My Lords, Amendment 38, among others, refers to the role of the Northern Ireland Assembly in approving the conduct of Ministers. I suppose that a parallel would be a legislative consent Motion; it is the same kind of principle. It is good to hear that negotiations are taking place, but the people who are most directly affected not just by this legislation but by the protocol itself are excluded from this process. Noble Lords should bear in mind that, if a trader brings a vehicle into Northern Ireland from Great Britain, the first person whom that trader will deal with will be an employee of a Northern Ireland government department, responsible to a Northern Ireland Executive Minister.
The people who are the most directly affected and who have a direct responsibility for the implementation of any of these processes—that is, the politicians in Northern Ireland—are spectators in a matter that most directly affects them. Of course, it is a national issue and an international issue; but when you drill down, as Amendment 38 is attempting to do, the people with their hands on the problem on the day, every day, are out of the frame altogether.
Now I do not care what the issue is, but have we learned nothing in this place over the last 30 or 40 years? If you exclude people from something that directly
affects them—and we had the Anglo-Irish process in the mid-1980s, when we followed the same principle that you negotiate over somebody’s head and shove a piece of paper in front of them and say, “There you are: implement it”—it will not work.
Amendment 38 is just one example. Will the Minister ask his colleagues to engage the politicians in Stormont directly in this process? That could be part of a solution. When we were part of the EU, it was not unusual for Ministers from Westminster to include devolved Ministers with them in their delegations. That was quite a normal process. Can we not adapt that principle? One Minister said a week or two ago—he meant well, I have no doubt—“Leave it to us. We’ve got your back here. We’ll look after it for you.” I have to say, with the greatest respect, that our backs are so full of dagger holes that we know all about that. We will believe only what we see and hear ourselves. Bring our politicians into the picture; bring them to the table with you so they are not your enemy.
I accept, of course, that we are dealing with an international issue, and foreign affairs and related matters are not devolved—I get that. But have we not enough flexibility to bring people along as part of our delegation so that they can see persons and papers? We do not have to break any rules. What is so secret?
Before he left office, I asked the noble Lord, Lord Frost, who is in his place, a Question about all the committees that have been set up under the agreement and who populated them. I think he left office before he was able to reply to that Question, but who are they? I do not know who they are. Where are they? How many of these committees do we have? All I can tell you is that nobody of political significance in Belfast is engaged. It will not work—fix it. Let us make these discussions meaningful. Let us get the people who have to deliver what is agreed, at the table. We would never have got the Good Friday agreement had we not done that by bringing everybody in.
I have listened at some length to the arguments about the legality of the legislation and its role. I am not a lawyer, but I respectfully invite colleagues to review the evidence submitted to the Sub-Committee on the Protocol in Ireland/Northern Ireland by Professor Boyle and another colleague from the University of Cambridge on what they consider to be the legal position of this legislation. They came to the joint conclusion that the Article 16 process would have to be involved in order to make it legal. I do not know whether that is right or wrong, but I refer Members to that piece of evidence. The transcript is available, it was a public investigation by our committee, and I commend it to colleagues. I ask them to look at it and see what merit there is for us.
There is a solution here; we can find a way through this. However, I can tell colleagues from years of experience—other people in this Chamber can do the same—that, with the process that we have chosen to take, we are going about things the wrong way. I understand where the Government are coming from with the legislation, and I do not wish to see the UK Government’s negotiating position weakened, but I want success. We are facing the worst crisis economically in many decades. Northern Ireland’s community is facing increased costs,
in part as a result of the protocol, obviously we have the lowest levels of income, and we also have a different energy system to the rest of the United Kingdom.
Basically, our political class is out to lunch. We are not contributing anything to the solutions, because of the stand-off at Stormont. I do not want to see Sinn Féin’s argument that Northern Ireland is a failed political entity justified, and that is the risk we are taking. My appeal to the Minister concerning any—indeed, all—of these amendments involving support and approval from the Northern Ireland Assembly is that one of the ways to get the Assembly going again is to engage the people who have to operate the outcome of the negotiations, so that they are part of the solution and have ownership of it.
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Because we in Northern Ireland are half in the EU and half out of it, there is no total solution to this; it is just a fact of life. It is a problem that is largely insoluble, but there are bits we can help with. Not only do we have to make the protocol less invasive but there has to be treaty change in the long term, because of the constitutional damage that has been done. That will take time, so we have a two-stage rocket here. We have short-term mitigations and long-term treaty change but, in the meantime, leaving Stormont as it is, history tells us, after the last number of decades—we have been through it all, and the noble Lord, Lord Kilclooney, and others were part of the process—that a vacuum is the worst possible thing we can leave in Belfast. It brings in all sorts of events that we cannot anticipate. It takes only one thing to go badly wrong.
I have to say to the Minister and His Majesty’s Government about recent events that there does not appear to be any coherent strategy to deal with things, and that is what worries me more than anything else.