My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for Amendment 89 on financial and economic misconduct. The amendment would permit the exclusion of suppliers where there is evidence of certain economic and financial offences. Of course, suppliers who commit fraud, bribery and money laundering and have failed to self-clean have no place winning government contracts. There are already mandatory grounds for exclusion that cover the most serious offences of this nature, as set out in Schedule 6. It is worth noting that the scope of economic
and financial offences covered is significantly wider than in the EU regime that it replaces, including a broader range of theft, fraud and money laundering offences.
However, the mandatory grounds in Schedule 6 rightly require the supplier or a connected person to have been convicted. By providing for exclusion without the requirement for a conviction, the amendment would require authorities to make a judgment as to whether there is sufficient evidence that offences have been committed in order to apply the ground. They would need to make this judgment at a point when the investigating authorities have not reached a view, which would be very difficult. The exclusions regime requires all grounds to be considered in respect of every bidder in a procurement, so authorities would have no choice about whether to consider these matters.
I thank the noble Lord for drawing our attention to the review of finance and corruption in local government. The recommendation in that review was that we consider whether this proposal is feasible. We have given it careful consideration but are not taking it forward, for the reasons I have already touched on. However, I would add that the very fact pointed out by the noble Lord—that investigations by the authorities into these matters, which can apply to many different areas of regulation, often take considerable time—speaks to the complexity of making these judgments within the contracting authorities. There is no reason to think that they would find this any easier than the relevant and proper authorities. In fact, they would find it harder, so it would be a new burden on those investigating suppliers—it could be a significant one—and on suppliers themselves, which I am unwilling to impose.
I turn now to Amendment 91A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, which introduces a discretionary exclusion for “significant” breaches of workers’ rights. I pay tribute to the noble Lord’s work in this area. In my view, the exclusion grounds already cover the most serious breaches of workers’ rights, so the mandatory grounds in Schedule 6 include slavery and human trafficking offences, offences relating to employment agencies and gangmasters, and refusal or wilful neglect to pay the national minimum wage. These are based on the serious labour offences within the purview of the director of labour market enforcement.
The amendment begs the question of what constitutes a “significant” breach. Unless there is a settled consensus on this point, which I am not aware of, it will be difficult for both suppliers and contracting authorities to interpret. We should remember that suppliers will need to self-declare whether they are subject to any of the grounds, and that contracting authorities will need to consider whether suppliers meet the grounds in each procurement that they run. That is quite wide-ranging in relation to employment rights. Questions of whether a breach is significant, and, indeed, whether it relates to rights derived from statute, common law or international obligations, will consume a disproportionate amount of time and resources. I do not doubt that there are a number of behaviours in different areas which the exclusion grounds we have set out might or might not cover; but the purpose of the exclusions regime is to protect against suppliers that may be fundamentally
unfit to compete for public contracts. It is not a means to enforce employment rights, or a lever to incentivise certain behaviours.
What we have introduced in this Bill is a much tougher regime of debarment, with central resources devoted to assessing suppliers and deciding centrally on debarment. This is tough for direct and indirect suppliers, as one bad apple in a company can cause them to be debarred—a very strong incentive to ensure that bad behaviour does not occur in the first place, of course; or, where it does, to take remedial action. However, expanding the exclusion grounds, as proposed in this amendment, will have a chilling effect on engagement in procurement, as I explained from a business perspective before I became a Minister and turned into the gamekeeper. We must be fair and remember that we have an interest in more competitive markets that improve value for money, innovation and productivity. I am grateful to those who have spoken for raising these issues. However, I believe we have done enough in Schedule 6, and I respectfully ask the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Hendy, not to press their amendments, given the lateness of the hour.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, raised a new point about the carry-on consequences of the issues we have discussed in this group. I am not sure that we can do anything about that, but I will certainly have a look at that as the Bill progresses. I beg to move.