My Lords, I supported these amendments in Committee and I should like to do so again today. I cannot help feeling that there is just a hint—as the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, put it earlier—of the generals fighting the last war, because it is very obvious why Clause 3 is there: it is to head off what was seen to be a trend at least in the decision in Miller 2.
I will make two points, if I may. First, following my noble friend Lord Butler of Brockwell, I agree that the clause is unnecessary. One of the things that was said by the Supreme Court at the beginning of Miller 2 was to distinguish the Prorogation issue with which it was concerned and Dissolution. It was made quite clear in a very few words at the start of that decision that decisions about Dissolution were nothing to do with the courts. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, made that point very clearly when he said that this is the most political of decisions that could be taken. That is a very clear warning to the courts that it is nothing to do with them. It is unnecessary, because I cannot see the courts engaging with a Dissolution issue in addition to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Norton.
The second point that I would like to say a little more about is the unwise precedent. The problem here is that the language of paragraph (c) in Clause 3 removes entirely from the courts the possibility of determining the limit or extent of the powers. The reverse of the coin is that it is the Executive who are the determination and who decide the limit or extent of their own powers. Earlier today, the noble Lord,
Lord Reid of Cardowan, said that this was the basis for a dictatorship. My noble friend Lord Butler referred in Committee to a number of examples not very far away from us in Europe, where there is perhaps a trend moving towards that. We have to be extremely careful not to give a signal to a Government that they can get away with an exclusion clause of this kind. The question is how far the clause should go, and it is paragraph (c) of Clause 3 that is completely objectionable, leaving it to the Executive to determine the extent and limits of their own powers.
The question of precedent is worth dwelling on. I admire greatly the skills of the parliamentary draftsmen. They have their own skills and traditions, one of which is that they are very determined to follow precedent in the way in which they engage with legislation. This has great value, because it means that there is constancy in the way in which issues are expressed in our legislation, which is of a very high standard. My concern is that, whatever may be said today about this not setting a precedent, it will nevertheless be there in the books, and the draftsmen will, some years ahead, say, “That is what was done in 2022. It is an example that we can follow.” That is danger that I fear in this clause, which is unnecessary. It is unnecessary, so we should not risk the creation of a precedent that, in future years, we may deeply regret.