My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, who brings great focus to a number of very important issues concerning the Ukrainian scene. I also look forward with warm anticipation to the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Soames.
I wonder if President Putin ever heard about the principles of war before he launched his special operation. Most important of these principles is:
“Selection and maintenance of the aim”.
His aim was clear: to make all Ukraine again part of Mother Russia. He had established to his satisfaction that China would be supportive, while many in the
third world might see his special operation as no part of their business. Eastern Europe is a far-off land and for some—for example, South Africa—a developing friendship with Russia was important.
Probably, there was also an expectation that Russia would soon succeed, as it had with Crimea. Then, after diplomatic tantrums, apoplectic condemnations and some more useless sanctions, Russia’s conquest would become accepted—in which case, why side with others against Russia? Almost 50 countries either abstained or did not choose to vote on the United Nations Assembly motion seeking to condemn Russia’s aggression. In some parts of the world, criticism of Russia is thus more nuanced—sympathetic, even—in spite of that totally unlawful behaviour, as indeed outlined by the Minister.
A year on, Putin has not changed his strategic aim. His claim last September that Kherson and much of the Donbass were now part of Mother Russia underlined his continuing strategic aim. Russia is expected to launch a further offensive. Will this one take the form of shock and awe, one wonders, with massive use of airpower? Russia has that ability, although it has been noticeable—even surprising—how little attempt it made at the outset, or in the past 12 months, to establish air supremacy in its classic form.
Putin’s military commanders will be instructed this time to use all means, short of nuclear weapons, to defeat the Ukrainians. But at the back of their minds must be a fear that NATO would take advantage and maybe use the conflict as a pretext for advancing further east. We know that is not true, but truth is not a feature of Russian thinking or practice. They employ untruths—blatant lies—and will assume that NATO would too. A chasm between cultures is there. It exists.
How much, then, will Russia keep in reserve against a fear of NATO attack? That must affect its decisions about a shock and awe air-led assault and other advances further into Ukraine. Occupation would require stationing forces to keep Ukrainians under control; that too must be planned for. Will production fully match its high rates of ammunition consumption? In sum, it is a difficult operational and logistic balance to strike, but I expect Putin to try to strike it.
Another great principle of war is “maintenance of morale”—that is, on your side, along with the destruction of the morale of your opponents. Here, one must hand the winner’s cup to Zelensky. His leadership of his country stands with the likes of a Caesar or a Churchill. Putin’s leadership, too, depends not just on the rigours of an authoritarian regime but on inspiring Russians that his cause is noble. However, when it comes to those engaged in the actual battle, differences in morale are striking.
Ukrainians have been given astonishing leadership from the top, and they have responded magnificently. What could be more inspiring than when, as has already been mentioned, at the start of the conflict Zelensky was offered a safe flight and responded, “I don’t need a ride; I want more ammunition”, or his message and the symbolism yesterday in Westminster Hall? He is going to need more and more ammunition and much other support for his military. His plea for fighter jets, which will take time to implement if agreed,
means he is up for a long struggle. Will the many new Russian troops, freshly conscripted and exposed to brutal conflict, feel as inspired as the Ukrainians? No way.
Finally, faced with further assault, the Ukrainians stand firm; they do not fold. What then? If they do not just hold ground but gradually force the Russians to retreat and give up more and more of the country they occupy, even Crimea, Putin must face the truth: he has not achieved his aim. He must fear, however unreal, that behind any Ukrainian success, NATO would choose to venture even closer to Moscow—even further than Sweden and Finland joining NATO. That is a position unacceptable to Putin. In his eyes, it would directly threaten to destroy his Russia. How would he respond if he were to be booted out of Ukraine? That is the big unknown for all to ponder. I hope, even now, that we and our allies are in deep deliberation and gaming these future issues.
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