UK Parliament / Open data

Ukraine

Proceeding contribution from Lord McDonald of Salford (Crossbench) in the House of Lords on Thursday, 9 February 2023. It occurred during Debate on Ukraine.

My Lords, I sometimes hear noble Lords complain that people outside your Lordships’ House do not pay enough attention to what is said inside it, but I assure you that, today, one part of our external audience is listening very carefully: the Russian embassy in London. People there are not listening because they want to hear the strength of support for Ukraine or because they are looking for arguments to change their President’s mind. They are looking for evidence that we are not united, that there is division in the United Kingdom and that there is hope for Russia and its propaganda. I fear that

the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, will be the one on which they focus most, but I hope that the first secretaries in the embassy are honest enough to report that the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Soames, much better reflected the mood of the House.

The day after Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February last year, we had a debate. The atmosphere in the House was uncertain, even fearful, because back then we could see, more clearly than we do now, why President Putin thought he would succeed. He thought that he was confronted by a divided West. He knew that we had failed to respond adequately to the invasion of Crimea in 2014. He thought that his back was covered, and that China and the South would support him; that his army was the best in the world and would arrive in Kyiv in three days; and that his opponent was hollow, and Ukraine was a corrupt country with an elite who was mostly in his pocket and a President who was a clown.

The few days after the invasion were more difficult than we remember. Things were touch and go. We did not know whether the Ukrainian army would hold or whether Zelensky would rise to the task. Already, in those first days, as the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, reminded us, Zelensky showed his mettle. When offered a route out, he said:

“The fight is here; I need ammunition, not a ride.”

After nearly a year, we look back and see that Putin miscalculated in everything and in some things comprehensively and disastrously. First, the West is not divided. It has come together as never before and is supporting Ukraine to the hilt. The weakest link in our chain was supposed to be Germany and, even though it took some time to get going, it is with the programme. Remember, a year ago, Nord Stream 2 was about to be commissioned. The Russians thought that the Germans could not do without their oil and gas and that, however reluctantly, they would acquiesce. That did not happen. Nord Stream 2 is now mothballed indefinitely. A year ago, Russia supplied about 40% of Germany’s gas. Germany managed to reduce that to zero by September last year, so Germany has retooled and the West is in a similar place. The West is hanging together.

Secondly, Putin thought that Russia’s traditional partners would be with him, but China, frankly, is not. China has taken this opportunity to benefit from cheap, discounted Russian oil and gas. It has not done anything practically to support Russia; this is key. I learned over my career to disagree rarely and gently with the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, but I think that in diplomatic terms Ukraine has also scored a triumph in the South. The Security Council of the United Nations cannot function in these circumstances because Russia has a veto. But the General Assembly is still working, and in the resolutions that come to it, Ukraine has attracted 140 positive votes—141 altogether supporting Ukraine. Russia, by contrast, has attracted four: Belarus, North Korea, Syria and Eritrea. I submit that that is a measure of success; although there is no doubt more we could do, the international community, including the South, is more sympathetic with Ukraine than it is with Russia.

Thirdly, on the excellence of Russian forces: they are not excellent. They are losing the fight on the ground; they made some initial progress but, as the Minister reminded us in her opening statement, Ukraine has already recaptured 50% of what was taken in those early weeks. Russia’s forces are demoralised and badly equipped; they are going through their weaponry at a rapid pace. The only place that is resupplying them is Iran; it causes trouble but will not strategically affect the picture. As we all know, this was supposed to be a special operation. This was supposed to be wrapped up quickly, but the Russians had to conscript people. The moment they started to conscript, we saw the weakness. More young Russian men left the country than were conscripted into the Russian army. Russia’s army is not doing well.

Fourthly, and lastly, Ukraine was already a country. It had been independent since 1990—an independence recognised by Russia. But countries gain their national identity in phases; war is often the crucible in which a national identity is forged. That is what has happened in Ukraine in the last 12 months. A country that may have been a bit too much on paper is showing itself to be vibrant and determined, and it is doing this under the leadership of an amazing President: a man who, on paper, was not at all equipped to do the job he has to do, but a man who has risen to that task magnificently. I will gently disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Soames about yesterday’s visit; it was not symbolic but was purposeful. He had an agenda, and although he was addressing us in Westminster Hall, he was also appealing over our heads. My favourite line was when he said:

“In Britain, the king is an air force pilot and in Ukraine today, every air force pilot is a king.”

This was the prelude to asking us for fighter jets. Although we are hesitating, and I can see reasons to hesitate, I can also feel the national debate moving ahead of us.

So what are we going to do? In order for Ukraine to win, which is in our collective western strategic interest, we must do everything that we can to support it. The military training is vital. The tanks are important. The jets, too, will be important and we can take the risk. The noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, was talking about forward defence. Right now, Ukraine is our front line, too. What is done in Ukraine is done for our defence too. What we do there contributes directly to the defence of the United Kingdom. What is supplied to Ukraine is fulfilling a national purpose. We can take some risk because it will help us.

Also—this, I admit, is a personal calculation—the Russians are completely extended in Ukraine. They do not have the option to strike anywhere else. They cannot hit the Baltic states right now because they have nothing with which to hit them. Another little piece of the Russians’ miscalculation was as regards NATO. The only thing stopping Finland and Sweden from joining today is Turkish hesitation, but that will be overcome. We collectively need to do all that we can to help them.

One other thing that President Zelensky said yesterday, which received less interest, was the value of preventive action before armed conflict starts. One of the most important things for him was the training of Ukrainian

forces in the UK, which started under Prime Minister Johnson. This meant that, when things kicked off, they had sufficient resilience to resist. Zelensky’s challenge is to expand that sort of assistance, and yet the DAC in Paris and our development community is resistant to the idea that military training can be a proper subject for overseas official development assistance. It would be good to take up his suggestion and reconsider that resistance.

Lastly, there are the ultimate objectives, which are all about Ukraine. The ultimate objective does not touch Russia, and that is important to acknowledge and repeat, as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwell and Nottingham did. We are not at war with Russia. We are not going to touch its territory and there needs to be clarity about that. Once Ukraine has won its war in its territory, that will be enough.

2.57 pm

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
827 cc1381-4 
Session
2022-23
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
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