My Lords, I will speak specifically to Amendment 6, to which I have added my name. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, explicitly outlined its importance.
This very important group of amendments seeks to get to the core of what this is all about: why are subsidies required? As it stands, the Bill sets out seven subsidy control principles, which you could actually call rules and which on their own can easily be interpreted in a mutually contradictory way. They are further complicated by additional “energy and environmental principles”, by “subsidy schemes” versus “streamlined subsidy schemes”, and by “schemes of interest” versus schemes of “particular interest”.
This web of rules is combined with a complete lack of context. I take to heart the points just made by the noble Lord, Lord Lamont. As a councillor in south Wales, I was on the receiving end of changing maps. There is great significance in maps as an instrument to encourage investment in certain areas. If you are not going to have a deprived areas map for places to be assisted, you can have a carefully written industrial strategy that sets out terms on which assistance would be given to help the less prosperous areas. There is also a clear potential for overlap with other government schemes. It seems that levelling-up funding could well be seen to be in direct contravention of several of the principles set out in the Bill.
All this is further complicated by the unbalanced power structure at the top. I will not go through it again, but we will undoubtedly do so at different points on our amendments over the next few meetings. Briefly, the crux of the problem is that the Secretary of State is the Minister for England at one moment and the UK’s referee at another. In addition, there is a weak regulator with ill-defined powers and a lack of transparency, with high financial limits at which subsidies have to be registered. All this together strikes me as a chaotic system that is cooking up a bureaucratic nightmare because it does not have the clarity of the map or of the industrial strategy. It is a lawyer’s dream come true and invites litigation.
My noble friend Lord Fox gave us some excellent examples, and we could add to them the overt conflict between the principles of this Bill and those of the ARIA Bill. I was one of the Peers sitting here prior to Christmas discussing the Government’s desire to have the freedom to invest without particular principles that they would have to obey. I cannot see how that does not conflict with this Bill.
The amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, tries to start to sort this out. So far the Government clearly do not know what they want, or they would have set it out in much greater detail and with much more clarity. Another way of looking at this is that the Government have been given all the cards in terms of power and can brush aside competition. They can hide significant subsidies that fall below the very generous thresholds that they have set out. It leaves the Government free to pick winners on the flimsiest of evidence—almost as was done over PPE at the start of the Covid pandemic, and we know what grief that has caused to both the Government and taxpayers.
Crucially, Amendment 6 sets out a process of agreement between the four Governments on what constitutes “disadvantaged areas” that are hence in need of levelling-up subsidies. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said, this must be a decision taken at a political level. It is not suitable for the CMA or the Competition Appeal Tribunal; their job is to judge individual cases against the rules established as a result of political decision-making.
Amendment 6 would once again establish in legislation the existing concept of common frameworks in relation to this topic. There are of course dozens of common frameworks on everything, from nutritional labelling to rail technical standards, from blood safety to motor insurance. Each has a set of rules on how the four Governments of the UK will co-operate to ensure that individual internal markets work properly. If any mechanism is likely to disrupt relationships within the internal market then subsidies are the one, so a formal common framework with evenly balanced dispute mechanisms is required. That way, the Governments of the four nations can establish their own priorities for subsidies and ultimately subject them to a formal dispute procedure if needed.