My Lords, I will speak in a moment to Amendments 4, 7 and 9, but can I go back to the discussion that happened a few moments ago and the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Grocott? I will again read paragraph 8.132 of the Companion: “Other bills”,
so one that has not been referred to a Select Committee or Joint Committee,
“may, on motion (which is debatable and of which notice is required)”—
that means assuming the usual channels cannot resolve the problem in a way that is satisfactory to the House—be
“moved at any time between committee and third reading”.
We are still on Report and will be at the end of today, so we will not have reached Third Reading. Although I do not claim to be an expert, I think it is open to the House to consider the remedy available at paragraph 8.132 of the Companion. That is what I would like the House to do and what I expect the usual channels will do. I should assert that, as Convenor of the Cross Benches, I am not a usual channel for these purposes because I do not have a party.
Now to the Bill. Of course, we are grateful to the Minister. I feel very concerned that somehow people may think the anxiety of the House is a reflection on her. I can do nothing except on behalf of myself thank her for the way in which she has listened. I have an awful suspicion—and she cannot confirm or deny this—that, if she had her way when she was in the department, we would not have ended up with the Bill in this absurd situation.
The provision in Clauses 1, 3 and 4 is extraordinary. I will go through what I said again when we were speaking about this last. The two words “Academy standards” are a clear misrepresentation of what Clause 1 is about. It is simply a skeleton provision from which the Secretary of State can pick whichever particular provisions he wishes to invent for himself; he is not bound by any of them, and he or she can write them for himself or herself.
Clause 3 is Henry VIII. The House has listened to me on Henry VIII a number of times so I will not go on about it, but I hope noble Lords have all noticed that the Bill has a particular quality, in that it has two Henry VIII clauses: Clause 3 and Clause 66. Removing Clause 3 simply removes something that is completely unnecessary. Clause 66 will no doubt continue because the departmental computer will just produce one at some stage in the Bill. I have never before come across two Henry VIII clauses in the same legislation—so we have Henry XVI, and the Bill has a particular record apart from all its other flaws.
It also has a provision in Clause 4 which is a shameful, pernicious new way for central government to obtain power: the issuing of guidance. When the Government and department of the day issue guidance, those to whom it is sent answer to it. In the Bill, there
is a provision that enables the Secretary of State to issue a compliance direction anyway. So we have a new form of acquisition of central power, ultimately in No. 10 Downing Street, which we have shamed the country with by passing and enacting the Elections Act. It is exactly the same provision.
Any one of those three would be great from the point of view of central government, but we have all three together. It is a rather poisonous cocktail from all our points of view. It is like supping Irn-Bru, only on stilts. It is the most amazing combination of powers. That is why these clauses should fail.
I am concerned, as has been expressed by others, but not about the way in which the Conservative Party is going to sort itself out. I am concerned about that for the sake of the nation, but not for the sake of the Bill, because, as has been arranged so far, when the clauses go back in whatever form they are amended to the Commons—there will be new clauses—there will be no Second Reading or Committee here. We must therefore look at the provision of paragraph 8.132.
Something else worries me even more. The Bill started here, and this Minister was sitting here and able to hear observations from all sides of the House about the absurdity and the rather alarming features that discolour Clauses 1, 3 and 4. We have got where we have got to, and these amendments will pass in due course. But the chilling feature is that, if the Bill had happened to start in the House of Commons, I have no reasonable doubt that those provisions would have come to us as drafted, after peremptory debate. The Minister would then have had no option but to say, “Well, it’s gone through the Commons. What are you doing interfering with its wishes?” Of course, we would have gone on, but there comes a time when the Commons has to win.
It is pure luck that the power grab in these clauses has come before this House and that we have had this Minister here to lead her department to the obvious and sensible conclusion. But our present constitutional arrangements mean that only the coincidence that the Bill happened to start here gives us relief. If it had started in the other place, I have not the slightest doubt that this is the Bill that we would have had to consider. I find that chilling, because we all know that the opportunities for this House to change legislation that passed through the House of Commons are very limited. That is the state that our constitution has got to in 2022, and it is the most alarming feature of these clauses.