This is a variation on a theme, but this one goes even further—I can be even briefer. The DPRRC reserved its most withering comment for Clause 15. I quote from paragraph 56 of its report:
“Clause 15 contains a power of the sort we rarely see—a power that in essence allows Ministers to rip up and rewrite an Act of Parliament”
and then to retain powers, if any of those new primary legislative functions are, in the Minister’s view, not operating as they should, not to return to Parliament for new primary legislation but to bring forward further regulations. This also completely rips up the entire concept of post-legislative scrutiny, whereby we learn from elements and seek amendments. This is important because, under Article 15(3), three areas of the protocol are not excluded but all the others are, including processes in a joint procedure of dispute resolution, monitoring, evaluation, classification of goods and joint mechanisms designed to be under a process. If it fails, there are mechanisms under Article 16 for safeguarding and rebalancing mechanisms. These are all gone and we do not know what will be in their place.
I understand the arguments presented that anything will be better than what there is at the moment, which is one of the themes. We just cannot be sure, however, because there is nothing in here that offers that reassurance. The breadth of this power, which provides the ability to make primary legislation and then to effect primary legislation again, is really egregious. On that basis, I beg to move.
8.45 pm