My Lords, I feel that this debate has begun to justify the generous tribute to your Lordships’ House paid by my noble friend Lord Soames in his powerful and memorable speech. Perhaps the most intriguing aspects of Putin’s special military operation in Ukraine are how he dared to start it; why it so rapidly became a military humiliation for Russia; why the disastrous strategic, economic and human consequences for Russia were not anticipated; and why it will almost certainly—it certainly should—result in the end of Putin’s rule in Russia.
The relationship between Russia and Ukraine this century has been one of suspicion, resentment and hatred, and the seeds of this were sown by Stalin a century ago. On 7 August 1932, the Central Committee of the USSR ordered that the Soviet theory of the collectivisation of agriculture be imposed on Ukraine. The Holodomor, which involved deliberate starvation as a form of genocide in Ukraine, led to the death by starvation of over 3.5 million people by April 1933. Some claim that as many as 10 million people died. It involved Soviet enforcers seizing all grain and livestock from farmers. Collectivisation was well described by Robert Conquest in his book The Harvest of Sorrow, published in 1988, with his conclusion that,
“in any future crisis in the USSR, it is clear that Ukrainian nationhood will be a factor and a vital one”.
On 9 April 1933, the British embassy in Moscow received a desperate appeal from Ukraine, which said:
“England, save us who are dying of hunger; help us get rid of the Bolsheviks”.
Sadly, there was no response.
By July the Soviet intelligence service, OGPU, had turned into the much-feared NKVD, with Yagoda—later executed, of course—in charge of it. In November 1933, famine arrived in Russia following collectivisation and the implementation of Stalin’s call for the liquidation of the kulaks as a class. On 25 July 1934, your Lordships’ House debated famine in the Soviet Union. Looking through the debate, it seemed to me that our Foreign Office was more anxious than anything to avoid criticism of the Soviet system. But that was then: the new shadow of fascism had emerged, even more threatening and dark than that of communism.
History has taught us to be clearer and bolder. In September 1936, the even more feared Yezhov took over the NKVD, launching Stalin’s great terror, with 1.5 million people arrested, of whom 44% were executed. Yezhov was shot in February 1940. In May 1937, Stalin started his purge of the Soviet army. The first bunch were shot in June and, by November, most military commanders were dead. Perhaps that explains the huge loss of Russians before the Nazi invaders were defeated.
Russia’s military has never lacked numbers, courage or endurance, but they have seldom had the training, leadership, equipment, logistics, competence or professionalism needed in a modern army. The result of this has been demonstrated in Ukraine over the last 12 months, with Putin making frantic changes of military command, moving from one general to another. How has he survived the humiliations he has brought upon his country?
To protect the leader, the shadow of the secret police has always dominated everyone in Russia, but Putin has gone one bit better. Since the end of the USSR, the Russian Federation has become largely Christian. Putin himself is a churchgoer. He has, from the start, had spiritual blessing for the Ukraine operation from Patriarch Kirill of Moscow, who leads the Russian Orthodox Church. A 2020 survey by the American Government estimated that 63% of the population are Orthodox believers, so the Church endorsement may help explain the continuing public compliance, if not support, for Putin’s war. Surprisingly—no, not at all—Patriarch Kirill, who is now 76, was a KGB agent from his youth. The Swiss Government have recently declassified their police archives on Kirill to show that in the 1970s, as agent Mikhailov, the young priest was the KGB’s man in Geneva, and he represented the Russian Church on the World Council of Churches.
I understand that, generally, there are 10 clinically accepted indications of the personality default known as psychopathy. They include behaviour that conflicts with social norms; disregarding or violating the rights of others; an inability to distinguish between right and wrong; difficulty with showing remorse or emotion; a tendency to lie often; manipulating and hurting others; disregard toward safety and responsibility; expressing anger and arrogance on a regular basis; and a tendency to engage in behaviour that is reckless or impulsive or may lead to harmful consequences. I suggest that Putin ticks half those boxes.
Let us hope that, with our undaunted support, President Zelensky can save Ukraine from Russia—but I fear that it may need the Russian people to save the world from President Putin.
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