My Lords, I join those who have indicated that they fully support Part 3 of the Bill and would raise the retiring age for judges—or rather return it to where it was 27 or 28 years ago—to 75, which it was for nine years of my own time on the Bench. I should declare that I too am well beyond the age when such as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, might be having a discreet word with me.
I point out that this provision is fully supported by—as I understand it from Second Reading—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, who originally lowered the age to 70. He recognises that, all these years on, frankly, 75 year-olds now are a good deal younger than the 70 year-olds of those days past.
I suggest that the most important consideration is really that of judicial recruitment, which is still proving extremely difficult. The imperative surely is to get the most able people on to the Bench, whether they be men or women, whether they be gay, trans or straight, and whether they be young or old. The fact is that most cases are decided by a single judge. It is no good having the most wonderful judge trying the case in the next court if your judge is perhaps rather an indifferent one. So it is too with courts of three, five, seven or whatever.
Of course diversity is a highly desirable objective; obviously, public confidence in the justice system overall is enhanced if more people see themselves represented among the judiciary. In a three-judge, five-judge or seven-judge court, the wider the diversity of judges—including, of course, more women—the likelier the court is to bring to bear a wider experience and judgment on the questions. But I suggest that the argument in favour of 72 rather than 75 being supportive of diversity is, frankly, somewhat speculative; certainly, it is not sufficiently clear, I suggest, to justify sacrificing the goal of individual excellence on the altar of supposed greater diversity. Getting the best candidates to apply and appointing them on merit has to be the cardinal rule.
As to that, raising the MRA to 75 is, to my mind, assuredly going to assist in the recruitment of the ablest candidates, and I suggest that is so equally of women candidates as of male ones. First, it becomes more attractive because it is viable to take the job rather later in one’s career than at present. It gives candidates, male and female, longer to pursue whatever their initial career has been—it may have been in academe or in a range of areas on the borders of the law. It certainly gives practitioners a longer working life in which they can earn more than we all recognise they are going to be earning on the Bench.
Secondly, it gives candidates the option—it is not compulsory; they do not have to serve until 75—of being employed, useful and busy, as most of us would wish to be, for longer and later in their lives. Most of us do not actually want to be forced into compulsory retirement at 70—or, for that matter, at 72.
Thirdly, not only does a retirement age of 75 provide a yet better incentive than 72 for encouraging the best applicants to apply but it serves the public good. It retains supposedly skilled and experienced judges for that much longer. Despite what the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, suggests, it is surely not to be supposed that judges suffer a significant and noticeable failing in their abilities between the ages of 72 and 75 sufficient to draw the line at 72. It must therefore be in all our interests to keep these judges working, if they wish to, for that much longer.
Finally, I add as a footnote that it will save the taxpayer the need to pay these reluctantly retired judges a judicial pension for those three years for doing nothing.
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