My Lords, many of us are worried about the powers to regulate, but it is not just about democracy. I have time for the concerns expressed in the email that was just read out—of course I do. I just point out, however, that the situation that we are in that is so objectionable to the noble Lord’s colleague in Northern Ireland came about because of the actions, decisions and agreements made by their elected Government. Sometimes that is how it works, too. The problem that I have with the powers is not just the issues that we have heard expressed extremely well by those far more qualified to do so than I am; it is that we do not know what Ministers intend to do with those powers. There is a circumstance in which the gentleman who wrote the email might find himself doubly aggrieved, because we do not yet know what it is that Ministers will do to resolve the problem that the noble Lord has, or whether the actions of the Government in the future would actually be ones that would satisfy that grievance. That is where I am coming from. It is because there is a lack of clarity, and uncertainty; there is an option to negotiate that is not being taken. I am now repeating myself, and using yet another set of clauses to make exactly the same general points.
I am not going to repeat what has already been said, but I want to make a wider point about the approach to law-making that the Government are getting increasingly fond of. We see some extreme examples of it in this Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, when he introduced this set of amendments, said that he could not actually be clear about how Clause 14 would be used by the Government, because, in the words of the DPRRC,
the memorandum has so little to say about this broadly worded power. Nothing is said about the sort of provision that could be made under it.
Clause 14 tells us—in case we did not know—that overriding parts of the protocol is going to require a whole host of consequential changes elsewhere, and that is what I will talk about this time when we are talking about powers. We have been here before. Noble Lords will remember that as we approached the end of the transition period, departments rushed to make various changes to the operability of retained EU law. In a worryingly high number of cases during that process, as I remember, the Government made mistakes and further, correcting regulations then needed to be brought forward. This exercise is no simpler than that. If anything—because this Bill is highly contentious and because of the wider context—it is even more complicated than that previous exercise.
We need to be mindful of how these things are going to work in practice. If the Government get their Bill, how is this really going to work? Have they actually considered this? Given the difficulties that the Government had with revoking things such as the duty to post reports to the European Commission, how confident can we really be that an as yet unclear policy direction can even be delivered in a way that is in any sense timely and accurate? That really will matter to the correspondent of the noble Lord opposite. What I am saying is, putting aside my dislike for the Bill, this is not a good way for us to be making law or for the Government to put their policy into practice.
Just imagine that this Clause 14 is available to Ministers —and I hope this does not happen, but suppose it did—can we have some kind of indication from the Minister of how long this process is going to take? How many SIs does he think are going to be needed; how will the Government sequence this workload? The lack of planning around some of this in previous endeavours has really caused problems, and we do not want to be in that place again. I still think this is a bad Bill in principle, but I am afraid that its implementation is likely to render it completely unworkable in practice.