I accept what the noble Lord says about it being astonishingly wide but, if he will have a little patience, I will quote some examples to him shortly, and he will see that they are not the biggest items that he can think of.
The powers in Clauses 21 and 22 have been included in the Bill to provide government with the ability to react at pace to unforeseen delivery barriers. Making them subject to the affirmative procedure could delay the provision of support to consumers this winter and put at risk the point when energy suppliers have certainty over the final delivery requirements.
The approach that the Bill takes to parliamentary procedure is not unprecedented: for example, a direction under the Electricity Act 1989 has already been used to deliver the energy bills support scheme in Britain. Furthermore, the powers in Clauses 21 and 22 may be used only “in response to” the current energy crisis,
“or in connection with the Act”
or with regulations or schemes made under it. They are therefore time-constrained in that respect. Amendment 39 would reduce the sunsetting provision for powers under the cost plus revenue limit from five years to three and a half years. We consider the five-year sunset appropriate for the Government to respond to the immediate effects of the energy crisis, while ensuring ongoing protection for consumers if gas prices remain abnormally high for a prolonged period. The upcoming consultation will allow the Government to further define the intended use of this power.
Amendments 40, 41 and 42 seek to sunset the powers under Clauses 21 and 22 to two years, with an extension permissible by affirmative regulations. The Bill already makes clear that Clauses 21 and 22 must be used only “in response to” the current energy crisis, or “in connection with” the Bill or with regulations or schemes made under it. Generally, those other provisions in the Bill are already subject to sunsetting. A crisis is, by its nature, something extraordinary and temporary. I submit that the circumstances and timing in which the Government can use this power are therefore already appropriately constrained by the Bill.
Three amendments have also been tabled that relate to requirements to consult. Amendment 19
“would require the Secretary of State to consult before utilising … powers”
on the temporary cost plus revenue limit. It is the Government’s clear commitment to consult as soon as possible; therefore, we do not believe that this amendment is necessary.
Amendment 21 would require the Secretary of State to consult on pass-through requirements on intermediaries. As the schemes are being stood up at pace, this requirement could delay much-needed support being passed through to consumers this winter, and therefore could be positively harmful.
Amendment 23 would require modifications to licences under Clause 21 to be subject to consultation with the relevant bodies. As I mentioned, this clause ensures the Government’s ability to react at pace to unforeseen barriers to delivering the schemes. A requirement to
consult would, again, simply delay our ability to deliver the schemes effectively and quickly, and therefore would be counterproductive.
Finally, a set of amendments have also been tabled which would remove certain powers from the Bill, including the opposition of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, to Clause 22 standing part of the Bill. Clause 22 and its powers enable the Government to issue directions to energy licence holders and the Northern Ireland regulator in connection with schemes under the Bill and in response to the energy crises. The ability to issue directions of a general character is necessary to deliver support under the Bill and to tackle barriers to their implementation. Amendment 26 would limit the Secretary of State’s powers to issue directions of a “general character” to those only of a “specific” character. Amendment 28 would remove Clause 22, which provides that, when a direction to a person conflicts with existing requirements in an “enactment or instrument”, such requirements should be “disregarded”. Currently, we envision limited circumstances in which these circumstances will arise.
I will now give the example asked for by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr: the Government may need to issue a direction to the Utility Regulator in Northern Ireland to ensure that the timing of electricity regulated tariff reviews is aligned with similar reviews in Great Britain. This may be necessary to ensure effective administration of the energy price guarantee in Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In doing so, it may be necessary to rely on Clause 22 to resolve any potential conflict between the terms of the direction and the statutory requirements of independence applying to the energy regulators in Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and any existing requirements as to timing in the supplier’s licences, to enable all parties to comply with the direction for tariff review alignment. Without this, licence holders or the Northern Ireland regulator may be uncertain about their legal position, and this could have the effect of households and businesses missing out on appropriate and timely support. This plays to the noble Lord’s points. I realise that there is a suspicion that there is some malign intent behind these clauses, but they are, essentially, designed to deliver support at pace in a fast-moving environment and to provide the Secretary of the State with the powers to ensure that this happens in a legally correct manner. I reassure the noble Lord that there is no hidden agenda here.