majority of members of the constituent councils”.
If all the constituent councils are going to feel on a level footing, as it were, with the rest, it is important that they all have that say and that things can change only once there is a majority who actually wants to make that change. It is then more likely to be accepted and moved forward in a constructive manner.
I will comment on a few other amendments. The deletion of the paragraph that the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, has asked for in his Amendment 69
“would reduce the risk of single party control of the executive of a CCA or its committees”.
We strongly agree with the noble Lord on that. It is an important amendment, because the Secretary of State should not be able to make regulations which disapply the political proportionality rules for an executive or committee of a CCA; we believe that that is for the electorate to decide.
We also agree completely with the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, in his Amendment 71, which means that a constituent council can include
“a district council in a two-tier county council for an area within the CCA’s area or proposed area”.
We believe that this is one of a number of places in the Bill where district councils must be allowed to be included as constituent councils in two-tier areas.
The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, has also tabled Amendments 72 and 75, which, again, reduce the risk of one-party dominance. I absolutely understand his point: if you allow voting members to resolve that non-constituent members can vote on a CCA, you could end up with the situation where this class of member is appointed specifically to boost the voting majority of one party. This comes back to us saying earlier that, if you are not careful, you could end up with a situation where things could be manipulated, even if that is not the Government’s intention. We have to be very careful about that, so we strongly support those amendments.
The amendment to Clause 26 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, would require a referendum. I see that she is very keen on referendums today. I am not sure whether this is subject to prior legislation, but I am sure that she can enlighten me. The consultation to which we referred in our amendment in relation to setting up the CCA could carry a requirement that it also determines the nature of that CCA: for example, whether it is to be mayoral-led or indirectly elected, appointed by the CCA. In any case, it is probably good practice to consider a referendum on whether there should be a mayor and whether a CCA is indirectly elected. However, the one concern we have—I am sure that the Minister will refer to this—is the considerable cost of running any referendum; that is the sticking point for us.
Amendment 114, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, ensures that appointments cannot be imposed without scrutiny and without the CCA’s
agreement. Again, this is around the appointment of a deputy mayor, in particular. If we assume the current system will continue as it is—that is, where deputy mayors are appointed—I would certainly agree with the noble Lord that this should not be without the scrutiny and agreement of the CCA. The question here is whether a powerful position such as that of deputy mayor should even be appointed in the first place, or whether we should undertake some kind of democratic process for these powerful positions.
Amendment 116A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stunell, seeks to probe the circumstances in which political balance might be inappropriate. This is a very helpful amendment where the noble Lord, Lord Stunell, is seeking to explore the nature of political balance in bodies that exercise joint functions. In effect, these have usually worked without political proportionality being applied, but it would be interesting to hear the Minister’s view on how this might operate going forward.
Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, has another two amendments. Amendment 120
“would ensure that the CCA is confident that powers being delegated by the deputy mayor are appropriate.”
Sensibly, it seeks to add an extra protection, which we would support—we would not want to see any deputy mayors going rogue, for example. Amendment 122
“would ensure that the views of a majority of the CCA are fully considered”.
Again, we think this is absolutely appropriate. There are important matters that this could cover—for example, the transfer of fire and rescue powers to the chief constable, which is of course a possibility. With that, I beg to move.