My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to engage in a full, non-time-limited debate on something that is an existential threat to the security of the United Kingdom. I very much appreciated the introduction to the debate by my noble friend Lady Goldie. Can the Minister confirm, to be clear, that His Majesty’s Government’s absolute minimum strategic objective is to prevent Ukraine being defeated? The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, told us that it is a much more complicated issue than the minimum objective, and we do not know what the long-term objective will be. I think all noble Lords will agree that if Ukraine were defeated, we would have to at least double our defence expenditure, with all the attendant difficulties that would ensue. The noble Lord, Lord Robertson, gave us hope and evidence that, at some point, even autocrats have to give up. I will elaborate on why Putin will have to do so .
In state-on-state conflict, success for the aggressor will depend upon either an immediately successful attack, using overwhelming military or political superiority, or enjoying overall strategic superiority in the longer term. By as early as 26 February last year, it was likely that the former was not going to happen, and by 9 March, it was not at all clear that the Ukrainians would ever be defeated. To enjoy overall strategic superiority, an aggressor needs to have a larger population and industrial capacity and economy to match it. Russia’s population is quite a bit larger than that of Ukraine, as my noble friend Lady Meyer pointed out, but Putin is profligate in the way he tolerates casualties, and one should never underestimate the moral component of fighting power.
More important in terms of strategic superiority is the relative size of the economies and industrial capacities. While Ukraine is obviously inferior in this respect, it will benefit from the sum of all the NATO countries’ capacity, whereas I understand that Russia’s economy is only the size of Italy’s and is largely based on mineral extraction. Furthermore, we will not allow the Ukrainian Government to run out of money and we can share the cost of doing that. Sadly, this could make for a long war with much pointless, tragic and avoidable loss of life on both sides—and it absolutely pains me to see the loss of life of civilians and lovely young men on both sides. Of course, this is made worse by the Russian people’s tolerance of pain in order to avoid defeat. Nevertheless, the long-term outcome is not in doubt, so long as we do not give up: Putin’s position is not sustainable .
With one exception that I will come to, I believe that HMG, particularly the FCDO and the MoD, are doing an outstandingly good job. I share the views expressed by my noble friend Lord Soames about my right honourable friend the Secretary of State, Ben Wallace, in my noble friend’s excellent maiden speech. I admire the way that each decision made by Ministers is very carefully calibrated and calculated: I hope that that answers some of the rhetorical questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria .
I recall that in around 2010, my heart sank when some Cameron advisers claimed that the British Army did not need armoured brigades with their armoured battlegroups. To be honest, these are extremely expensive to operate and maintain, with considerable logistic support required to keep them in operation. We cut them back because we could not afford them—or we thought we could not afford them. The problem is that to attack dug-in infantry without using an armoured battlegroup, with its protected mobility and firepower, is a suicidal endeavour. That is no doubt why the Ukrainians are desperate to create more such fighting units: they cannot afford the immoral casualty rates that the Russians appear to accept in making such dismounted attacks. I point out that for both sides, training for armoured manoeuvre warfare is not quick, easy or cheap, but hopefully we can enable the Ukrainians to be more effective in that regard.
I have heard and read concerns that donating a squadron of Challenger tanks to Ukraine would leave us short. I do not believe anything of the sort; we have plenty of surplus tanks and we can rehabilitate any tanks much faster than we can train the gallant Ukrainian soldiers to operate and maintain them. Challenger 2 is a very complex tank to take into service and sustain. Now that we have managed to get the Leopard 2 released, there are some tricky questions about how to deploy Challenger 2, but I am confident that the Government and MoD will make the correct decisions, and these are not something we should seek to influence.
I echo the comments of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, about the logistics for this equipment. If Challenger 2 and the AS-90 are to be deployed to the front line in Ukraine, I urge Ministers to obtain categoric assurances from the staff that there will be first-line and second-line maintenance in place within Ukraine, a robust repair loop for engines and main assemblies, and the black boxes that proliferate in armoured fighting vehicles.
It is not clear to me that HM Treasury is fully seized of the strategic objective of at least preventing Ukraine being defeated. How can we be sure that it is not still penny-pinching the MoD? Noble Lords should understand that we cannot determine what our future defence posture should be until the outcome of this war is clear and the lessons have been analysed.
However, I want to refer to a more immediate problem. In order to support government-to-government arrangements, the Ukrainians, through commercial agents, have been buying up private and commercially owned armoured fighting vehicles in the United Kingdom. These vehicles will allow their troops to move around the battlefield with less chance of falling victim to artillery fire or other perils, as I have explained. Every
AFV that is sent out provides another group of brave Ukrainian soldiers with the protective mobility they deserve. The Government’s export control organisation has been doing an excellent job of processing the licences for these AFVs, and no doubt it carefully considers all the relevant factors, including where the vehicles are going and, most importantly, where the money is coming from. It obviously has access to all the facilities and capabilities of the state, coupled with the close involvement of the MoD.
Noble Lords will appreciate that locating, purchasing and preparing these AFVs is a specialised business that only a few are effective at undertaking, and only a few have the necessary contacts and facilities. One of these dealers is called “Peter”—that is not his real name, which I cannot divulge for security reasons. I understand that Peter has export licences for at least 100 AFVs. Peter contacted me to ask for my help, because his bank wrote to him on 20 December last year to tell him that his bank account will be closed on 20 February. The bank made it clear that it was not prepared to discuss the matter or say why it was necessary. Peter suspected it was to do with money laundering, because his turnover has rocketed, and he is dealing with Ukrainian businessmen.
I have sought to deal with this matter discreetly and behind the scenes. The major high street bank has been very helpful and, so far as I can discern, it has done nothing wrong and has only been implementing the money laundering regulations. Thus, it would be unfair to name the bank. At a senior level, the bank has made it clear to me that it could continue to provide banking services if it received a letter from a Treasury Minister telling it to do so, or if Peter promised to stop selling AFVs to Ukraine.
I am grateful to the appropriate Treasury Minister for agreeing to have a meeting yesterday about this matter. Unfortunately, within two hours of us feting President Zelensky in Westminster Hall, the Minister was unable to agree to relax the money laundering regulations, even in a specific and minor way. The best advice from the Minister appeared to be that Peter should engage—wait for it—a consultant who would help him be compliant. The problem with that approach is that it is obvious that the bank was unhappy about the Ukrainian businessmen, and it is not clear to me how an expensive consultant can overcome that difficulty. It is also not what the bank thought to recommend to me.
I apologise for raising this matter in such an important strategic debate. However, as matters stand, Peter will have to cease exporting armoured fighting vehicles to Ukraine on or before Monday week if he is to pay the wages to his staff and continue in business. As I understand it, this is because Treasury Ministers believe that the complete integrity of the money laundering regulations is more important than supplying armoured fighting vehicles to Ukraine. The consequence of this will be that some heroic Ukrainian soldiers will die because they have been denied the opportunity of protected mobility on the battlefield. When my noble friend Lord Ahmad comes to reply, can he confirm that refusing to relax the money laundering regulations in the way I have suggested is the settled policy of His Majesty’s Government?
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