My Lords, we come to Part 5. I shall also speak to Amendments 167, 168 and 169. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, my noble friend Lady Hayter of Kentish Town and the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for their support for some of these amendments. This group contains four of several amendments put forward by a coalition of groups, including British Cycling, Cycling UK, Living Streets, RoadPeace and the Road Danger Reduction Forum—I declare an interest as a former vice-president of Cycling UK—and they have one thing in common: the intention to protect the lives of vulnerable road users.
Before explaining the amendments, I should clarify that they are all examples of issues that I and these groups have been urging the Government to consider as part of the wider review of traffic offences and penalties that the Government promised in 2014, seven years ago, but have still not carried out. I will say more about that when we get to Amendments 159 and 165, but I shall make two comments now that I hope will provide some context. The first is that the call for a wider review is now backed by a growing list of road safety groups as well as motoring groups. The second is that without that review there is a real danger that the Government’s very limited proposals in the Bill to amend road traffic law could in fact be counterproductive.
Part 5 currently contains just three proposed changes. First, it increases the maximum sentence for causing death by dangerous driving from 14 years to a life sentence. Secondly, it does the same for causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs; these are traditionally seen as equivalent offences. Thirdly, it introduces a new offence of causing serious injury by careless driving, with a maximum sentence of two years. These amendments were consulted on as part of a rather limited review of road traffic offences and penalties in 2017—that is four years ago—and a number of parliamentarians in both Houses have been urging the Government to enact them ever since.
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The road safety groups I have mentioned fear that the proposals will do very little to tackle the routine injustices arising from a seriously defective legal framework
and might in some cases prove counterproductive. Many noble Lords and parliamentarians—indeed, everyone—have their views on road safety and enforcement of penalties. I am sure that we will have a good debate about it this evening.
I have every sympathy with other noble Lords who are seeking either to amend or remove Clause 66, which would create a new offence of causing serious injury by so-called careless driving, with a maximum prison sentence of two years. I agree with those noble Lords—we will come to this later—who fear that if someone’s driving is genuinely just careless, it would rarely be sensible to impose a custodial sentence on them unless, for instance, they are a repeat offender; in other words, unless there are other reasons to believe that they need to be locked up in the interest of public protection.
This example highlights two problems, which Amendments 152 and 168 seek to address. One is the lack of clarity in the definitions of careless and dangerous driving and the huge inconsistencies in how these are applied by prosecutors and the courts. The other is the legal framework’s overreliance on custodial sentencing for road traffic offences, when driving bans would, in many cases, be much more appropriate.
Amendment 152 proposes redefining the core road traffic offences of careless and dangerous driving, and their equivalents involving causing death or serious injury, as well as those involving driving while under the influence of drink and drugs. At present, careless driving is that which
“falls below what would be expected of a competent and careful driver”,
while dangerous driving falls “far below” that standard. It is hardly surprising that judges and jurors have widely different interpretations of what counts as “below” and “far below” that standard, and even what is meant by a competent and careful driver. I am sure that noble Lords have their own opinions about that as well.
I suspect that many jurors, faced with someone accused of causing death or very serious injury, but who is not an obviously dangerous person, will think, “There, but for the grace of God, go I.” I cannot be sure of this, as the law prevents anyone attempting to research jurors’ reasons for their verdicts, but I can well imagine that the prospect of sending someone to prison for dangerous driving often leads jurors to opt for a careless driving conviction, even when the driving has caused
“danger either of injury to any person or serious damage to property”
that would be obvious to a competent and careful driver.
These words are also part of the definition of dangerous driving, and have been there ever since “dangerous driving” replaced “reckless driving” in the Road Traffic Act 1991. They were intended to provide objective definitions of dangerous and careless driving, which relate to the standard of driving rather than the state of mind of the driver. Yet time and again, prosecutors and the courts seem to treat driving offences as being merely careless if they result from momentary lapses of attention, however obvious the resulting danger would have been to a competent and careful driver. This needs some reflection.
The proportion of prosecutions and convictions for careless and dangerous driving has varied enormously, both over time and even in different parts of the country. For instance, when the offence of causing death by careless driving came into effect in 2008, it led to a huge reduction in prosecutions and convictions for causing death by dangerous driving, even though there had been no change in the definitions of careless and dangerous driving.
I will give two examples of the consequences, which are not very pleasant. Groups such as RoadPeace and Cycling UK can point to many more. A 66 year-old pedestrian, Charles Roberts, was crossing a 30-miles-per-hour road at Hyde Park Corner. Not many cars stick to 30 miles per hour around Hyde Park Corner, but a businessman from a foreign royal family crashed into him in his new, highly imported performance car. Just before the crash, the driver had accelerated hard when the lights went green and reached 54 miles per hour in a few seconds. By the time he noticed Mr Roberts crossing the road, it was too late to brake. Earlier this month, he was allowed to plead guilty to causing death by merely careless driving and escaped jail, receiving just an eight-month suspended sentence and a short driving ban. How was that careless? It could not have been, in my view.
This type of leniency causes huge additional distress to those who are already victims of serious injury and bereavement, and can have appalling consequences. There is another example of a driver causing serious injury to pedestrians outside Westfield shopping centre in London. He received just nine points on his licence after pleading guilty to careless driving; soon afterwards, he posted a WhatsApp video of himself back at the wheel bragging:
“Nine points ain’t gonna stop me driving.”
Nine months later, he was driving at 68 miles an hour in a 30-miles-per-hour street in London. This goes on and there are many examples.
Instead of relying on the terms “below” or “far below” the standard of a notional competent and careful driver, Amendment 152 proposes new definitions. Driving would be dangerous if it would result in a driver being failed automatically if they drove in that way during a driving test. How many noble Lords can remember their driving tests? I do, but it is probable that not many people drive that way today. It would be merely careless if it amounted to a breach of the Highway Code that affected another road user but was not dangerous. Amendment 152 also proposes that causing death by driving while under the influence of drink or drugs should be an offence, whether or not the driving was careless or dangerous. This is already the case for the offences of causing death by driving while uninsured, unlicensed or disqualified. It also creates an offence of causing serious injury by driving while under the influence. It seems odd that we do not have that.
Amendment 167 has two underlying aims. First, it reduces the maximum sentence for any offence that is merely termed “careless”. I cannot see how a driver can cause death or serious injury without causing danger that would be obvious to a competent and careful driver. That situation should be looked at again as part of this amendment. There is a huge discrepancy between maximum penalties for causing
death offences and the equivalent offence of causing serious injury. That needs looking at again. Amendment 167 increases the maximum penalties for the existing offences of causing serious injury by dangerous driving from five years to 14 years, and for dangerous driving from two years to five years on indictment.
Secondly, it reduces the maximum penalty for existing offences of causing death by careless driving from five to two years, and for the proposed new offence of causing serious injury by careless driving from two years to six months. It goes on in a similar vein but increases the minimum number of penalty points from three to six for causing serious injury by dangerous driving, for dangerous driving and for causing death by careless driving while under the influence.
I shall not go on for much longer, but I need to finish by speaking to Amendment 168, which would increase the maximum sentence for driving while disqualified from six months to three years and introduce a three-year minimum driving ban for driving while disqualified, and a few other things as well. If Amendment 152 were passed, Amendments 167 and 168 have been worded so that they would apply to the resulting new offences of causing death by dangerous driving.
I hope the Minister will consider these proposals seriously, particularly as part of the long-awaited review of road traffic offences and penalties. Shifting the emphasis of road traffic sentencing from prison towards driving bans would pave the way for a legal framework that was more likely to function as intended, because judges and jurors, as well as victims, would be more likely to see it as just and reasonable. I beg to move.