My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken to this group of amendments, which concern the data-sharing provisions in Chapter 1 of Part 2 of the Bill. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, for the time she has given me today and the discussion we have managed to have. I actually think we sneakily agree with each other—but not for the same reasons. Before responding to her amendments and those of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I will deal with the government amendments in this group, which, if I may take the mood of the House this evening, appear to have attracted broad support.
Information sharing between relevant agencies is essential to the effectiveness of the serious violence duty. It is very important to note that it can be shared only in compliance with data protection legislation. Nothing in this Bill either waters down that legislation or breaches it. The duty will permit authorities to share data, intelligence and knowledge to generate an evidence-based analysis of the problems in their local areas. In combining relevant datasets, specified authorities, local policing bodies and educational, prison and youth custody authorities within an area will be able to create a shared evidence base on which they can develop an effective and targeted strategic response with bespoke local solutions. We can see this in other areas where local bodies work together.
Each of the authorities specified in the legislation has a crucial role to play, and it is vital that authorities are able to share their data to determine what is causing serious violence in the local areas. For example, information sharing can contribute to local efforts by allowing authorities to identify patterns and trends, geographical hotspots and the most vulnerable victims, much in the way that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, outlined.
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That said, I have listened carefully to the issues raised in Committee, in particular on the question of whether it is appropriate to allow any obligation of confidence owed by the person making a disclosure, or any other restriction on disclosure, to be set aside in the case of sensitive and confidential personal information. In bringing forward amendments to address these concerns, we absolutely need to balance the protection of sensitive personal information with the need to ensure that the new duty can deliver a sea-change in how agencies work together to prevent and reduce serious violence. I have listened to the particular concerns in respect of patient information, which is why I have tabled these amendments.
The government amendments will provide that personal data cannot be disclosed by a health or social care authority—that is, a clinical commissioning group in England or a local health board in Wales—under Clauses 15 or 16 or regulations made under Clause 9. In addition, personal information which is patient information cannot be disclosed by any authority under the powers conferred by the duty. This will further limit the disclosure of information under these new powers, in particular confidential patient information held by any authority under the duty and personal data held by health or social care authorities. It is necessary to take both of these steps to exclude patient data explicitly because health and other authorities under the duty may hold this information. For example, local authorities might hold, and will hold, social care patient information. As a result, excluding patient information will mean that no authority can share that information under the provisions in this Bill and will instead need to rely on existing legal gateways should they need to do so.
In order to support the approach of the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care to streamlining the number of data collections currently undertaken and reducing the burden on front-line agencies and bodies responding to information requests from local policing bodies—that is, PCCs and equivalents—made under Clause 16, we are limiting these to information already held by an authority to whom the request is made.
Turning to the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, let me respond first to Amendments 11, 22 and 30, which relate to the provisions in Clauses 9, 15 and 16 which provide that, in determining whether a disclosure would contravene the data protection legislation, the power conferred by the relevant section of the Act is to be taken into account. The explanation of this is a bit complex and, before I set it out, it may assist the House if I reiterate the intention behind the clauses.
Clause 9 supports collaborative working, including by conferring a power on the Secretary of State to make regulations which authorise the disclosure of information between authorities subject to the serious violence duty and other prescribed persons in a prescribed area for the purposes of preventing and reducing serious violence. This might include organisations within the public, private or voluntary sectors, as well as regional or national bodies. This would be a permissive
gateway, so would permit, but not mandate, the sharing of information, and any disclosures must only be made in compliance with data protection legislation and cannot be made if certain prohibitions on disclosure set out in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 apply.
To give an example, a voluntary organisation prescribed under the regulations could share management information about the characteristics of its clients and beneficiaries which could support the development of a local needs assessment. I should stress, however, that such voluntary organisations would not be required to provide personal information on their clients by regulations made under Clause 9.
Clause 15 will create a new information-sharing gateway for specified authorities, local police bodies and education, prison and youth custody authorities to disclose information to each other for the purposes of their functions under the duty. Again, this clause will permit, but not mandate, authorities to disclose information to each other.