My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 40 to 45 in place of my friend, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, who greatly regrets that she cannot be in her place. She is very grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Lister and Lady Chakrabarti, for their support, and to Women for Refugee Women for its briefings.
Amendments 40 to 44 relate to Clause 31. They are being brought back at this stage because the Government’s response stopped short of providing the reassurances we hoped for. Some 27 organisations with significant expertise in supporting people seeking asylum support these amendments to Clause 31.
In Committee, the Minister stressed that Clause 31 was necessary to provide clarity and consistency of decision-making, the argument being that proving a status of persecution on the basis of reasonable likelihood is too vague and inconsistently applied. Clause 31 seeks to resolve this apparent lack of clarity by instead inserting the balance of probabilities test and a new fear test. This will raise the standard of proof for gaining refugee status, which will have a disproportionate impact on certain vulnerable groups. For women fleeing gender-based violence and those seeking asylum on the grounds of sexuality, providing this increased proof
will be difficult and is likely to be highly traumatising, particularly given what we already know of the Home Office’s culture of disbelief and approach to such victims. For this reason, the UNHCR and, indeed, UK courts have consistently applied the reasonable likelihood test. Clause 31 will put us consciously and deliberately out of step with the way the UNHCR believes that the convention should be interpreted and how our own courts, notably the Supreme Court, have interpreted it.
What is most odd, and the reason for pressing this again, is that the Government believe this change will provide clarity. It is not clear why this should be true. There is already a problem with disbelief in the Home Office, which can be readily shown by the fact that 48% of appeals against the Home Office’s decisions to the First-tier Tribunal are successful, and 32% of judicial reviews are settled or decided in favour of claimants. Clause 31 does not seem to provide any additional clarity. Adding two different limbs to the test with different standards of proof seems a recipe for creating more confusion, making it harder for legitimate victims and so inevitably prompting more appeals. Amendments 40 to 44 therefore look to keep the status quo standard of proof and keep us aligned with the UNHCR and existing UK case law.
I turn briefly to Amendment 45, which relates to Clause 32. This was discussed at length in Committee and I will not go over the old ground, but in short, the interpretation of the convention applied in Clause 32 seems punitive towards women and other victims who use the particular social group reason without any clear or positive purpose. As the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, argued in Committee, if Clause 32 is necessary to clarify the “particular social group” definition, there is no reason it could not be provided by clarifying once and for all that the two conditions are alternatives, not cumulative, as has been the understanding in UK law since Fornah and was recognised by the Upper Tribunal as recently as 2020. This would provide clarity without disadvantaging women and other vulnerable groups.
More than 40 organisations in the ending violence against women and girls and anti-trafficking sectors have supported this amendment to Clause 32. This week, three UN special rapporteurs released a statement on the impact of the Bill, in particular Clause 32, on women. I urge the Minister to listen to their plea. As of 2019, only 26% of asylum applications have come from women. Why would we want to make it harder for legitimate victims of gender-based violence and other gender-related forms of persecution to seek help? Might the Minister say why gender is not mentioned in Clause 32 in the way that sexual orientation is, since it is mentioned in the EU directive on which the Government seek to rely?
Clause 32 not only reverses UK case law but does so against the UNHCR’s standards, following an interpretation of EU law that was rejected by our own Upper Tribunal in 2020. The Home Office did not appeal that decision; nor was that change included in the New Plan for Immigration. It seems to have come from nowhere with little scrutiny or expert oversight. As with Amendments 40 to 44, Amendment 45 is not
radical. It simply asks that the Bill continue to operate with the status quo interpretation of the 1951 convention, which is well understood and used by UK courts. The alternative is an unnecessarily punitive barrier being put in front of vulnerable groups. I beg to move.