My Lords, I want to talk about the wider context for the post-Soviet space, so to speak, for the western alliance and for British politics as such. There has been a certain amount of debate as to when this conflict started. Was it last year? Was it 2014? Was it 2008, with the Russian invasion of Georgia, or was it earlier? In effect, it began with the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the different assumptions and illusions held by the new Government of Russia and the Governments of the other states that had emerged out of the Soviet Union.
One of the most vivid memories I have out of all of this was when, at very short notice, I was asked to join a Harvard University team going out to Kyiv six weeks after Ukraine became formally independent. On the first day of the conference, the new Foreign Minister of this new country came and gave us a speech, which concluded with the wonderful declaration: “Ukraine has two major strategic objectives for the next two years. The first is to join the European Union and the
second is to join NATO.” My American colleagues turned to me and said, “You’re answering that, William.” I had to explain that life was not as easy as that.
We all know that we were struggling in the 1990s to explain to the Baltic states, the Balkan states and others that the transition was a difficult one; that corruption was always a problem; and that it takes an awfully long time to institute respect for the rule of law and democratic institutions and to change the old culture, and we have not entirely succeeded.
The Russian Governments who succeeded the Soviet Union have been interfering in their neighbours and former clients almost since the word go. I have been in and out of Georgia on a number of occasions and have seen that vividly. As we are talking about destruction, I remember going to Abkhazia in 2004. Over a third of the houses in Sukhumi had been destroyed. It was absolute devastation. When I went into South Ossetia, we found ourselves surrounded in the UN convoy by little green men who objected to our inspecting the damage in various places.
This is not just about Ukraine, and it has not just happened. When we talk about how we can resolve this conflict, we also have to talk about its implications for Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, potentially Kazakhstan, and, as the noble Lord, Lord Soames, reminded us, Serbia and the Balkans. These are all areas where we have seen active Russian interference, and where the end of this conflict, if it involved a Russian setback, would set off all sorts of other minor earthquakes. It is not totally out of the question that current Russia would disintegrate further. I have been to Tatarstan, and everyone is conscious that there are all sorts of historical tensions, of which those who are there are well aware. Coming out of this conflict, therefore, is not going to be very easy.
We all know also about Russian interference in western politics. The Intelligence and Security Committee’s report on Russia was very strong on the extent to which the Russians had penetrated the British establishment, including the Conservative Party. The incidents with the Conservative Friends of Russia and all that were not entirely spelled out in the report; let us hope that that is all behind us and that we all understand what we are dealing with.
We should still be worried that in the United States and a number of other countries, there are those on the right who sympathise with autocracy and illiberal democracy. If we were still to be in the conflict in 18 months’ time and the United States was approaching the return of a Republican President, we might find that the demand on European leadership, rather than American leadership, in resisting Russian interventions in Ukraine would be almost heavier than the Europeans could bear. After hearing the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, who is a great expert on the American right, I wonder whether he thinks that is a real problem or that the debate in the United States has also moved on and we may relax a little about the willingness of the Americans to stay the course and help to pay for the reconstruction.
We have been discussing in this debate questions such as “How long will the conflict last?”, “How will it end?” and “What objectives are we fighting for?” Yesterday, President Zelensky set out those objectives
on a pretty high level. He said that we are protecting the international legal order against a terrorist state and that we must make every effort to turn our achievements into the foundations of the future global security architecture. That is ambitious, and we have not thought much about that yet.
In the 1990s, the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, did a great deal on what the post-Cold War European security architecture should be. We never got very far with it, I am afraid. Maybe that sort of question will come back. It will be very difficult for us to explain to the Ukrainian Government that joining the EU is not entirely easy, to dissuade the Georgians and heaven knows who else from wanting to do the same, and to manage the expansion of NATO if it cannot be avoided any further, while also managing the rest of the post-Soviet space. It will all be extremely difficult. We mishandled it in the 1990s, but it was very difficult to know exactly what to do.
I have some sympathy with the agony that the Russians have gone through, coming down from being an imperial power to being simply one of the major nations of the world. After all, Britain has been going through the same process and has been finding it extremely painful. There are those who wish to deny that we are not any longer as exceptional as we thought. I remember reading a wonderful book which used history to justify how exceptional Britain was: How We Invented Freedom & Why It Matters. The American edition was called Inventing Freedom: How the English-Speaking Peoples Made the Modern World, so I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, has a degree of sympathy with the Putin essay using Russian history to justify his exceptional view of the world.
We and our public have found it difficult to adjust. The Russian population—certainly the Russian elite—have found it very difficult to adjust too. We do not know where this conflict will end. We know that it must end in a reassertion of international legal and political norms, and that does mean, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, said, that Russia must lose in one form or another.
Lastly, on implications for British policy, at present we do not have a coherent UK foreign policy. I look forward to the new integrated review because, after the illusions of the Boris Johnson “global Britain” order, we need to redefine. What are the implications for defence spending? Clearly, we must expand spending on defence. Political leadership, which is as important at home as it is abroad, will therefore require politicians to say, “If we are going to spend more on defence and not cut what we are spending on domestic matters, we will have to raise taxes and not cut taxes.” People, such as Liz Truss, who still go around saying that the most important answer to every single question that Britain faces is to cut taxes, may have to be countered.
Then there is the question of domestic policy on energy spending. We know that energy prices are likely to jump up and down until this conflict is over and perhaps for some time after. That also requires political leadership, in explaining to our public that these sacrifices are worth making, and that the domestic and international emergency we are in justifies these sorts of sacrifices
and the additional financial burdens that we will have to suffer. We do not know where we are going or how long the conflict will last, but we know that we have to stick it out.
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