I completely understand the point that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, is making. I promise him that I am sticking very closely to the script. I am well aware of that.
I think I have dealt with most of the questions, albeit probably not to noble Lords’ satisfaction. What I cannot do, I am afraid, is commit to coming back on Report with anything, but obviously I am going to reflect very carefully on the tone of this debate—to go to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker—and take that back to the department.
Turning to Amendment 175ZA, I assure the House that the Government will conduct robust identity and suitability checks before granting an ETA. We will use the information supplied in the ETA application form to check against our watchlist system. However, as I am sure the noble Lord and the noble Baroness will understand, I cannot go into details of the exact checks that applicants will undergo or how those checks will be conducted, as to do so could undermine our ability to secure the UK border. Such a detailed commentary could provide those people whom we want to prevent from travelling to the UK sufficient information to attempt to circumvent our controls, undermining the very objective of the ETA scheme and the wider universal permission-to-travel requirement to enhance the security of our border.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked about what has happened since we left the European Union and lost access to the European Criminal Records Information System and the Schengen Information System. The UK participated only in the law enforcement aspects of SIS II, meaning that we could not, and did not, use SIS II information for immigration purposes. Therefore, having returned to the Interpol channels, we are now routinely exchanging information with EU member states on persons of interest, including missing and wanted individuals, and on lost and stolen documents. Moreover, through the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, we continue to share criminal records with the EU for law enforcement purposes, including to assist criminal proceedings and for public protection. This is almost identical to the arrangement that we had under ECRIS as an EU member state.
I assure noble Lords that the confirmation of an individual’s status prior to travel will be a matter for the Home Office and their carrier. The onus will not be on the individual to produce evidence of their status to a carrier; instead, carriers will be expected to check and confirm with the Home Office that an individual has an appropriate permission before they bring them to the UK. It is our long-term ambition for all carriers operating scheduled services across all modes—air, rail and maritime—to use interactive advance passenger information, or iAPI, systems to provide passenger information to the Home Office in advance of travel. In return, passengers will receive confirmation of permission to travel prior to boarding.
iAPI is already a well-established mechanism used around the world, particularly by other countries that already operate travel authorisation schemes. None the less, the Home Office will undertake rigorous systems testing to ensure that our messaging to carriers
works before the scheme goes live. We expect the likelihood of a technical malfunction occurring to be negligible.
In the unlikely event that a technical malfunction does occur—