My Lords, as we have heard, these amendments are about two things: serious violence reduction orders and stop and search powers more broadly. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, for setting out the case for their amendments, and to other noble Lords for promoting the points of the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, in her absence. We wish her well.
Amendments 90G, 90M and 91C would raise the threshold for the standard of proof required to impose an SVRO from the civil to the criminal standard. SVROs are civil orders introduced to protect communities and deter offenders from future offending. As such, we think that the civil standard is appropriate to enable a court to consider a wide range of evidence from both the offender and the prosecution when considering whether to make an SVRO.
Amendments 90H, 90J, 90K and 90L all seek to limit the circumstances in which an SVRO may be made. As regards Amendment 90H, it is the Government’s view that an SVRO should be available when an adult has been convicted of an offence where a knife or offensive weapon was present, whether it was used in the commission of the offence or not. But this does not mean that an SVRO will be applied for, or made, in all such cases. The prosecution would first need to consider whether it was appropriate to make an application to the court for an SVRO. The court must consider it necessary to make the SVRO in order to protect the public or prevent reoffending, and it would be very difficult to see how a court might consider an SVRO to be necessary if there was no evidence of risk of harm involving a knife or offensive weapon or risk of knife or offensive weapons offending; the bladed article was not relevant to the offence; or the individual was in possession of a bladed article with a reasonable excuse such as for use at work or for religious purposes—the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester gave an example of the church picnic.
Amendments 90J, 90K and 90L would remove provisions in the Bill that would allow an order to be made if another person who committed the offence used or had with them a bladed article or offensive weapon in the commission of the offence and the
offender knew or ought to have known that this would be the case. I reiterate that, for an SVRO to be made in any circumstances, the individual must have been convicted of an offence where a bladed article or offensive weapon was used in the commission of the offence or was with either the offender or another individual who was also convicted of an offence arising from the same set of facts. This provision would capture a situation where more than one person was convicted of an offence arising from the same set of facts, but not all the individuals used a bladed article or offensive weapon in the commission of the offence, or had such an item with them when the offence was committed.
In these circumstances, an SVRO may still be necessary to protect the public or any particular members of the public, including the offender, from the risk of harm involving a bladed article or offensive weapon, or to prevent the offender from committing an offence involving a bladed article or offensive weapon—for example, a fight or robbery where the offender in possession of a knife and the offender not in possession of the knife are convicted of offences arising from the same facts. In any such case, the prosecution must consider whether to make an application for an SVRO and the court must consider whether to grant that order. I think the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made that point. Both the prosecution and the court therefore retain discretion to determine the appropriate course of action on a case-by-case basis. On my noble friend Lord Moylan’s point about “ought to have known”, I will undertake to ensure that we address that point in the statutory guidance; it is a good point. I also add that the phrase is used in other legislation, so it is not a new concept that is unknown to the courts, albeit that it is used in different circumstances. I will take that one back.
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Amendments 90N, 90P and 90Q seek to amend the evidential requirements for an SVRO to be made. We consider it appropriate for the court to consider a wide range of evidence about the offender that may not have been admissible in the proceedings in which the offender was convicted. For example, the offender may have a history of knife carrying that would be relevant to whether an SVRO would be necessary to protect the public from the risk of harm involving a bladed article or offensive weapon, or to prevent the offender committing an offence involving such an article or weapon.
Amendments 91A and 91B would change provisions for offences relating to an SVRO. We have provided a reasonable excuse defence in relation to failing to comply with any of the requirements of an order or any prohibitions, because it is possible that a person may have a good reason not to comply. However, it is difficult to see any circumstances where it would be reasonable for an offender not to tell an officer that they are subject to an SVRO if they are asked. I am therefore not persuaded of the case for Amendment 91A.
As for amendment 91B, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is quite right that the Police Act 1996 already provides for an offence of wilfully obstructing a constable in the execution of their duty. However, we think that it is clearer to set out in one place what specific behaviours amount to an offence in relation to an SVRO. This would provide clarity to the CPS, police and courts as
well as the offenders themselves. Moreover, the obstruction offence in this Bill carries a higher maximum penalty compared with that in the 1996 Act.
Amendment 91D seeks to limit the number of times an SVRO can be renewed to no more than once. We do not expect the police to apply for an order to be renewed indefinitely, and we will clarify this point in the statutory guidance. However, there may be circumstances where it would be necessary to renew the SVRO for further periods of between six months and two years, and it will of course be up to the court to decide if this is both necessary and proportionate.
Amendments 95A, 95B and 95C seek to specify matters to be addressed in the report on the operation of the pilot and to provide for the national rollout of SVROs to be conditional on a parliamentary vote. I hope that noble Lords will be reassured by the fact the SVROs will be introduced on the basis of a targeted pilot. They will be piloted in the Sussex, Thames Valley, Merseyside and West Midlands police forces. On the point from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, I say that the Bill expressly provides that the Secretary of State must lay a report before Parliament on the operation and outcome of the pilot. I know that noble Lords will be keen to know the detail of the matters to be addressed in the report on the outcome of the pilot and I reassure the House that we want the pilot of SVROs to be robust and its evaluation to be thorough, before any decision is made to roll them out across England and Wales.
I am pleased to announce that we have appointed Ecorys as the independent evaluator of the pilot. It will work with the pilot police forces to monitor and gather data on a number of different measures. These will include the impact of SVROs on serious violence, evidence on reoffending and the outcomes for offenders who are the subject of an SVRO. We will also use the pilot to build our understanding of how we ensure that vulnerable offenders are supported and directed to local intervention schemes, and of community responses to the orders. The pilot report will include basic data on the age, sex and ethnicity of people subject to SVROs. We make no assumption now about the success or otherwise of the pilot, but I do not see any reason to depart from the normal position that commencement regulations are not subject to parliamentary procedure.
Amendment 101 seeks to repeal the Section 60 stop and search provisions. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for some of the points that he made, and of course the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is right once again to highlight the vital importance of ensuring that officers are using their powers based on intelligence and legitimacy to ensure that the rights of the individual are upheld. The guidance is very clear that the Section 60 powers should only be used proportionately and in an intelligence-led way. I come back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that perhaps we could do more so that people go into areas knowing that they are Section 60 areas. I will take that point back.
To respond to the point from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, race or ethnicity should never be a reason to use stop and search powers against individuals, and safeguards exist to prevent that, notwithstanding
the awful experience of the right reverend Prelate—I am sorry, the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu. He will always be a right reverend Prelate to me. Those safeguards include statutory codes of practice, body-worn video, which we have in place now—that is a fantastic advancement, ensuring that officers are accountable during a search—and extensive data published by the Home Office on the use of stop and search in order to drive transparency. We will always give the police the tools they need to tackle serious violence and other crimes. I therefore do not think it is in the best interests of public safety to repeal those important powers.
I shall deal briefly with the government amendments in this group, on one of which the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, asked for clarification. New Chapter 1A of Part 11 of the Sentencing Code confers a number of powers and duties on the police in relation to SVROs. On introduction, new Section 342J provides that the Secretary of State may issue guidance to the police on the exercise of those and other functions under that chapter. Amendments 92, 93 and 94 widen the power to issue guidance so that guidance may be introduced on any matter relating to SVROs and provide a non-exhaustive list of the matters that may be covered by the guidance.
On Amendment 93, we expect the pilot forces to work closely with the CPS to identify cases that may benefit from an SVRO. That would be a similar process to how police forces identify now who may benefit from a criminal behaviour order or other relevant order. We want to ensure that SVROs are as effective as possible, benefit the right cohort of individuals and deter criminal offending. We will therefore be working closely with the pilot forces to agree effective processes in order to achieve that aim.
Amendment 91 is a technical amendment that clarifies that if an application for an SVRO is made, the court can adjourn proceedings after sentencing the offender in order to deal with the SVRO at a later date. For the avoidance of doubt, Amendment 96 makes a similar amendment to the provisions in the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 relating to knife crime prevention orders, or KCPOs, to make it explicit that if an application for a KCPO is made, the court may adjourn proceedings on the application after sentencing the offender.
The Government’s firm view is that the stop and search powers provided for through the new serious violence reduction orders and the existing Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act provide an important and effective tool to help the police tackle knife crime and keep our community safe. We think that the circumstances in which an SVRO may be made are appropriate to help protect the public on our streets. However, we are committed to the robust piloting of SVROs before any national rollout, and I hope I have been able to reassure the House of that.
Given that, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to withdraw his amendment. Should either he or the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, wish to test the opinion of the House, I have any hesitation in asking noble Lords to reject their amendments.