My Lords, it is a real pleasure to follow my noble friend Lord Sedwill and be the first to congratulate him on his powerful and eloquent maiden speech—a really important contribution to
this very serious debate today. The whole House has seen in one shot the expertise and wisdom that he brings to our debates. He has been a colleague and friend for many years. I think I can say that he is the number one crisis diplomat from the Foreign Office ranks, with his expertise in Iraq and the fact that he was UK ambassador to Afghanistan and then the NATO civilian representative there. His arrival in this House greatly strengthens the small Bench of former national security advisers here and the slightly larger bench of former Cabinet Secretaries. Indeed, he held both jobs simultaneously for a while, which is quite a feat; I held one and it was more than enough for me. The House has really gained from my noble friend’s presence and we look forward to many more such powerful speeches in future.
Putin’s invasion of Ukraine takes Europe back to the darkest days of the last century. It poses a fundamental threat to the system of international rules that the noble Lord, Lord Sedwill, and many others here today spent their careers, as I did, trying to enforce. It has profound implications for peace and security on our continent. I want to make two brief points today. The first is my assessment of what may well now happen in Ukraine, and the second is how the West can respond at a level that matches the seriousness of the horrors that Putin is inflicting on the continent.
First, western intelligence agencies are to be congratulated on calling this right. They have been warning us that Putin intended to mount a full-scale invasion—to some scepticism, to begin with. I think the West was absolutely right in trying to pursue a dual track of diplomacy and deterrence to try to prevent this happening. Both those courses failed but probably nothing would have prevented Putin going ahead.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, that Putin has decided that his legacy must be a buffer zone of weak vassal states surrounding Russia, and that Ukraine, as a vibrant, democratic country, presented a real threat to his vision. We therefore have to be clear that his objective is to overthrow the current Government in Kyiv and replace it with a pro-Russian regime. I think he will try to achieve that by encircling Kyiv rather than by street-to-street fighting, but I think he will do whatever it takes now that he has taken this gamble of throwing everything into Ukraine. The Ukrainian army is fighting valiantly but in the end it cannot prevail against the full might of Russian aggression, so we have to steel ourselves for all this to be accompanied by the round-up and internment of many thousands of patriotic Ukrainians and the whole dismal apparatus of repression, military police, informers and the knock on the door at midnight. That is what will be happening in Europe, on our continent, in the days ahead.
Assuming that Putin achieves that objective, I think that is when his problems then start. In order to keep a quisling Government in power in Ukraine, I do not see how he has any alternative but to maintain hundreds of thousands of Russian troops in Ukraine for the indefinite future, tied down and suffering casualties from the guerrilla fighting that will then follow. There are many risks for him there, as other noble Lords have said. This war is not supported by Russian public opinion. When the body bags start coming back in
serious numbers, it will be remembered that it was Putin alone who took the decision and he will carry the responsibility for it. In the end, I am sure that Russia and Putin will be the losers from this gamble.
What can the West do to increase the cost of Putin’s decision? I agree entirely with what noble Lords have said: we must clearly now strengthen the sanctions regime as far as possible. I support what has already been announced on detaching Russia from the western financial system and the benefits of technology and markets in the West. Clearly, we must reinforce NATO’s eastern member states against the risk of spillover or miscalculation. I do not think Putin intends to attack NATO but there is always the risk of miscalculation.
Then we must find the stamina to sustain these measures for years and, potentially, decades. Too often, sanctions regimes erode fairly rapidly. We must not let that happen on this occasion. We need new mechanisms, as we had during the Cold War, to ensure that co-ordination, and we will need to review our own national security policies. As the noble Lord, Lord Howell, has said, this is now a global issue and we ought to be mobilising a global coalition of support for the international rules that are so important to us.
For the US, that means accepting that China is not the overriding priority and that a strong US presence in Europe and leadership in NATO are vital for American interests. For the EU, it means increased defence spending and years of investment to wean EU countries off dependence on Russian energy. Britain has played a leading part in the crisis management so far and I welcome that, but there is still more to do to prevent London being a safe haven for corrupt Russian money. There is one obvious gap in our foreign policy management, and that is structured co-operation with the EU. That needs to be corrected urgently.
For Putin, the security of Russia depends on the insecurity of the rest of Europe. That is not a doctrine that we can allow to succeed.
11.05 am