My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, particularly in her suggestion that it is not too early to start thinking about the long term. She is quite right.
I say to my noble friend Lord Soames, who is no longer in his place, how much I admired his contribution to our discussion. I know we will have many more quality contributions of that kind from him, and it is a great pleasure to have him in our House.
A lot of wise things have already been said in this debate. We have reached the point in our discussion where much of the important ground has been covered one way or another by previous speakers. I intend to be brief.
I think there is widespread understanding that we are at something of a turning point in this war. The bravery and resilience of the Ukrainian people and their leadership was exemplified by President Zelensky in his remarkable performance yesterday, crucially underpinned by the military assistance given by the allies. That has led to a level of Ukrainian success in the field that has come as a fairly nasty shock to the Russians; the situation on the ground is not one that they either wanted or expected. However, when they gear up for the next offensive, they are not likely to make precisely the same mistakes. It seems to me that they will be better organised and their attempt at combined-force operations will be much more effective. General Gerasimov, who is no fool and whose prestige is now directly engaged, and for that matter Putin, even though his position is not necessarily in danger, must be conscious of the damage done to their reputation for competence. There is not a lot more that they have to claim in that regard. All those factors mean that we shall see a different quality of military performance when fighting really resumes. Economy is not going to be the Russians’ main consideration; I think they are going to throw everything they have at it, so the challenge to the Ukrainian forces could be formidable.
HMG have given real leadership in supporting Ukraine’s military capability. I commend the Government on the absolutely consistent and strong role that they have played, frequently being the catalyst for action by allies that might not otherwise have occurred, or certainly not have occurred in sufficiently good or timely a way as has been the case as a result of the actions of our Government. Perhaps we are at another of those
turning points in the equipment debate, now that the UK has undertaken to train pilots. This is against the background of the rather curious charade which has been played out over previous weapons decisions—I take tanks as an example—whereby the allies start out by saying that a given weapon or munition is either too escalatory to risk in the theatre, too sophisticated for the Ukrainians to master, or insufficient in supply or inappropriate. There were all those things and you could not tell, frankly, whether they were real reasons or excuses but they then vanished at the 11th hour.
This game of red lines being put in place, defended and then lifted at a late hour is a rather odd way of going on. I hope that we can, as an alliance, do less of this in future. There is clearly an important decision to be taken about air power and I hope that the Minister, when he speaks, will be able to respond to the question of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup: where does the UK place its action in offering training for jet aircraft? Is it going to be followed by supply and do we reckon that it is part of a short or immediate response to military need, or is it actually related to a much longer view of the kind of armament that Ukraine will need? It sure is going to have to be an armed country when the war comes to an end.
Turning to the post war for a moment, one has only to think about the consequences of not helping Ukrainians to defend themselves successfully to realise how important that task is. There will be no acceptable basis for ending the fighting if Russian forces have not been driven from Ukrainian territory and are still occupying it. If there is no end to the fighting, there is no basis for negotiation—and no negotiation means no legal basis for security in Europe. I take issue slightly with my former colleague the noble Lord, Lord McDonald, when he says that it is all about Ukraine. A great deal of it is about Ukraine but it is also about European security, and that is why its fight is our fight. It is about European security and the whole of our continent. Clearly, we therefore have to be in a position not only to secure the future of Ukraine as a free and democratic country but to secure a continent in which we can live in reasonable stability.
I want to use the word “peace” but I have a very unhappy feeling that the Europe we will inherit after the end of this war is not going to be quite as peaceable or relaxed, if I put it that way, as the political climate that we have enjoyed since the fall of the wall and German unification. It seems that we are going to be in a more militarised continent, one where our defence spending will be at a higher level on a sustained basis. That will be so for not just this country but the whole of the alliance. We will be coping with an aftermath of decisions and difficulties. This poses the question: are we moving towards an attempt—with success, I hope—at once again resuming co-operative security in Europe, or will we be dealing with a Russia that is contained and where the objective of the exercise is to prevent more damage rather than to return to any kind of active or positive relationship? These seem to be some of the choices that we are going to have to confront.
There are questions of what happens to sanctions, over what period they can be lifted and how we balance the need to demonstrate that there is a cost of war to regimes like Russia’s against the issue of the
long-term future of the Russian people—who are also victims of the actions of their leadership. These are going to be very difficult issues. It will behove us to start thinking about how we handle some of them and laying out some of the options for ourselves, because we may have to make very difficult choices and we need to be united about them. There would be nothing worse than the West falling apart when it comes to trying to deal with the consequences and the aftermath of war.
To conclude, I agree very strongly with those who say that the Ukrainians’ fight is our fight because their security is part of ours. While they make the sacrifice with their lives, the least we can do is offer our maximum support to help them towards their success.
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